Believe those who are seeking the truth. Doubt those who find it. Andre Gide

Monday, August 29, 2011

Fiat money in theory and in Somalia

A classic question in the theory of money is how an intrinsically useless object like fiat money can possess exchange value. The modern theory of money has essentially settled on the answer first provided by Ostroy (1973). In a nutshell, circumstances may dictate that some objects are relative good for record-keeping purposes, quite apart from any other use they may have in consumption, production, or storage; see also, Kocherlakota (1998).

The basic idea is as follows. We know that monetary exchange is not necessary, even in economies where mutually beneficial bilateral barter exchanges do not exist (what economists clumsily call a lack of double coincidence of wants). This is not simply a theoretical statement; we know of (and indeed most of us belong to) small economies (networks of families and friends) that operate according to "gift giving" principles. We are willing to make individual sacrifices without monetary compensation, hoping that they will be noticed, remembered, and most importantly, reciprocated at some point in the future.

Gift-giving societies seem to work well enough in small groups. This is probably because it is relatively easy to keep track of (remember) individual contributions and rewards in small groups. This "societal memory" seems to break down in large groups. Evidently, there are limitations to how much information can be recorded securely in the collective minds of people who make up society. When this is the case, some substitute form of memory could be useful. This is where money comes in.

Imagine that there is an object that is durable, divisible, portable, hard to counterfeit, and in limited supply. A lot of commodities fit this description, including gold, silver, and salt (think of what "salary" means). Historically, privately-issued paper in the form of asset-backed securities (like the banknotes of antebellum America) have also fit this description. In larger economies, objects like these begin to circulate as a means of payment. They become money.

Let me explain the basic idea. In the past, I may have made a contribution to society for "free." Well, not exactly for free; but because I knew that my contribution would be noticed and reciprocated. But as my community grows, it becomes increasingly difficult for people to keep track of each other's contributions. Well, if that's the case, then it might make sense to record my gift in some other manner. Accepting a monetary object is one way to do this. The money in my possession constitutes information about my past contributions to society. In the language of Narayana Kocherlakota (currently president of the Minneapolis Fed), money is memory.

Because commodities (including the physical capital that may back paper money) have uses in consumption and production, an implication of this is that society must bear a cost if such goods are tied up in facilitating exchanges. Their value in exchange generally means that they are priced above their "fundamental" value; that is, they possess a "liquidity premium." (This is related to what Caballero calls an asset shortage.)

Now, here is where fiat money potentially plays a role. According to the theory described above, the role of money is to encode a particular type of information (relating to individual trading histories). But information like a credit history is intrinsically useless (one cannot eat someone's credit history, for example). So rather than tying up intrinsically useful commodities to record intrinsically useless information, why not delegate the job to an intrinsically useless asset instead? Like the U.S. paper dollar, for example. (Electronic book-entry objects can work as well.)

According to this view, the market value of fiat money consists exclusively of a liquidity premium. The asset has no intrinsic value, and yet it has a positive price. Fiat money is a "bubble" asset -- but this is a bubble that plays a useful social role (it economizes on commodities that have uses other than record-keeping).

Prior to Ostroy's work, the answer to the question of how fiat money can possess exchange value was that its value is somehow supported by government decree (the original meaning of the word "fiat"). In particular, the government could introduce paper and insist that taxes be paid in government paper.

A recent paper by William Luther and Lawrence White (Positively Valued Fiat Money after the Sovereign Disappears: The Case of Somalia) casts some doubt on the strength of the mechanism highlighted by this older view.

Evidently, it is the case that the Somali shilling continues to circulate in that country long after the government that issued that paper collapsed in 1991. Here is a quote from the paper:
One of the most astounding phenomena of the domestic market is the continued circulation of the old Somali bank notes. The Somali currency has had no central bank to back it up since the bank was destroyed and looted in 1991. Nonetheless,the currency has maintained value, and has floated against other foreign currencies that are traded freely in local markets.
One reason the shilling continues to maintain its value is no doubt related to the fact that it's supply can be trusted to remain relatively constant over time. In fact, it's supply may be contracting over time as notes wear out (I have heard stories of where old notes are laminated to make them more durable, but am unable to confirm this.) On the other hand, there is some evidence of counterfeiting; e.g.,
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the Somali shilling held a positive value in the absence of sovereign support, however, is that individuals found it profitable to counterfeit these notes. Mohammed Farah Aideed ordered roughly 165 billion Somali shillings in 1996 from the British American Banknote Company based in Ottawa, Canada. Another 60 billion Somali shillings were imported by Mogadishu businessmen in 2001. In total, an estimated 481 billion in unofficial Somali shilling notes have been printed since 1991.
This counterfeiting phenomenon, however, does not appear to be excessive; and, indeed, it probably plays some positive role in keeping the supply of shillings relatively stable.

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

A Bad Rap for the Bond Raters?

Who's going to listen to a company whose name translates to "average and below average"? Jon Stewart.

In my previous post (Wonderland), I asked what sort of evidence justifies making public sport out of the major bond rating agencies and their role in the recent financial crisis. The type of sentiment I question was repeated the other day by Paul Krugman here; I quote:
And S&P, along with its sister rating agencies, played a major role in causing that crisis, by giving AAA ratings to mortgage-backed assets that have since turned into toxic waste.
The first thing we have to ask, of course, is what does a AAA rating actually mean? The only thing most people know is that AAA is the highest rating that agencies attach to bonds. But that's an ordinal statement; it does not necessarily imply "absolutely free of risk." Apart from death and taxes, there are no perfect guarantees in life.

The second thing we have to ask is what sort of risk are the ratings trying to measure. In a nutshell, they measure the risk that the terms of a contract are not fulfilled. They do not measure the liquidity risk associated possession of the asset (the major problem during the financial crisis). Note: by liquidity risk, I mean the ease with with one can dispose of an asset (or use it as collateral in a loan) over a short period of time, without the asset being ridiculously discounted in the market.

Now, there seems to be no question that in the depths of the crisis, a lot of MBS was treated as if it were toxic (it was heavily discounted). But as I said above, bond ratings do not (I do not think) measure liquidity risk. They measure things like, well, did the MBS actually deliver on the interest and principal that was expected?

It surprising how difficult it is to find out just how much of the outstanding MBS actually did end up as toxic waste. Paul Krugman seems to think it was a lot. So do a lot of other people. But where is the data?

I decided to ask Gary Gorton, who knows more than most about these matters. Here is how he replied to me:
Of the notional principal amount of AAA/Aaa subprime bonds issued in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 (which is almost $2 trillion), the realized principal loss as of Feb 2011 is 17 basis points – almost nothing, but much higher than AAA/Aaa other stuff.  Yes, I think the agencies are being treated unfairly by uninformed people.  There are many other facts that are similar that are also inconsistent with the popular narrative of the crisis. 
If this is true, it is indeed remarkable. The actual losses on these "toxic" products has been tiny. That is the type of risk that was being evaluated. (I might add that the losses on bank deposits during the great financial panics of the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1913) were reportedly in the order of 50 basis points.)

Evidently, Gary has a PhD student working on this. I look forward to reading her findings (and reporting them here). Of course, if anyone out there has evidence relating to this question, I'd greatly appreciate hearing from you.

Update: August 10, 2011

Thanks to Jesse for this link to Bond Girl, who makes a lot of the same points (and more).

I also received this note from Don Brown (thanks, Don--I will investigate):

I cannot verify current loss=17bp figure, but it doesn't sound surprising to me.  HOWEVER, that misses the point.  There are significant losses to be taken on 05-07 vintage subprime, due to massive delinquencies.  It will be on the order of 12-15% of the original amount of AAA subprime securities that FNMA/FHLMC bought.  I encourage you to do your own original research to verify this, but as a quick back-of-the-envelope:


I know that agency portfolios were buying wide-window AAAs off subprime, mostly 06-07 vintage.  They bought a lot ($250B if I remember correctly).  Note: portfolios were the hedge funds that FN/FH were running, outside of their traditional business as mortgage guarantor.


Average original subordination was 26-30%.  So actual losses on subprime would have to be around this level to start showing losses.  Currently, actual losses aren't at this level, but it's easy to see that they will increase (barring a miracle).

To date, most subprime deals have taken losses in the 15-20% range (percentage of original balance).  They have serious delinquencies 40-60% of current balance (serious dlq defined as 90+ days dlq, FCL, or REO).
15% current losses leave you with 11-15% subordination (on average).  Currently, subprime loss severity is around 80% (upon liquidation of the house).  For a 50% dlq deal => 50%x80% = 40% additional losses from here (distributed over time).  That would imply actual losses of 25-29% on the current face of the class.  Average factor for these classes are 0.55.  Very roughly, this translates to 12-16% loss on the original investment.


For examples, take a look at OOMLT 07-5 1A1(cusip 68403HAA0) and CWL 06-26 1A (cusip 12668HAA8).  One of the agencies owns these classes (almost all subprime deals have a Group1 / Group2 structure.  Group1 was conforming balance subprime loans that went to the agencies).  You can find the remittance reports at BoNY web site or CTS.  They are publically available.

Update: August 14, 2011

Rebel Economist (see comments below) directs me to this interesting link: Is Blaming AAA Investors Wallstreet Serving PR? 

Friday, April 29, 2011

Ron Paul on Bernanke's Press Conference

CNBC interview with Congressman Ron Paul yesterday (April 28, 2011); click here.

The interviewer begins by quoting a statement Paul made after Bernanke's news conference:
Bernanke continues to ignore his culpability for the inflation all Americans suffer due to the Fed's relentless monetary expansion.
Let's take a look at U.S. inflation since 2008. Here it is.


The average annualized rate of inflation over this time period is a dizzying 1.6%. Note the significant deflation experienced during the economic crisis. Ah, good times. The rate of return on your money was really high back then! I can recall clearly how savers were rejoicing...praising the Fed for the deflation.

PCE inflation measures the nominal price of a basket of consumer goods. You know, the stuff people buy to maintain their material living standards. This price index was actually falling in 2010. For better or worse, the Fed interprets "price stability" as 2% inflation. This explains QE2.

PCE inflation has recently jumped up to near 5%. This jump is attributable primarily to food and energy prices. Despite what some people like to believe, the Fed does not control food and energy prices (at least, not separately from other prices). Most economists attribute these relative price changes to geopolitical events and other temporary global shocks affecting the world supply and demand for food and energy.

It seems that what Congressman Paul means by inflation (judging by this interview) is "commodity price inflation." I think he must have in mind the price of commodities like gold. Why is the price of gold rising? Because people are dumping the USD and flocking to a "currency" they can trust.

Well, alright. There is probably something to this notion of currency substitution. If the Fed grows the money supply, its value must fall. The price of gold must rise. In the interview above, the Congressman claims that even grade schoolers can understand this (suggesting that Bernanke cannot).

Recent money supply and gold price dynamics seem to support Congressman Paul's hypothesis, which he states as some sort of obvious universal truth. But if this is so, then what explains the following data?


The graph above plots the price of gold and the (base) money supply over the 20 year period September 1980 to March 2001. As you can see, the Fed created a lot of money "out of thin air" over this 20 year period. The base money supply increased by over 300%.

Imagine that you are 50 years old in September 1980. Imagine that a trusted friend of yours--oh, let's say your doctor--convinces you to put all your savings into gold. The reason he offers is that the Fed is pursuing a policy of "relentless money expansion." He warns you that the money supply is set to grow by 300% over the next 20 years. So you listen to him.

You buy gold at $673 per ounce. And then you wait. You wait until you turn 70. And then you go to withdraw your savings. You discover that the gold price in March 2001 is $263 per ounce. That's a whopping rate of return of...wait for it... -60% over 20 years. That's a minus sixty percent.

All you kids understand now? Viva la gold standard! Class dismissed.

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Meet the FOMC

From CNBC News, a nice little snapshot of the people who currently make up the Federal Open Market Committee.
When people think of "the Fed," they might picture a monolithic building in Washington, D.C., or the serenely smiling, bearded face of its chairman, Ben Bernanke.
But the reality is, the group making decisions about raising or cutting rates or pumping money into the economy through so-called quantitative easing is made up of several highly educated, opinionated individuals with sometimes-conflicting ideologies, personalities and policy specialties.
Meet the Federal Open Market Committee.
Read more: Infighting at the Fed? 

Thursday, April 14, 2011

Time to replace the Core Inflation measure?

As almost everyone knows, inflation appears to be ticking upward. PCE inflation has recently approached an annual rate of around 5%. However, core inflation--the inflation rate that strips out the food and energy components of the consumption basket--remains relatively subdued (almost 2%, though it too has been rising as of late).

The Fed is widely understood to have an implicit inflation target of 2%. And the Fed has been known in the past for preferring the core PCE inflation measure over actual (headline) inflation numbers. With food and energy prices rising rapidly as of late, the reference to core inflation makes the Fed look out of touch with the prices consumers actually pay for their daily basket (food and energy make up about 25% of the average consumption basket).

What, if anything, justifies looking at price indices that strip out components of the index? A cynical view is that the Fed may prefer core to headline because it evidently makes the Fed's performance look better (in terms of keeping inflation low). This cynical view conveniently ignores the fact that headline inflation is frequently below core.

If you want to educate yourself about the issues surrounding the use of core, I recommend that you read this piece by Jim Bullard: Headline vs. Core Inflation: A Look at Some Issues. He starts as follows...
Monetary policymakers are responsible for maintaining overall price stability, which is usually interpreted as low and stable inflation. In order to decide on appropriate policy actions given their objective, policymakers need to know the current rate of inflation and where it is headed. What makes for a reliable predictor of future inflation has been debated throughout the years and continues to be the subject of economic analyses today.  
and concludes with...
In the end, the policymakers' goal is to use the inflation measure that helps them achieve low and stable headline inflation in the long run. 
In short, the Fed is not wedded to any particular policy-relevant measure of inflation. Many different measures should likely be used as input into any policy decisions.

In terms of the use of core inflation, my own personal view leans toward dispensing with any inflation measure that strips out components of the consumption basket. If the main object of doing so is to get at some measure of "trend" inflation, then why not just compute a trend directly? For example, here is what one would get by using a simple exponential trend:


My crude measure of trend is not that much different from core. I doubt that there would have been any substantive difference in the way policy was actually conducted if reference had been made to this (or some other) measure of trend over the core measure. And an explicit reference to trend rather than core may have deflected the silly charge made by some that the Fed does not care about food and energy prices.

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Ron Paul's Money Illusion (Sequel)

As I promised to do here, I am posting a sequel to my original column: Ron Paul's Money Illusion. I want to thank everyone who took the time to comment and criticize the views expressed there because it has led to me to sharpen my thinking on the matter. I doubt that what I have to say here will sway opinion one way or the other, but I at least hope that the nature of my criticism will be more clearly understood.
 
The purpose of my original post was to critique a statement I've heard Fed critics repeat ad nauseam. The statement can be found in Paul's book End the Fed (p. 25):
One only needs to reflect on the dramatic decline in the value of the dollar that has taken place since the Fed was established in 1913. The goods and services you could buy for $1.00 in 1913 now cost nearly $21.00. Another way to look at this is from the perspective of the purchasing power of the dollar itself. It has fallen to less than $0.05 of its 1913 value. We might say that the government and its banking cartel have together stolen $0.95 of every dollar as they have pursued a relentlessly inflationary policy.
I think that the first part of this statement is true, so I do not wish to dispute this fact. On the other hand, I think that one might reasonably ask whether this fact alone should be a source of great consternation (especially in the presence of other, more pressing, policy concerns). As for the final sentence in the quote above, well, I think it is just plain false. Now let me explain why I think all this.
Let me begin with the picture most popular with end-the-fed types--a graph depicting the declining purchasing power of the USD. I use postwar data without loss of generality, since most of US inflation has happened since then.


This picture plots the inverse of the price-level (as measured by the consumer price index). I have normalized the price-level to $1.00 in 1948. It falls to roughly $0.11 in 2010. This corresponds to roughly a nine-fold increase in the price-level or about a 4.6% annual rate of inflation. (Note that the rate of inflation has slowed considerably since 1980).

The picture above is used by some end-the-fed types to great effect in generating anger and fear among some members of the population. Anger via the claim that the Fed has stolen 90% of (the purchasing power) of your money; and fear through the prospect of this purchasing power approaching zero in the not-too-distant future.

Graphs like the one above have their uses. But one should not get too carried away with a single picture. Let me draw you another picture. This one plots the inverse of the U.S. nominal wage rate (total nominal wage income divided by aggregate hours worked).


This graph plots the purchasing power of the USD, where purchasing power is now measured in terms of labor, rather than goods. This graph shows that you need a lot more money today than you did in 1948 to purchase 1 hour of labor. Another way of saying this is that the average nominal wage rate in the U.S. has increased by a factor of 25 since 1948. Is this a cause for alarm?

No. In fact, there is very little one can conclude from these pictures, which are plots of nominal variables. We need more information than this to make any substantive statements about the impact of nominal wage and price dynamics. In the absence of money illusion, people care about real variables--not nominal variables. To put things another way, people eat bread, not money. The nominal price of bread, in of itself, is an uninformative measure. What would be informative is its nominal price in relation to one's nominal income (or wealth). The first graph above has nothing to say about how nominal incomes have evolved.

Let me now combine the two graphs above into one picture, with both series inverted, and with both the price-level and nominal wage rate normalized to $1.00 in 1948 (the actual nominal wage rate was $1.43).


According to this (publicly available) data, the price-level (CPI) has increased by about a factor of 10 since 1948. But the average nominal wage rate has increased by a factor of 25. (There is, of course, considerable disparity in wage rates across members of the population. But I am aware of no study that attributes significant wage or income heterogeneity to monetary policy. Of course, if readers know of any such studies, I would be grateful to have them sent to me.)

The figure above implies that the real wage (the nominal wage divided by the price-level) has increased by a factor of 2.5 since 1948. This is undoubtedly a good thing because it implies that labor (the factor we are all endowed with) can produce/purchase more goods and services. More output means an increase in our material living standards (Though again, I emphasize that this additional output is not shared equally. But surely a laissez-faire world advocated by some is not one that would generate income equality either.)

Now, an interesting question to ask is how the picture above might have been altered if the price-level had instead remained more or less constant. Judging by the emails I receive, many people evidently believe that the nominal wage path depicted above would have largely remained the same (that is, they apparently seen no connection between nominal wages and the price-level).

If this was indeed true, then the average real wage in America would have increased by a factor of 25, instead of 2.5 under a regime of price-level stability. And if you believe this, or something close to it, then the conclusion would indeed be startling: the inflation generated by the Fed has apparently served only to reduce the purchasing power of labor (diverting resources to powerful capitalists). This claim--or some variation of it--is implicit in the quoted passage above.

I suggested, in my original post, that there is reason to believe that under an hypothetical regime of price-level stability, the nominal wage rate in the graph above would instead have ended up increasing only by a factor of 2.5 (more or less)--the factor by which real wages actually rose. This is what I meant by my claim of long-run neutrality of the price-level increase; and it is also what I meant by Ron Paul's Money Illusion (which is subtly different than claiming the superneutrality of money expansion; more on this later).

Some evidence in favor of my "long-run neutrality view" is to be found in the time-path of labor's share of income (GDP):


I see no evidence in the data here that  our higher price level today has whittled the share of income accruing to labor. Moreover, I see no evidence suggesting that episodes of high or low inflation are related in any systematic way to the resources accruing to labor. (In fact, I see some evidence of a rising labor share during the high inflation decade of the 1970s.) But perhaps other data tells a different story. If so, I'd like to see the data (i.e., instead of a short email claiming that I am wrong).

And what about the effect of inflation on the return to saving? I received many emails like this one:
Please, Mr. Andolfatto explain to me how this works out for someone who has been a careful saver of his money and now sees the purchasing power of that money destroyed? Please explain to me how this works out for a retired person on a fixed income who sees the declining purchasing power of that income?
These are good questions. The way they are asked suggests that I am in favor of inflation. I am not. It's just that I do not want to overstate the economic significance of inflation. Especially a low and stable inflation rate regime, like the one we have been living in for the past 30 years. And especially in light of what I view as potentially much more significant economic problems.

The concern expressed above would certainly be valid if the following was true: [1] if many people are forced to save in the form of zero-interest cash; and [2] if inflation is high and volatile. There are many episodes in history where savers have been hurt by an unexpected increase in inflation. I do not wish to defend the actions of any agency responsible for episodes of high and volatile inflation. And certainly, there are many economists within the Fed that are critical of past (and even current) Fed policies.

But this is not the regime we currently live in. As I said, inflation has been (relatively) low and stable for over 30 years now. And the Fed is committed to keeping inflation to keeping inflation "low and stable" (implicit inflation target is 2%).  The argument that a "careful saver" over the last 30 years "just now" sees the purchasing power of that money destroyed seems implausible to me. Most people do not hold the bulk of their savings in the form of cash. (And if people were holding their savings in the form of Treasury bonds, they would have experienced significant capital gains over the last couple of years with the decline in nominal interest rates.) I think its fair to say that most people, or the people who manage their money, expect inflation. Market-based measures of inflation expectations show that inflation expectations are currently around 2%; see here.

I might add, as an aside, that in the emails I received promoting this line of argument, the writer typically professed concern for the "poor and unsophisticated saver." It was interesting to note that in each and every case, the writer him/herself was always very eager to point out their own sophisticated saving behavior--having, for example, invested in gold and silver (as I show here, you would have done better investing in stocks).
Well, and what about those on fixed incomes? The writer above mentions retired persons on fixed incomes. I presume he means nominally fixed pension benefits? (These benefits are generally indexed to inflation, though perhaps imperfectly.)

I think that a lot of the concern here is with respect to the fact that the prices of some goods (like food and energy) have recently risen very sharply and that, for most people, there is no correspondingly sharp increase in nominal incomes. People are right to be concerned. Here is an interesting picture from the WSJ:
 
The data show that some prices are rising rapidly. Some prices are not moving much at all. And some prices are even falling. In short, there are economic forces at work that are changing the system of relative prices. These relative price changes reflect fundamental changes in the structure of supplies and demand in the world economy. These changes would occur whether the Fed was in existence or not. Indeed, we expect relative price changes to be a normal part of a laissez-faire economy.

Finally, someone posed the following question to me:

Please explain to me how this (inflation) works out for the rest of the country when Wall Street bankers are the first to get their hands on newly printed Fed money, so that they can bid up all kinds of prices, including rents on apartments, which makes it difficult for anyone but a Wall Streeter to afford to live in Manhattan?
There is no persuading the people who organize their worldview around a web of conspiracy theories, but let me try anyway. First, this makes it sound like the Fed simply hands out cash to people. It does not. The Fed is not permitted to hand out cash in exchange for nothing in return. When the Fed creates new money, it uses the new money to purchase assets from another party. The Fed engages in asset swaps; there are no "helicopter drops." (It is the government that injects money into the economy via purchases of goods and services.)

Indeed, the business of banking is mainly a business of creating liquidity through asset swaps (e.g., when you take out a mortgage, a private bank creates and lends you book-entry money in exchange for your house as collateral). Even in a private banking system, someone must be the first to get their hands on newly created money. Even under a gold standard, someone will be the first to get their hands on newly discovered gold. And as for the price of real estate in Manhattan...I'm not sure what to say. It is one reason why I live in St. Louis!
I want to return to the last sentence in the End the Fed quote above:
We might say that the government and its banking cartel have together stolen $0.95 of every dollar as they have pursued a relentlessly inflationary policy.
This claim is simply false. Let me explain why.

Monetary economists make a clear distinction between base money, broad money, and wealth. The layperson typically makes no distinction between "money" and "wealth." Wealth is denominated in dollars. But this does not mean that all wealth is in the form of dollars (most of it is in the form of physical capital). Most people will interpret "dollars" in the quoted passage above to mean "wealth." Thus, the statement de facto claims that the Fed bears responsibility for stealing 95% of our wealth. This is a preposterous claim.

It is true, however, that something has lost 95% of its value since 1913. But just what is this something?

Answer: It is the outstanding stock of base money in the year 1913. (One dollar created yesterday, for example, has not lost 95% of its value as of today.) This 1913 money stock constitutes a tiny fraction of our total wealth. Moreover, since it has been in circulation for almost 100 years (much of it held by banks themselves in the form of reserves), the loss in its purchasing power has been spread over countless individuals, agencies, and generations.

Having said this, it remains true that inflation constitutes a tax. Seigniorage revenue refers to the purchasing power the government creates through the act of creating new money. Seigniorage revenue is also sometimes called an inflation tax. As far as taxation goes, seigniorage in the U.S. is small potatoes; see here. It constitutes a tiny fraction of government revenue (the bulk of which comes in the form of direct taxation).

Some people wonder how this is the case today, given the massive expansion in the Fed's balance sheet. The short answer is that seigniorage comes from permanent increases in the supply of new money (where the new money is ultimately used to purchase goods, rather than assets). The Fed, in its commitment to keep inflation "low," has implicitly promised to unwind its balance sheet at some point in the future should circumstances dictate. (Unwind in the sense of selling off its accumulated holdings of income-generating assets in exchange for base money).

If the Fed maintains its credibility (and this will be the hard part going forward), then there is little reason to expect even a huge temporary increase in the supply of base money to have an explosive impact on inflation (Japan's own quantitative easing experience provides an excellent example of this). This is, of course, something that the Fed monitors very closely.

To conclude, I think that the "currency debasement hurting the poor unsophisticated saver and man-on-street wage earner" argument is largely overstated. The assertion that "the Fed has stolen 95 cents of every dollar" I view as absurd. There are legitimate criticisms one could level at the monetary institutions of this country, but these are not some of them.

There are fundamental market forces at work in today's world that are causing the return to labor, saving, and entitlements to vary over time. I think that there is good reason to believe that these fundamental or "real" factors are much more consequential than the monetary or "nominal" factors emphasized by some people. But this topic is best left for a future column.

Romanian language version here.
Polish language version here.

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Out of thin air?

Have you ever said something like "Let me buy you a beer next week"?
I'm sure you have. We all issue promises of this sort. And we frequently use such promises as a form of currency. For example, we might say something like "Hey, why don't you give me a beer now...and let me buy you a beer next week?"

I have just described a simple credit exchange. Societies rely heavily on promising-making and promise-keeping. It is the foundation of all financial markets.

I'd like to point out something about the promises you make. They are made "out of thin air." The promises that other people make are also made "out of thin air" (including politicians like you-know-who). Oh, some may write the promises down in the form of IOUs or other legal documents. But really, as Chamberlain discovered on his return from Germany, we know the intrinsic value of paper (promises).

The fact that promises are made "out of thin air" does not mean they are worthless. The value of a promise is determined by the perceived (and ultimately, actual) credibility of the promise-maker to make good on his/her promises. The relevant concern of those who rely on financial agencies is the credibility of they claims they make. The fact that financial agencies issue promises "out of thin air" is a red herring. And if the charge is made with exclamation, well...forgive me for suspecting that the motive is to arouse impassioned anger, rather than rational discourse.

The Fed creates fiat money (yes, out of thin air). But fiat money in itself does not constitute a promise against anything in particular (on the other hand, there are those who argue that it is a promise to discharge a tax obligation). In a gold standard regime, a Fed note would constitute a claim against gold. But we do not presently live in a gold standard regime. So what sort of promise underlies fiat money?

Apart from any intrinsic value determined by its ability to discharge a tax obligation, the value of fiat money ultimately hinges on its scarcity. More precisely, it depends on how its supply is managed over time. Or even more accurately: it depends on the expectation of how its supply is to evolve over the indefinite future. This expectation hinges critically on the credibility of the money supply manager.

In our current regime, the Fed is (implicitly) promising to keep inflation centered around 2% per year. The actual inflation rate dipped considerably below this number during the past recession and it is now considerably higher (owing largely to the boom in commodity prices). But if one draws a trend line through these ups and downs, we're basically sitting close to 2%.

Now, we can argue at length about whether 2% is the right number. The Fed calls 2% "price stability," but clearly it is not price stability in a literal sense. The real rate of return on non-interest-bearing money is -2%. This is currency debasement; albeit, at a rather slow rate relative to the 1970s or Zimbabwe's recent experience. Price-level stability requires an inflation rate of 0%. The Friedman rule suggests that a moderate deflation is desirable.

Anyway, back to my main point. Which is that condemnations of the Fed based on charges of creating money "out of thin air" are off the mark. The discussion should instead center on whether the Fed, as currently construed, is an institution that can be trusted to make good on its promises. This is the same question one would ask of any agency, public or private.

And if the Fed is abolished, and then what? What replaces it? A gold standard? Here is what one person wrote to me on the subject:
And yes, a gold standard would be fine by me.  Is there an argument against the gold standard that I don't know about? Also, as an example of hyperinflation, how about when Roosevelt rounded up everybody's gold in 1933, and then debased our currency by 50% ?
I think this highlights a point that I have been trying to make for some time now. The "gold standard" is nothing more than a promise made "out of thin air" by the government. Look at how easily Roosevelt abrogated that promise in 1933. What makes people believe that the same thing cannot happen again? (Related arguments apply to so-called "free banking" regimes.)

Sure, we might say that such acts are or should be prohibited under the Constitution. But the Constitution is also a document that has been fabricated "out of thin air." I have been told by some that the existence of the Fed is itself a violation of the Constitution. So you see how easy it is to violate that venerable document.
   
Imagine that it is somehow possible to make the gold standard credible and absolute. If this is possible, then it must also be possible to make a fiat money standard credible and absolute. Just replace the gold with fiat tokens. As a bonus we would have an efficiency gain (commodity monies are better utilized as commodities, rather than exchange media).

So, please, enough of this "out of thin air!" stuff. It's tiresome for those who know better, and distracting for those who do not. Let's divert attention to more substantive issues.

For example, the Fed has a legislated monopoly over the supply of small-denomination paper. Is this a good idea? What if we keep the Fed as is and allow free-entry into the business of money creation? If an unfettered private money system works well enough, it might drive Fed notes out of circulation. On the other hand, perhaps the demand for Fed paper will remain. Government paper (in the form of US Treasuries) drove out private money (AAA tranches of MBS) in the repo market in the past financial crisis. Now, isn't that interesting?