tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-87028402026047393022024-03-17T00:27:34.355-07:00MacroManiaDavid Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.comBlogger293125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-35652499649180732002024-02-09T07:05:00.000-08:002024-02-09T07:06:19.959-08:00Does high-interest policy constitute fiscal stimulus?I haven't had much time to blog lately, but I thought I'd weigh in on an interesting discussion I see brewing in Twitterland. The macroeconomic backdrop of the story is how the U.S. economy grew so rapidly in 2023 in the face of a dramatic increase in the Fed's policy rate. Over the period March 19, 2022 - July 27, 2023, the IORB rose from 0.40% to 5.40% and has remained there ever since. In 2023, RGDP grew at 2.5%. PCE inflation in 2023 came in at 3.7% (a decline from the previous year's 6.5%). The unemployment rate remains low (around 3.5%). What's going on here? What happened to the recession so many were predicting?
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One idea floating around out there is that high interest rate policy constitutes of a form of fiscal stimulus. Here's Stephanie Kelton expressing the idea:<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3gLbBN2XbBa2ZmrFt1SPYWtIKffp2azVetB9t9zedjfMyyEgEU-cwCldfpXzFGt8sCOnpD6EHS1oQGUZFnKxeaw51oeph0DGkZMnr2W3S7Pj8impCOp3TtqqlxZPZgi2LNf1OKPfW8mm3srfhNrVT6YIG_ukLxRcjDB-uAjBYsNmgNEl964UMWMNGxKhP/s596/Kelton.png" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; "><img alt="" border="0" width="320" data-original-height="203" data-original-width="596" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3gLbBN2XbBa2ZmrFt1SPYWtIKffp2azVetB9t9zedjfMyyEgEU-cwCldfpXzFGt8sCOnpD6EHS1oQGUZFnKxeaw51oeph0DGkZMnr2W3S7Pj8impCOp3TtqqlxZPZgi2LNf1OKPfW8mm3srfhNrVT6YIG_ukLxRcjDB-uAjBYsNmgNEl964UMWMNGxKhP/s320/Kelton.png"/></a></div>
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And here's my friend Sam Levey suggesting the same thing:
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGUdGms1s7txrI9aYycINaA7lwCxseqk6_ZqeZZscB5qt4LMpK58RKF1oN8M_FyPn5OmpBChK_RLbYm-VqVT-mpB4E8ee5DyqtqkCc_fiqQ60ypz_dV8fu3g8bHj0gW0je9C08g8Ppjf2LEnM8411IDKSfC5diVal3AaUNaqERy_xAaH4d6Mx8jDyhKWkR/s663/Levey.png" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; "><img alt="" border="0" height="320" data-original-height="663" data-original-width="589" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGUdGms1s7txrI9aYycINaA7lwCxseqk6_ZqeZZscB5qt4LMpK58RKF1oN8M_FyPn5OmpBChK_RLbYm-VqVT-mpB4E8ee5DyqtqkCc_fiqQ60ypz_dV8fu3g8bHj0gW0je9C08g8Ppjf2LEnM8411IDKSfC5diVal3AaUNaqERy_xAaH4d6Mx8jDyhKWkR/s320/Levey.png"/></a></div>
For ears attuned to conventional wisdom, this idea sounds bizarre and counterintuitive. But I think there's a way to reconcile these different views.
The first step toward reconciliation is to understand the difference between <i>increasing the interest rate</i> and <i>keeping it elevated</i>. That is, we need to make a distinction between <i>change</i> and <i>level</i>.
<p>I think *changes* in the policy rate seem to work the way conventional wisdom dictates (i.e., lowering aggregate demand through a variety of channels). One important channel works through the wealth effect (e.g.):
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTm2VOWoG6HthW-36ZRxTQXQT8P1K8wPVDs7hKNib_19XF4FkvESdQk79k5YP-ClGIq_q-m7-deqfQmWIXK_gvlN1LVXoYvkHwQWAoSlPJKBdclvfQp0p-ehsxF_rTxrMesv0oTYwliiAKK9obWW9D_suK0hN5WJzQtfFrqwCxs1fHTn5EW98ShChi2E7e/s1318/stock%20market%20and%20policy%20rate.png" style="display: block; padding: 1em 0; text-align: center; "><img alt="" border="0" width="320" data-original-height="450" data-original-width="1318" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTm2VOWoG6HthW-36ZRxTQXQT8P1K8wPVDs7hKNib_19XF4FkvESdQk79k5YP-ClGIq_q-m7-deqfQmWIXK_gvlN1LVXoYvkHwQWAoSlPJKBdclvfQp0p-ehsxF_rTxrMesv0oTYwliiAKK9obWW9D_suK0hN5WJzQtfFrqwCxs1fHTn5EW98ShChi2E7e/s320/stock%20market%20and%20policy%20rate.png"/></a></div>
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Once the policy rate remains stable and the transition dynamics work their way through ("long and variable lags"), the higher policy no longer appears contractionary. In fact, high interest rate policy may very well be expansionary, as Stephanie and Sam suggest. How might this work?
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In the class of economic models I work with (e.g., see <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2015/09/08/a-model-of-u-s-monetary-policy-before-and-after-the-great-recession">here</a>), monetary (interest rate) policy and fiscal (tax & spend) policy are inextricably linked through a consolidated government budget constraint. A *change* in the policy rate has all the textbook effects of monetary policy--but only in the "short-run." So, for example, while an *increase* in the interest rate puts downward pressure on the price-level, the disinflationary force is transitory (the P-level remains permanently lower if the policy rate remains permanently higher, but the rate of change of the P-level in the long-run remains unchanged).
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<p>
At least, this is what is predicted to happen if the fiscal policy framework is "Ricardian." A Ricardian fiscal policy is one in which the path of the primary deficit/surplus adjusts over time to anchor a given debt-to-GDP ratio. A Ricardian fiscal regime is often just assumed in economic models. This assumption seems hard to reconcile with the fact that Congress does not appear to implement offsets to Fed policy. At least, it does not appear to do so immediately. It is, however, possible that the offsets (higher taxes, lower spending) are postponed to the future (perhaps after our representatives become alarmed by posts like Marc Goldwein above).
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<p>
But there is another possibility. It could be that the fiscal regime is "Non-Ricardian." A Non-Ricardian fiscal policy does not anchor fiscal policy in the way a Ricardian regime does--it does not offset higher interest expense (and higher interest income for bond holders) with higher future taxes and/or lower future spending. To finance the added interest expense, it just lets the Treasury issue nominal Treasury securities at a faster pace. If the Fed keeps its policy rate steady (at its higher level), then this additional flow of private sector wealth is likely to manifest itself as stimulus (higher inflation, if the economy is at full employment). Is this where we're at today?
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Of course, the Fed is likely to react to the situation described above by *increasing* its policy rate again. But if fiscal policy is Non-Ricardian, the disinflationary pressure induced by the rate change will eventually dissipate. Indeed, it will result in an even higher rate of inflation in the long-run. This is related to the "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" argument put forth by Sargent and Wallace over 40 years ago; see here: <a href="https://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2021/03/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant.html">Is it Time for Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic?</a> And in case you believe this scenario is only hypothetical, consider this paper on the Brazilian hyperinflation: <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/TIGHT-MONEY-PARADOX-ON-THE-LOOSE-%3A-A-FISCALIST-Loyo/910ba2359c85f8724ba0d54423539b9718220db9">Tight Money Paradox on the Loose: A Fiscalist Hyperinflation</a>. (Note: this is not to suggest that the U.S. is Brazil.)
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As always, please feel free to share your thoughts below.
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DA
David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-35759982027853800682023-07-17T12:58:00.001-07:002023-07-17T12:58:17.867-07:00Constrained efficient inflation<p>I haven't had time to do much blogging lately. But I have been studying the recent burst of inflation and thinking of how to interpret what we're experiencing. As is my way, I decided to write down a little model (a dynamic general equilibrium model) to help organize my thinking on this question. Below, I summarize the interpretation stemming from the model (available on request). Because it's a model, it does not capture everything that one might think isimportant. But I think it certainly captures some of the main forces operating on the U.S. economy over the 2020-2022 time period. And if so, then it offers a different take on how to interpret the recent episode of (relatively) high and (hopefully) transitory inflation. I look forward to any feedback. DA</p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Introduction</span> </p><p>In February 2020, the month before the full effects of the pandemic were felt in the United States, PCE and CPI measures of inflation were running between 1.7% and 2.4%, consistent with the Federal Reserve's official 2% target inflation rate. From March 2020 to February 2021, these measures of inflation declined significantly, with most measures falling below 1% in May 2020, before recovering to somewhere near 1.5% by February 2021. In March 2021, measures of inflation began to rise sharply and significantly. By February 2020, the month prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PCE and CPI inflation rates rose to between 5.4% to 8.0%, with core PCE peaking in that month. Other measures of inflation peaked in the summer of 2022. Inflation has been declining slowly and steadily since then. Most outlooks have inflation declining to between 2% and 3% by the end of 2024.</p><p> If inflation continues along its projected path to settle in at or even somewhat above 2%, then the recent inflation dynamic will be hump-shaped, beginning in 2021, peaking in 2022, and falling significantly in 2023; see Figure 1.</p><p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiwuKr4BMMhILMyvcBIo_2dFsA-mAxZ-G1O4ZqrWOvArZyNLnk_OcTdsZ1Qqi8NY9GjuDh8ZwrHsq12AcUnMQp1HbvPOszzN-_ILtS5-aBDfNEtlvnKrHdqh5tU5R5ojmD6i6YGCPvhSD4JdwfeYfa0eZ5vOljgjaSUA_hJsAREGcEY6A8NdgmrhFbeWkmQ" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="270" data-original-width="674" height="160" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiwuKr4BMMhILMyvcBIo_2dFsA-mAxZ-G1O4ZqrWOvArZyNLnk_OcTdsZ1Qqi8NY9GjuDh8ZwrHsq12AcUnMQp1HbvPOszzN-_ILtS5-aBDfNEtlvnKrHdqh5tU5R5ojmD6i6YGCPvhSD4JdwfeYfa0eZ5vOljgjaSUA_hJsAREGcEY6A8NdgmrhFbeWkmQ=w400-h160" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Figure 1</td></tr></tbody></table></p><p> How should we interpret the hump-shaped inflation dynamic in Figure 1? The answer to this question is critically important because an evaluation of monetary and fiscal policy over this episode requires a proper interpretation of the phenomenon being studied. More than one interpretation is possible, of course. But any useful interpretation will have to rely on theory at some level. The goal of this paper is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain the qualitative properties of data in an empirically plausible manner and be used to assess the monetary and fiscal policies employed since March 2020.</p><p><span style="font-size: large;">An overview of the argument </span></p><p> Views on the causes and nature of the "COVID-19 inflation" vary considerably. There is no doubt an element of truth to many of these views and my interpretation below relies on more than one causal factor. </p><p> Beginning in March 2020, there were the supply disruptions induced by the pandemic. Some sectors of the economy, like leisure and hospitality, were virtually shut down in an attempt to "flatten the curve." Individuals stopped patronizing establishments delivering in-person services. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio fell from 80% to 70% from February to April in 2020 and did not recover its initial level for another two years. Severe disruptions in the global supply chain led to shortages of goods at final destinations. At the time these COVID-19 related shocks had more or less dissipated, additional disruptions emerged with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 along with growing Sino-American tensions. </p><p> These "supply side" shocks were real and significant. It is not entirely clear, however, how they might be used to understand the inflation dynamic in Figure 1. The intensity of the "supply side" shock likely peaked in 2020, a year in which inflation declined. And the Russia-Ukraine war shock appeared in 2022, after the sharp rise in inflation in 2021. Of course, these observations do not mean that supply disruptions had no effect on the inflation dynamic. But they do suggest that other forces were likely at work. </p><p> Other important forces were surely at work on the "demand side" of the economy. Exactly what these forces were and how they should be modeled remains an open question. Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub, and Werning (2022) demonstrate how a negative sectoral supply shock in an incomplete markets setting can endogenously result in "deficient demand" (a decline in actual output in excess of the decline in potential output). Although their paper does not focus on inflation dynamics, the mechanism they identify is presumably disinflationary; at least, on impact. </p><p> Another way in which demand can be affected is through expectations. Developed economies devote significant amounts of time and resources to activities broadly classified as investments, including business fixed investment, residential investment, human capital accumulation, and job recruiting. The contemporaneous demand for goods and services devoted to investment (broadly-defined) surely depends on its expected rate of return. Indeed, there is considerable evidence suggesting that this is the case; see Liao and Chen (2023) and the references cited within. Whether these expectations are driven by news over economic fundamentals (e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2006) or by purely psychological factors (e.g., Keynesian "animal spirits") matters little for positive analysis. Depressed expectations over the return to investment will depress investment demand whether expectations are formed rationally or not. The manner in which expectations are formed does, however, have implications for monetary and fiscal policy. </p><p> The analysis below assumes a large "negative sentiment shock" in 2020, consistent with the fear and uncertainty associated with the unfolding pandemic and the dramatic measures taken to shut down parts of the economy. When the outlook on investment returns darkens, investors typically seek safe havens. During the financial crisis of 2008-09, U.S. Treasury securities served as a "flight to safety" asset. The result was plummting bond yields. To the extent that interest rates do not (or cannot) move lower, the demand for safety expresses itself as a decline in capital spending and the price-level. That is, a negative sentiment shock is disinflationary; at least, on impact. Below, I assume that this negative sentiment shock largely reversed itself in 2021, consistent with the appearance and widespread use of COVID-19 vaccines in that year. </p><p> Now, imagine for the moment, that monetary and fiscal policy remained roughly unchanged from 2019 to today. That is, imagine that the Fed did not lower its policy rate in March 2020 and that the large discretionary fiscal programs (primarily the CARES Act of 2020 and the American Rescue Plan of 2021) had not been implemented.</p><p> Assume that the negative sentiment shock was significantly more powerful than the negative supply shock in 2020, in line with Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub, and Werning (2022). Assume that these two shocks are largely reversed in 2021. Then the supply-demand framework sketched above suggests a large disinflationary impulse and recession in 2020, followed by an equally large inflationary impulse and economic recovery in 2021. Depending on the nature of adjustment costs, employment and inflation should have more or less returned to their pre-pandemic levels by 2022 or shortly thereafter. To a first approximation, this is essentially what happened. However, actual inflation turned out to be much higher and more persistent than can be rationalized by these shocks alone. What is missing?</p><p> What is missing, of course, are the monetary and fiscal policy responses implemented at the start of the crisis. In March 2020, the Fed lowered its policy rate from 150bp to essentially zero where it remained until March 2022. The anticipated monetary tightening began in late 2021 (see the 2-year rate in Figure 2). From March to December of 2022, the federal funds rate rose by over four hundred basis points.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh4vTDjSQcxhxiqa7r-JZxiqF45bdMS_C5-ht1eVbjDCRZzMwm8cf6HHI3PLlVFTPpuCTj5bgLA3vQDmlMhKPoNfgYUjysty4E4DU0UwpUycg-Aiqx17CVV4R8Zj6DBVi6hLh_FdchLyy8jfsk3BlvC5IXwtxIY7GAr4T65xdSTFLI3rZbY67CoddAF6LNm" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="270" data-original-width="674" height="160" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh4vTDjSQcxhxiqa7r-JZxiqF45bdMS_C5-ht1eVbjDCRZzMwm8cf6HHI3PLlVFTPpuCTj5bgLA3vQDmlMhKPoNfgYUjysty4E4DU0UwpUycg-Aiqx17CVV4R8Zj6DBVi6hLh_FdchLyy8jfsk3BlvC5IXwtxIY7GAr4T65xdSTFLI3rZbY67CoddAF6LNm=w400-h160" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Figure 2</td></tr></tbody></table><p> From 2020 to 2021, the U.S. Congress passed a number of bills described as delivering "stimulus and relief." The two largest bills were the CARES Act, passed in March of 2020, and the American Rescue Plan (ARP), passed in March 2021. In broad terms, these spending packages had the following properties. First, the consisted largely of monetary transfers targeting the bottom half of the income distribution as well as distressed businesses. Second, the spending packages were large--around $2 trillion each--over ten percent of GDP in both 2020 and 2021. Third, the spending packages were not offset by spending reductions in other areas. Nor were surtaxes levied to finance the programs. The programs were financed with net new issuances of nominal securities purchased by the banking sector. That is, the transfers essentially took the form of "helicopter drops" of money; see Figure 3.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhxYUhKBuQHEyCs3oPu5ZNkF7vLSHzkDkRlPqIpDvw4WeHxjg-XXpnRUtoHEETmAHlM1BF87DuhFwTuo9rggF8yW9RnfYI9ELs80kAJNCTlt0TS5uYXiqLBknRp-AarjtGiToVb8OJzngiThzBlG0WV33lwkNEpZ45b0XwKk3x1miNdd3qeV508IfpzVjun" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="270" data-original-width="674" height="160" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhxYUhKBuQHEyCs3oPu5ZNkF7vLSHzkDkRlPqIpDvw4WeHxjg-XXpnRUtoHEETmAHlM1BF87DuhFwTuo9rggF8yW9RnfYI9ELs80kAJNCTlt0TS5uYXiqLBknRp-AarjtGiToVb8OJzngiThzBlG0WV33lwkNEpZ45b0XwKk3x1miNdd3qeV508IfpzVjun=w400-h160" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Figure 3</td></tr></tbody></table><p> The ultra loose monetary and fiscal policies over 2020-21 exerted strong inflationary pressures. In 2022, the Russian-Ukraine war contributed to headline inflation. The output loss in 2020 contributed to inflationary pressure. The reversal in business sentiment in 2021 contributed to inflationary pressure. </p><p> The inflationary pressures cited above were offset by strong deflationary pressures in 2020 and 2022. In 2020, there was a strong negative demand shock, resulting in a strong decline in investment with an accompanying movement in the demand for money (the inverse of money velocity); see Figure 4.</p><p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjO93dwYs0yOfloDLZuQzY13RnQeM5rtXPq2vSIrJ7qfMYPwQhFtiUyhPYLUcaRebZR-n_7NUV4Y_Ju-dkt4S7NqG5H8MO4jKm5kqoHEiwkXuk9nGWy9uYL_0s5-bnqOL8ox8ZQCnCyX-Lowoo5rAVwwNkKqPf-_XBKKdvpz92O_D9icNWmLPjSyDfo-OCR" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="270" data-original-width="674" height="160" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjO93dwYs0yOfloDLZuQzY13RnQeM5rtXPq2vSIrJ7qfMYPwQhFtiUyhPYLUcaRebZR-n_7NUV4Y_Ju-dkt4S7NqG5H8MO4jKm5kqoHEiwkXuk9nGWy9uYL_0s5-bnqOL8ox8ZQCnCyX-Lowoo5rAVwwNkKqPf-_XBKKdvpz92O_D9icNWmLPjSyDfo-OCR=w400-h160" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Figure 4</td></tr></tbody></table></p><p> As business sentiment reversed in 2021, the demand for money (safe assets, in general) declined. This turn of events occurred just as the ARP kicked in. Together, these two events generated a strong inflationary impulse in 2021. This impulse was counteracted in 2022 by strongly contractionary monetary and fiscal policies (a sharp rise in the policy interest rate in 2022 and the expiration of the ARP by the end of 2021). </p><p> The account given above is based on a model that I formalize below. Note that the account is purely qualitative in nature. This is because my model is designed only to flesh out the qualitative effects of a variety of economic forces that seem plausibly important (I am working on a quantitative version of the model with a coauthor). Formalizing the argument above through a simple dynamic general equilibrium model has two benefits. First, it will force me to be explicit about the assumptions I am making to render the verbal interpretation above logically coherent. Second, it will allow me to evaluate monetary and fiscal policies employed in the 2020-22 period. The model can also be used to perform counterf actuals. </p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Policy assessment</span></p><p>The model suggests the following assessment.</p><p>1. Cutting the policy rate in March 2020 was appropriate only to the extent that there were forces driving a declining output below potential. A strong deflationary pressure is not sufficient to identify an "output gap," because rationally-pessimistic forecasts are deflationary. One would have to make the case that investors became overly-pessimistic. Or that sectoral shocks somehow led to deficient demand (Guerrieri, et. al., 2022). These are difficult arguments to make because "potential" is unobservable and prior to the arrival of the vaccines, a gloomy sentiment did not seem irrational. </p><p>2. The fiscal transfers associated with the 2020 CARES Act were desirable. The policy mostly redistributed purchasing power (at a time when total output was declining) from high to low-income persons (the latter group being disproportionately affected by the shutdowns). Without the CARES Act, the economy would have likely experienced a significant deflation (benefiting those with wealth in the form of money/bonds). Hence, the desired redistribution was financed through an inflation tax. A temporary income or consumption tax might have been used instead. In this sense, inflation was at least in part an efficient tax (or constrained efficient, better ways of financing the desired transfers were available).</p><p>3. A case could be made that the 2021 ARP was desirable ex ante. A case could be made that it was undesirable ex post. Either way, the model suggests that the ARP was implemented at precisely the time investor sentiment had returned to normal. Essentially, 2021 saw a large increase in the supply of money and a large decrease in the demand for real money balances. Both effects served to drive inflation higher. </p><p>4. Strong disinflationary policies were enacted at the beginning of 2022. First, fiscal policy became highly contractionary (by ceasing the ARP). Second, the Fed began to raise its policy rate aggressively. These disinflationary policies were partially offset by the inflationary consequences of growing geopolitical tensions. </p><p> My own assessment of monetary and fiscal policy over this period of time (based in part on my model) is as follows. First, the Fed should not have lowered its policy rate in March 2020 (its emergency lending programs worked as needed). Conditional on having lowered the policy rate (forgivable, in light of the weak inflation numbers), the Fed should have begun tightening sometime in 2021 (consistent with the recommendations of those economists who favor NGDP targeting). Second, despite all its warts, the CARES Act was essential and did what it needed to do. Third, desirability of the ARP is better weighed in political, rather than economic, terms. It was a redistribution policy. It was financed through an inflation tax. It might have been financed in some less-inflationary way. But a tax in some form would have been unavoidable. </p><p> The policies and programs put in place by our elected representatives to meet the economic challenges inflicted on us by the pandemic were designed to redistribute purchasing power. If those policies were widely viewed as desirable, then it seems strange to blame inflation (or some other tax) for inflicting economic hardship. Inflation was mainly a symptom of the solution to a problem inflicted on humanity by nature. This is the sense in which one can describe the recent inflationary episode as "constrained efficient inflation." </p><p>PS. If the hump-shaped inflation pattern continues to play out, it will be judged by economic historians as a "transitory" inflation. There is nothing in the model which suggests that a recession is necessary for the transitory part. A helicopter drop of money creates a transitory inflation. This is textbook economics. </p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-83768006627632605552023-03-18T10:07:00.001-07:002023-03-18T10:08:40.506-07:00There's No Free Lunch or: How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Not Hate Inflation<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Remember when the Fed's most pressing policy concern was missing their 2% inflation target from below for most of the decade following the financial crisis of 2008-09? The concern never failed to puzzle me in all my time at the St. Louis Fed. I once let out how I really felt:<br /><br /></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjkckDC-RrzJSMcZClDJg7cOV8QyYrj7xsfyOy-XW8iJWnl81g-wG8a-RuRz83bzRFmEGhCdqbW97PC_y4hcFWpSZfwizjoot9ZlZt2-TGZKdDNKnyf0Vm-7hX6LIszWS_FS1KmPkeZExIjwq4HhX-e1HZt4TkpwEchXnuV-ncvxqMBJ0W6zU4CIhRFvA" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img data-original-height="558" data-original-width="1203" height="185" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjkckDC-RrzJSMcZClDJg7cOV8QyYrj7xsfyOy-XW8iJWnl81g-wG8a-RuRz83bzRFmEGhCdqbW97PC_y4hcFWpSZfwizjoot9ZlZt2-TGZKdDNKnyf0Vm-7hX6LIszWS_FS1KmPkeZExIjwq4HhX-e1HZt4TkpwEchXnuV-ncvxqMBJ0W6zU4CIhRFvA=w400-h185" width="400" /></span></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit;">All those years I was expecting low inflation and low interest rates to make the political opposition to ever-higher deficits melt away. As I recall explaining to my colleagues at the time "Either we'll get the biggest free-lunch of all time (increased government spending and/or tax cuts) or we'll get inflation." The inflation was inevitable, to my of thinking. I just didn't know when it would return. I certainly did not see the point of encouraging it! </span><p></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Well, inflation returned. But not exactly for the reasons I was expecting. What happened? </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">Shocks</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">What happened was COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war. These two shocks were large, disruptive, and persistent. A great many people died. Large parts of the economy were shut down with the hope of slowing the spread of the virus so as not to overwhelm our limited ICU capacity. The leisure and hospitality sector was crushed, and other sectors as well. There was a massive (and highly unusual) reallocation of production and consumption away from services to goods--a phenomenon that has not fully reversed to this day. We learned about the delicate and interconnected nature of global supply chains. People modified their behavior in dramatic ways. Work-from-home seems here to stay. And then, of course, as if a global pandemic was not enough, Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, leading to the usual sickening consequences of war: death, destruction, and displacement--as well as energy disruptions and food shortages that reverberated across the global economy. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is not, of course, the only thing that happened. We also had policy responses. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">Policy: What was needed</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">I want to limit attention to economic policy here (health policy is another matter). The COVID-19 shock disrupted some sectors of the economy more than others. Some sectors, like leisure and hospitality were virtually shut down. But in many other parts of the economy, people were able to work from home. Since not many people purchased pandemic-insurance, a large number of Americans were in for a whole lot of economic hurt. Most of those adversely affected were in the bottom half of the income distribution. What could and should have been done?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">I should like to think that most Americans would have been in favor of a social insurance program that supported those most in need; i.e., targeted transfers for as long as the pandemic remained disruptive. Most people would have recognized that this is the right thing to do. And even those few who seemingly do not care much for their fellow Americans might have recognized how redistribution would have been desirable, perhaps even necessary, to maintain social cohesion. We should not have wanted a replay of what happened in the last crisis, where the financial sector was bailed out while American many households were largely left flailing in the foreclosure winds that blew in the aftermath of 2008-09. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">How might such a program be financed? A consumption tax would have been one way. Imagine a "transitory" 5% federal sales tax to fund a targeted transfer program. The program parameters could, in principle, be calibrated in a manner that requires little or no adjustment in the deficit. Ideally, such an emergency program would have already been put in place. (As far as I know, there is still no such plan in place--a significant policy failure, in my view.)</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">How might things have
played out with such a policy, given the sequence of shocks that unfolded? To a
first approximation, my guess is "probably not much different." With the balanced-budget
policy described above, inflation would have almost surely been lower. Imagine
shaving 300-500bp off the "inflation hump" we've experienced so far:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi4DSRD7sHpjY-m601dzwxxKNwucI9l8Mfx25M6pQw9TsOBbsz3wfm8MdOPDpV7eua6I4CvrFuCvHb34jkhFsSKIDHEnAs1PSXlDCCIqB1z7XR3UQ7Yseqa-jDRaR44L5r7nR3RW-40q3iOnUQwmODye_Ed8D7_p0E0C3KpdWCZ0wASz-gVF8-wDBoikA" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img data-original-height="538" data-original-width="1211" height="178" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi4DSRD7sHpjY-m601dzwxxKNwucI9l8Mfx25M6pQw9TsOBbsz3wfm8MdOPDpV7eua6I4CvrFuCvHb34jkhFsSKIDHEnAs1PSXlDCCIqB1z7XR3UQ7Yseqa-jDRaR44L5r7nR3RW-40q3iOnUQwmODye_Ed8D7_p0E0C3KpdWCZ0wASz-gVF8-wDBoikA=w400-h178" width="400" /></a></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We would almost surely still have had some inflation stemming from supply disruptions and energy
costs (associated with the war). But inflation would have been less pronounced. Naturally, rather than complaining about high inflation, people would instead have
been complaining about high consumption taxes. ("They told us they'd be
transitory!") There's no such thing as a free lunch. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Under this higher-tax/lower-deficit policy, most Americans would have felt worse off relative to
2019. The blame for this feeling, however, properly lies with the shocks and
not the policy response. Yes, work-from-home types would not have received
transfers and they would have been paying more for goods and services. This is
the nature of redistribution, which I believe most people would have supported. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">Policy: What we got</span></p><p>To a large extent--and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7d79Knc8p4">all things considered</a>--we pretty much got what was needed: a set of redistributive policies with transfers targeted (mostly) to the bottom half of the income distribution (yes, yes, we can talk at length about how things could have been done better). Except that there was no surtax to fund the transfers. Our representatives in Congress chose to deficit-finance the programs. The resulting large quantity of treasury paper had to be absorbed by the private sector at a time supply was constrained and interest rates were not permitted to rise (I'll get to monetary policy in a moment). How does one not expect some additional inflation in this case? So, instead of a "transitory" consumption tax, we got a "transitory" inflation tax. There's no free lunch. </p><p>By the way, by "transitory" I mean to say that inflation is <i>expected</i> to revert to target, instead of remaining elevated or even increasing. In the fall of 2020, I expected a "temporary" inflation (see <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/fourth-quarter-2020/does-national-debt-matter" target="_blank">here</a>) because I thought the supply disruptions and CARES Act were not permanent. Inflation turned out to be higher and more persistent than I expected. But the supply disruptions have largely alleviated and the ARP expired at the end of 2021 (though the RUS-UKR war continues). Up until recently, I remained optimistic that--absent further shocks and with responsible fiscal policy--inflation would make its way back down to target in 3-5 years without a recession. I'm not as optimistic today, but let me return to this below. </p><p>What about monetary policy? Well, I was very pleased with the way the Fed calmed financial markets in March 2020, as I expected it would.</p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgC4bgnuhNvlwVNMmeEcnA3dcZSizR-C7u3UFWXtqKadj0fe2XPe1s4VGXCOEpXOt_QMK6QoFzRIBXxvZDxhnXvAOYyf9dHllsz_EzXswRND_ivY6jUQdA38UKp6cyV9TmIQIaxHcYCVneLXp5ofYMYplNdW2NlL9OqHbeD14xQV7uQdFllci0PP6Y1gA/s1212/fig5.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="419" data-original-width="1212" height="139" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgC4bgnuhNvlwVNMmeEcnA3dcZSizR-C7u3UFWXtqKadj0fe2XPe1s4VGXCOEpXOt_QMK6QoFzRIBXxvZDxhnXvAOYyf9dHllsz_EzXswRND_ivY6jUQdA38UKp6cyV9TmIQIaxHcYCVneLXp5ofYMYplNdW2NlL9OqHbeD14xQV7uQdFllci0PP6Y1gA/w400-h139/fig5.png" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p>Well done, Fed. But what about monetary (interest rate) policy?</p><p>Well, to be honest, monetary policy seemed a bit bonkers. Lowering the policy rate in response to recession engineered by a manufactured shutdown did not make much sense to me. My view was more in line with Michael Woodford's, as expressed here in his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BG9zPz2oeDI">2020 Jean Monnet lecture</a>. What was needed was <i>insurance</i>, not <i>stimulus</i>. And this insurance needs to be delivered through fiscal policy. </p><p>My own view is that many economists could not resist interpreting the severe decline in output as reflecting a conventional "output gap." To be fair, there may very well have been a decline in aggregate demand in the first half of 2020. The economic outlook at the time was very uncertain, which likely increased the desire for precautionary savings. Remember, monthly inflation rates for March, April and May of 2020 were <i>negative</i>. The monthly inflation rate only became positive in June 2020 (5.4% annualized rate), though it remained fairly subdued for most of 2020. </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTynAYDq7z6Is7-7GAijTM8ClVN73Z2ltW10hA8sXz5yNix-gUSxpnIQIroXfz1ImQUERicfdhuDsqeDEXTyw6cYsdxCBmFOsq68-UHnMVdfZHEWkh4wD6oi_7vhIwHOX6W2rTCld4Me27-V4Cfu590yAVIETAya3-YWJb0EN_NG_LsUCHKwEg9Rs_uA/s1138/fig2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="450" data-original-width="1138" height="159" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTynAYDq7z6Is7-7GAijTM8ClVN73Z2ltW10hA8sXz5yNix-gUSxpnIQIroXfz1ImQUERicfdhuDsqeDEXTyw6cYsdxCBmFOsq68-UHnMVdfZHEWkh4wD6oi_7vhIwHOX6W2rTCld4Me27-V4Cfu590yAVIETAya3-YWJb0EN_NG_LsUCHKwEg9Rs_uA/w400-h159/fig2.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p>Heading into 2020, the Fed's policy rate was around 1.6%. Was it really necessary to lower it any further? Especially in light of the fiscal transfers taking place throughout 2020? But apparently, in the minds of some, perhaps even most, the economy needed "stimulating." </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4uVOX9yuQky7FnNNal5wga-4g1s5tw0OEKGyAE9WErLvlHDFqBOGpUgFYLdPrYOUQZ212iRwQMeKb0CAOHNFsbGk7iMuWiqGya9Dv2y_OO_qYfYZDhGGCPPXVRkxNpN6_AogVoxlQnwljjiFnoSvIrN7gbbnS0CVSp0Lfx8bjN0fUNSfslPETWUigtQ/s1205/fig3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1048" data-original-width="1205" height="348" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4uVOX9yuQky7FnNNal5wga-4g1s5tw0OEKGyAE9WErLvlHDFqBOGpUgFYLdPrYOUQZ212iRwQMeKb0CAOHNFsbGk7iMuWiqGya9Dv2y_OO_qYfYZDhGGCPPXVRkxNpN6_AogVoxlQnwljjiFnoSvIrN7gbbnS0CVSp0Lfx8bjN0fUNSfslPETWUigtQ/w400-h348/fig3.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p>In any case, it seems clear now, in retrospect at least, that the cut should probably not have happened or, conditional on happening, should have been quickly reversed once the financial panic had subsided. The main effect of interest rate policy according to many was an undesirable asset-price boom (stocks, bonds, and real estate). The increase in private sector wealth coming from higher asset valuations surely added some fuel to the inflationary fire. </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBOjrT9AHUzo2s02A3ZxMZ1Be8M1Dd5OmMp9CUGkWrE6xqHQwJp2V2cqqMOmUFnXw7950TkZcXND-XJHNpDNuaKI-H9xKciURNo-16hjFDgzf2ztNkIMlGB9dNQ1Fo6STmPJclYs9VMaFyGK8b4bvZzSHpT4RyhRKPHzeng0bLbV3NyK2hnj4aPILFhQ/s1138/fig4.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="450" data-original-width="1138" height="159" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBOjrT9AHUzo2s02A3ZxMZ1Be8M1Dd5OmMp9CUGkWrE6xqHQwJp2V2cqqMOmUFnXw7950TkZcXND-XJHNpDNuaKI-H9xKciURNo-16hjFDgzf2ztNkIMlGB9dNQ1Fo6STmPJclYs9VMaFyGK8b4bvZzSHpT4RyhRKPHzeng0bLbV3NyK2hnj4aPILFhQ/w400-h159/fig4.png" width="400" /></a></div> <p></p><p>We can now see how that Fed-induced wealth effect is being undone. The rapidity of the rise in the Fed's policy rate is wreaking havoc on wealth portfolios. This is not a huge concern to the extent the policy is just reversing an undesirable asset-price inflation. But to the extent that these assets sit on bank balance sheets, to the extent these positions are not hedged against duration risk, to the extent that depositors are skittish, and to the extent that capital buffers are running low, then the banking system--or at least parts of it--are subject to runs. We are seeing this play out now in the United States. </p><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: large;">Where are we heading?</span><br /> <div>I fear we may be in a bit of a pickle. One reason is China. To be more precise, the risk of the U.S. entering a long and costly proxy war with China. Let's hope it doesn't happen. But I can't help thinking of Rome vs. Persia. I'm not sure about the Persian perspective, but my reading of history suggests that the late Roman Empire devoted considerable resources to defending its eastern frontier against its great rival. Such a fiscal strain requires taxes (or inflation). </div><div> </div><div>If the Sino-American proxy war scenario fails to materialize, then I think we stand a reasonable chance of getting out of this decade without a recession, but with inflation hovering above target for the indefinite future. The Fed might want to sell this as part of its "symmetric" inflation targeting regime. After all, we tolerated undershooting the target inflation rate for a decade (see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2018/12/does-fed-have-symmetric-inflation-target.html" target="_blank">here</a>). In my view, much will depend on the course of fiscal policy--the deficit, in particular--in relation to the global demand for U.S. Treasury securities (see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/05/understanding-lowflation.html" target="_blank">here</a>). Needless to say, these are very difficult objects to forecast. (In fact, there's no point in forecasting them -- we should just make contingency plans instead.)</div><div><br /></div><div>There is a chance that the Fed overdoes its policy tightening and starts to "break things." Given the recent events in the U.S. banking sector, the FOMC would, in my view, be wise to pause and see how things play out. This is not an issue of "financial dominance." It is based on the deflationary impulse induced by the recent bank failures. I expect all banks to redouble their efforts to repair their balance sheets. This means a fear-induced tightening of lending standards and slower loan growth beyond what one might consider to be a normal reaction against higher policy interest rates. </div><div> </div><div>If the Fed does pull a Paul Volcker, then we'll get a sharp recession. Inflation will come down--temporarily, at least. Where inflation goes from there will depend, as always (in my view), on fiscal policy. </div><div> </div><div>If the proxy war scenario does come to pass, then get ready to pay the necessary taxes. And remember: wars are typically inflationary. In fact, an inflation tax may not be a bad way to finance a part of this endeavor. The U.S. would effectively be collecting a greater amount of seigniorage on its U.S. Treasury securities held abroad. And why shouldn't our allies be prepared to shoulder some of the expense? (There are other ways, of course.) A proxy war may or may not be worth fighting. Either way, remember: there <a href="https://www.thesaurus.com/e/grammar/aint-amnt-haint-baint/#:~:text=Absolutely.,no%2Dno%20in%20formal%20writing.">ain't</a> no such thing as free lunch. </div><div> </div><div>As for monetary policy in a period in which the government has a set objective and wants to deficit-finance its spending, I'm afraid the Fed will just have to learn how to stop worrying and "love" inflation (in case you're unfamiliar with the reference, see <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012/">here</a>). Raising interest rates sharply can break things and create disinflation. But without fiscal reform, the respite on inflation is likely to be temporary. In fact, inflation is likely to reemerge even higher than before since the Treasury will now have to issue paper at an even faster pace, first, to cover the shortfall created by the recession, and second, to cover the higher interest expense of the debt. This is a version of Sargent and Wallace's "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2021/03/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2021/05/26/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic" target="_blank">here</a>. Need I add that creating a recession is no way to win a proxy war. </div><div> </div><div>How will U.S. policy evolve to meet our many challenges? No one knows how the future will unfold. Perhaps we can take some comfort in Winston Churchill's observation: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing--but only after they've tried everything else." Alas, the quote is apocryphal. Nevertheless, I am hopeful that we will "do the right thing" eventually (and before it's too late). </div><div><br /></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-64887554975042634522022-04-07T08:16:00.012-07:002022-04-07T09:46:20.231-07:00What economic model produces the Fed's inflation forecast?<p>John Cochrane's blog has always been a favorite of mine. It's provocative. It's entertaining. And it invariably leads me to reflect on a variety of notions I have floating around in my head. </p><p>In his latest piece, he asks an interesting question: <a href="https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2022/04/is-fed-fisherian.html">How does the Fed come up with its inflation forecast?</a> What sort of model might be embedded in the minds of FOMC members? I like the question and the thought experiment. My comments below should not be construed as criticism. Think of them more as thoughts that come to mind in a conversation. (It's more fun to do this in public than in private.)</p><p>John begins with the observation that while the Fed evidently expects inflation to decline as the Fed's policy rate is increased, at no point in the transition dynamic back to 2% inflation is the real rate of interest very high. To quote John (italics in original): t<i>he Fed believes inflation will almost entirely disappear all on its own, without the need for any period of high real interest rates</i>. Of course, this is in sharp contrast with the Volcker disinflation, an episode that demonstrated, in the minds of many, how a persistently high real rate of interest was needed to make inflation go down (some push back in this paper <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BuVQKjSDfRHprmQN5ZsqCTq0q_GmNWvE/view">here</a>).</p><p>John believes that the current inflation was generated in large part by a big fiscal shock in the form of a money transfer (an increased in USTs unsupported by the prospect of higher future taxes). I'm inclined to agree with this view, though surely there other factors playing a role (see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-inflation-blame-game_29.html">here</a>). John asks how this type of shock can be expected to generate a transitory inflation with the real interest rate kept (say) negative throughout the entire transition dynamic. Below, I offer a simple model that rationalizes this expectation. Whether it's the model FOMC members have in their heads, I'm not sure. (Well, I happen to know in the case of two FOMC members, but I won't share this here.)</p><p>Formally, I have in mind a simple OLG model (see, <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2015/09/08/a-model-of-u-s-monetary-policy-before-and-after-the-great-recession">here</a>). The model is Non-Ricardian (the supply of government debt is viewed as private wealth). The model's properties are more Old Keynesian than New Keynesian. The model is also consistent with Monetarism, except with the supply of base money replaced with the supply of outside assets (i.e., all government securities--cash, reserves, bills, notes and bonds). </p><p>So, I'm thinking about my model beginning in an hypothetical stationary state. The real economy is growing at some constant rate (say, zero). The supply of outside assets consists of zero interest securities (monetary policy is pegging the nominal interest rate to zero all along the yield curve). This supply of "debt" is also growing at some constant rate. Debt is never repaid--it is rolled over forever. Indeed, the nominal supply of debt is growing forever. New debt is used to finance government spending. The real primary budget deficit is held constant. The government is running a perpetual budget deficit via bond seigniorage; see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/03/sustainable-deficits.html">here</a>. The steady-state inflation rate in this economy is given by the rate of growth of the supply of nominal outside assets. (It is also possible that the inflation rate is determined by shifts in the demand for USTs; see <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2021/05/26/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic#:~:text=Sargent%20and%20Wallace%20(1981)%20published,of%20inflation%20without%20fiscal%20support.">here</a>, for example). The real interest rate (on money) is negative. </p><p>OK, now let's consider a large fiscal shock in the form of a one-time increase in the supply of outside assets (i.e., a helicopter drop of money that is never reversed). The effect of this shock is to induce a <i>transitory</i> inflation (a permanent increase in the price-level). An increase in the nominal supply of money at a given interest rate at full employment makes the cost of living go up -- it makes the real debt go down. And oh, by the way, the debt-to-GDP ratio is declining thanks in part to inflation:</p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj1WH5kQI1cEi-PtVuAVdN-Hbtpaf2UEG8f5cOQdeZzp2li2LB8tjILB4F30NwZfoOoQvQdOxw5jOazULn3_Ky_bHrYaZJnC634PecDrmHhWpuK5bERAwHaIIZx8rfF-FHVbVEU6724zcqccGbha-Y-OOYcZlqFFI6jk_ixL-8MA2Pun9FMHjmZzZFakA" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="450" data-original-width="1168" height="154" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj1WH5kQI1cEi-PtVuAVdN-Hbtpaf2UEG8f5cOQdeZzp2li2LB8tjILB4F30NwZfoOoQvQdOxw5jOazULn3_Ky_bHrYaZJnC634PecDrmHhWpuK5bERAwHaIIZx8rfF-FHVbVEU6724zcqccGbha-Y-OOYcZlqFFI6jk_ixL-8MA2Pun9FMHjmZzZFakA=w400-h154" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p>This is despite the persistent negative real interest rate prevailing in the economy. I mean, what else might one imagine from a one-time injection of money? Is this is what the Fed is thinking? (This is what I'm thinking!) Note: an increase in the interest rate in this model would unleash a disinflationary force, but this would only serve to speed up the transition dynamic. </p><p>As it turns out, this simple story seems consistent with what I take to be John's preferred theory of inflation. The large fiscal shock here is unaccompanied by the prospect of future primary budget surpluses. The effect is to increase the price level (i.e., a temporary inflation). Maybe the Fed has John's FTPL model in mind? </p><p>Neither of these stories line up particularly well with the New Keynesian model, which emphasizes interest rate policy as *the* way inflation is controlled. There are, however, many strange things going on in this model. First, while no explicit attention is paid to fiscal policy, the fiscal regime plays a critical role in determining model dynamics (basic assumption is lump-sum taxes and Ricardian fiscal regime). Second, the Taylor principle that is needed to determine a <i>locally</i> unique rational expectations equilibrium is an off-equilibrium credible threat to basically blow the economy up if individuals do not coordinate on the proposed equilibrium (I learned this from John <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13409/revisions/w13409.rev0.pdf">here</a>.) By the way, Peter Howitt provides a different (and in my view, a more compelling) explanation for the "Taylor principle" <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138687">here</a>--published a year before Taylor 1993. Given these shortcomings, why are we even using this model as a benchmark? This is another good question. </p><p>John presumably picks this model because he sees no better alternative for modeling monetary policy via an interest rate rule. If he wants an alternative, he can read my paper above. Or, he can appeal to his own class of models extended to permit a liquidity function for USTs. These models easily accommodate stable inflation at negative real rates of interest. But whether this is how FOMC members organize their thinking, I'm not sure.</p><p>In any case, John picks an off-the-shelf NK model and assumes that it adequately captures what is in the mind of many FOMC members. Let's see what he does next (Modeling the Fed). </p><p>He writes: <i>"The Fed clearly believes that once a shock is over, inflation stops, even if the Fed does not do much to nominal interest rates. This is the "Fisherian" property. It is not the property of traditional models. In those models, once inflation starts, it will spiral out of control unless the Fed promptly raises interest rates."</i> [I think he meant "<b>threatens </b>to raise interest rates.]</p><p>Comment 1: I'm not sure what he means by a "Fisherian" property. (Note: the Fisher equation holds in the OLG model I cited above--though the real rate of interest is not generally fixed in those settings.) </p><p>Comment 2: Conventional models? I presume he means Woodford's basic NK model. It seems likely to me, however, that FOMC members may have other "conventional" models in their heads -- like the Old Keynesian model or the Old Monetarist model--both of which continue to be taught as standard fare in undergraduate curricula. </p><p>OK, so John considers a very basic IS-PC model and considers two alternative hypotheses for how inflation expectations are determined. The first hypothesis is a simple adaptive rule (see also Howitt's work above). The second hypothesis is perfect foresight (rational expectations) -- which, by the way, implicitly embeds knowledge of the Ricardian fiscal regime. </p><p>Under the adaptive expectations model, inflation explodes. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, inflation largely follows the Fed's actual forecast. Maybe this is what the Fed is thinking? The Fed has rational expectations? </p><p>Except that I'm not really sure what this means. John does give us a further hint though. He goes on to say <i>"Not only is the Fed rational expectations, neo-Fisherian, it seems to believe that prices are surprisingly flexible!" </i></p><p>Right. So the Neo-Fisherian hypothesis is that to get a permanently lower rate of inflation, the Fed must (at least eventually) lower its policy rate (and vice versa to raise the rate of inflation). I've questioned this hypothesis in the past (see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/02/is-neo-fisherism-nuts.html">here</a>). But what's going on here now? Is John suggesting that the FOMC is made up of closet Neo-Fisherians? Steve Williamson would no doubt be pleasantly surprised. </p><p>John writes: <i>"The proposition that once the shock is over inflation will go away on its own may not seem so radical</i><i>. Put that way, I think it does capture what's on the Fed's mind. But it comes inextricably with the very uncomfortable Fisherian implication. If inflation converges to interest rates on its own, then higher interest rates eventually raise inflation, and vice-versa</i><i>."</i> </p><p>No, I'm afraid the conclusion that inflation is transitory (even with negative real rates) is NOT inextricably linked to the Neo-Fisherian proposition. It is only inextricably linked this way in a class of economic models that: [1] are pretty bad; and [2] highly unlikely to be in the heads of most FOMC members. </p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-60721469012386295762022-01-29T15:41:00.009-08:002022-02-15T07:05:30.682-08:00The Inflation Blame Game<p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><span style="font-size: medium;">Inflation is back together with a new season of America's favorite sport: zero-contact, finger-pointing. I thought I'd sit back and share a few thoughts with you on the subject on this cold Saturday afternoon. Use the comments section below to let me know what you think.</span></span></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><span style="font-size: medium;">In one corner, I see some pundits somehow wanting to blame the 2021 inflation on workers. Workers are somehow forcing their improved bargaining positions on employers, raising the costs of production, with some or all of these costs passed on to consumers. Then, as workers see their real wages erode, the cycle begins anew begetting the dreaded "wage-price spiral." Those pesky workers. </span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">There's no doubt something to the idea that wage demands can lead to higher prices (and why shouldn't workers want cost-of-living adjustments?) But what is the evidence that this behavior was the <i>impulse </i>behind the 2021 inflation? </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">While it's difficult to tell just by eye-balling the data, I think it's reasonable (under this hypothesis) to see wage growth precede (or at least be coincident with) inflation. Unfortunately (for this hypothesis), this is not what we see in the data. In the diagram below, use the <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/8702840202604739302/8293516807400415164"><span style="color: blue;">Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker</span></a> to construct nominal wage inflation for the bottom (green) and top (yellow) wage quintiles. This is plotted against CPI inflation (blue). </span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEinSjpNd8AAApgyJx79EzMmCDRjqXQ5ojaYS2n6GX-eW3ly9V5ks700iGClygp-8G_D5nKLgcEboF5FNgfqkeE5bDsEVLm-6eTDD_GSInNsWtyEq9LSwDcrjELgDD-lmuZlfkzBzhokTk2w-PN5OGq3XDkVja5zXzFoXZY75mA6PUXPUqLbPgZPncZ2mQ=s1104" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="559" data-original-width="1104" height="203" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEinSjpNd8AAApgyJx79EzMmCDRjqXQ5ojaYS2n6GX-eW3ly9V5ks700iGClygp-8G_D5nKLgcEboF5FNgfqkeE5bDsEVLm-6eTDD_GSInNsWtyEq9LSwDcrjELgDD-lmuZlfkzBzhokTk2w-PN5OGq3XDkVja5zXzFoXZY75mA6PUXPUqLbPgZPncZ2mQ=w400-h203" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Another problem for this hypothesis is that wage inflation is moving in the <i>wrong direction</i> for the top three wage quintiles over the Covid era. What we see here is a clear acceleration in the rate of inflation, followed by modest acceleration in wage inflation for the bottom quintile and a deceleration in wage inflation for the top quintile. In 2021<i>, real wages across all quintiles declined </i>(according to this data). So much for increased worker bargaining power. [Note: it is quite likely that net income for the bottom one or two quintiles increased, thanks to government transfers.] </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 13.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">On the other side of the political spectrum, we see pundits and politicians blaming the 2021 inflation on "corporate greed." Framing the issue in terms of "corporate greed" is not especially helpful, in my humble opinion. The substantive part of this claim is that large firms were somehow able to leverage their pricing power in 2021 into higher profit margins and record corporate profits. There is, in fact, some evidence in support of this. The diagram below plots profit margins for firms in the <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/8702840202604739302/8293516807400415164"><span style="color: blue;">Compustat database</span></a>. Profit margin below is computed on an after tax basis (net income divided by sales). The data is divided between large and not-large firms. Large firms are those in the top 10% of sales volume.</span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhk_VQUbjfVOWbr9MCOondUNbMk5pYn8ZtZK_L3wpZc4aHyTQprB-nus8DYoJ7IHeVDuqoRyb6GoxBD7WOeqQCRgJyPUyoA4K381wr5dyi7Se6aHZlNfPw30XcDypP-dgyGZA5gpvH-j9MQFUWfuc8g4QONqz-DSuqcX8EZAGRVcgSkHmQhzFMhrR4v8A=s1104" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="560" data-original-width="1104" height="203" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhk_VQUbjfVOWbr9MCOondUNbMk5pYn8ZtZK_L3wpZc4aHyTQprB-nus8DYoJ7IHeVDuqoRyb6GoxBD7WOeqQCRgJyPUyoA4K381wr5dyi7Se6aHZlNfPw30XcDypP-dgyGZA5gpvH-j9MQFUWfuc8g4QONqz-DSuqcX8EZAGRVcgSkHmQhzFMhrR4v8A=w400-h203" width="400" /></a><span style="font-size: 13.5pt;"> </span></div></span></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">By this measure, profit margins seem remarkably stationary over long periods of time. There is some evidence of a modest secular increase in margins c. 2003. Large firms have higher margins. But the part I want to focus on here is near the end of the sample. Profit margins for 90% of firms seem close to their historical average. We see some evidence that profit margins for the top 10% of firms increased in 2021. But this increase peaked in Q3 and then declined back to historical norms in Q4. While the spike in profit-margins likely contributed to inflation, it hardly seems like a smoking gun. And the Q4 reversion to the mean suggests that "corporate greed" is not likely to be a source of inflationary pressure in 2022. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Well, if workers and firms are not to blame, then who or what is left? There's the C-19 shock itself, of course, along with the effects it has had on the global supply chain. But the 19 in C-19 refers to the year 2019 (and 2020). We're talking about 2022 here. Sure, the supply chain issues are still with us. But at most, I think they account for a substantial change in relative prices (goods becoming more expensive than services) and an increase in the cost-of-living (an increase in the <i>price-level</i>--not a <i>persistent</i> <i>increase in the</i> <i>rate of growth of the price-level</i>). <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">While the factors above no doubt contributed in some way to the 2021 inflation dynamic, let's face it--the size and persistence of the inflation was mainly policy-induced. The smoking gun here seems to be the sequence of the C-19 fiscal transfers. As we know, this had the unusual and remarkable effect of increasing personal disposable income throughout most of the pandemic. The Fed also had a role to play here because it accommodated the fiscal stimulus (normally, one might have expected a degree of monetary policy tightening to partially off-set the inflationary impulse of fiscal stimulus). Below I plot retail sales (actual vs trend) and the timing of the fiscal actions. </span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEghGd8W_FkVyrDLQfwjzoJVJ6eKIvM1FBuL-i_4XMux4IYkL4mMsD4ArN4r0EXIADqDjlPFuFy5NaRTpM673Km9niO7QDaFihcx79LxdT8qF5Tkpw5tZ5ITDf0nzyhYZroP7A6VVfuh_SyotsozocSFeQezRCDgYhjhMq7ZRhAaPVr7-pDgFGcMIhkUoA=s1104" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="559" data-original-width="1104" height="203" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEghGd8W_FkVyrDLQfwjzoJVJ6eKIvM1FBuL-i_4XMux4IYkL4mMsD4ArN4r0EXIADqDjlPFuFy5NaRTpM673Km9niO7QDaFihcx79LxdT8qF5Tkpw5tZ5ITDf0nzyhYZroP7A6VVfuh_SyotsozocSFeQezRCDgYhjhMq7ZRhAaPVr7-pDgFGcMIhkUoA=w400-h203" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">I used retail sales here (I think I got this from Jason Furman), but the picture looks qualitatively similar using PCE (the path of nominal PCE went above trend in 2021 and not earlier in the way retail sales did). Just eye-balling the data above, I'd say the CARES Act was a major success (especially under the circumstances). The subsequent two programs might have been scaled back a bit and/or targeted in a more efficient manner. And, knowing what we know now, the Fed could have started its tightening cycle in 2021. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Having said this, I wouldn't go so far as to say these were flagrant policy mistakes--given the circumstances. If there was a policy mistake, it was in not having a well-defined state-contingent policy beforehand equipped to deal with a global pandemic. Not having that plan in place beforehand, I think monetary and fiscal policy reacted reasonably well.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Policymaking in real-time is hard. And policy, whether formulated beforehand or not, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">must necessarily balance risks. There was a risk of undershooting the support directed to households. We saw this during the foreclosure crisis a decade ago. And there was a risk of overdoing it in some manner. Keep in mind that it was not clear when the legislation was passed how 2021 would unfold. Similarly, for the Fed--perhaps still feeling the sting of having moved too soon and too fast in the past, hopeful that inflation would decline later in the year--delayed its tightening cycle to 2022. It wasn't perfect. But taken together, the economic policy responses had their intended effect of redistributing income to those who suffered disproportionate economic harm during the pandemic. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Finally, what does all this mean for inflation going forward? Well, as I suggested above, I don't think we have to worry about a wage-price spiral (the fiscal policy I think is necessary to support such a phenomenon is not likely to be present). </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Profit margins appear to be declining (reverting to their long-run averages). The money transfers associated with the last fiscal package are gone for 2022. No big spending bills seem likely to pass in 2022. For better or worse, we're talking a considerable amount of "fiscal drag" here (although, some have pointed to how flush state government coffers are at the moment). </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Hopefully (fingers crossed), supply-chain problems will continue to be solved. If so, then all of this points to disinflation (a decline in the rate of inflation) going forward. Some recent promising signs as well: [1] month-over-month CPI inflation has declined for two consecutive months (November and December); and [2] the ECI (employment cost index) decelerated in Q4 of 2021. (These numbers are notoriously volatile, so don't put too much stock in the direction. But still, it's better than seeing them go the other way.)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">Some caveats are in order, of course. In December 2020, I suggested we prepare for a "temporary" burst of inflation in 2021. While this came to pass, the level of inflation surprised me (to be fair, I hadn't incorporated the ARP in my assessment, but even if I had, I think I still would have been surprised). Moreover, I was also surprised by the persistence of inflation--I thought it would decelerate more rapidly (even given the ARP). This just serves to remind me how bad I am at forecasting. Someone recently mentioned a great quote by Rudi Dornbusch: "In economics, things take longer to happen than you think they will, and then they happen faster you thought they could." I can relate to this. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18px;">Inflation may turn out to be more persistent that I am suggesting. But how might this happen, given the disinflationary forces I cited above? One reason may have to do with the tremendous increase in outside assets the private sector has been compelled to absorb--the increase in the national debt has manifested itself as an increase in private sector wealth. Jason Furman sees this as "excess saving." The question going forward is whether the private sector will be compelled to spend this (nominal) wealth (it already has done so, as my chart above shows) or continue to save (not spend) it? It is possible that this "pent up demand" will be spent over a prolonged period of time. The effect of this would be to keep inflation elevated higher than it would otherwise be (serving to reduce real nominal wealth). How long this might take, I have no idea. But even so, it seems clear that the effect cannot persist indefinitely. At some point the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline to its equilibrium position (D/Y has already started to decline; see <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=Kise" target="_blank">here</a>). </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18px;">Another reason why inflation forecasts should be discounted is that it's very difficult to forecast future contingencies. What might happen, for example, if Russia invades the Ukraine this year? Events like these will create disruptions and there's not much monetary and fiscal policy can do about them. But whatever happens, I think the long-run fiscal position of the U.S. will remain anchored (Americans will demand this). And remember, the Fed is bound by its Congressional mandates to keep inflation "low and stable." The Fed's record on inflation since the Volcker years has been pretty good. I'm betting that the record will be equally good over the next 10 years.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">***<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;">PS. I see some people out there strongly asserting it is a "fact" that fiscal policy did not cause the 2021 inflation (see <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/8702840202604739302/8293516807400415164"><span style="color: blue;">here</span></a>, for example). The reason, evidently, is because inflation is a global phenomenon. There's something to this, of course. After all, C-19 is a global pandemic. But this reasoning nevertheless seems faulty to me. First, the USD is the global reserve currency. It's quite possible that the U.S. exported some of its inflation to the world (much in the way it did in the 1970s). Second, many other countries (like Canada, for example) adopted similar fiscal policies. Those countries with less expansive fiscal policies also displayed lower inflation, as far as I know. Rather than deflect the blame, we should own it here. Fiscal policy had a lot of positive effects too (e.g., lowering child poverty). The challenge, as always, is to develop ways to calibrate these policies in a more effective manner. <o:p></o:p></span></p><div><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 13.5pt;"><br /></span></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-72859967983092558832022-01-29T10:11:00.005-08:002022-01-29T10:16:43.887-08:00Some Thoughts on the Fed's CBDC Report<p>Economists within the Federal Reserve System have been musing about central bank digital currency for a while now. For example, yours truly provided a few thoughts on the possibility way back in 2015 (see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/02/fedcoin-on-desirability-of-government.html" target="_blank">here</a>) and most recently <a href="https://voxeu.org/content/central-bank-digital-currency-considerations-projects-outlook" target="_blank">here</a>. But the views of individual Fed researchers are simply our own personal views. What people are really interested in is an <i>official</i> view--namely the view of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. At long last, their report is now available <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/money-and-payments-20220120.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>). </p><p>The report makes it clear that the Fed has no immediate plans to issue a CBDC. The main purpose of the report is to provide some background information, discuss the potential costs and benefits of a CBDC, and solicit feedback from the general public. It is a very nice educational piece. There was nothing really new in it for people who have been following the discussion over the past few years, but there was one thing I found interesting (and potentially important). The interesting part, I think, has to do with their definition of CBDC:</p><p><i></i></p><blockquote><i>For the purpose of this paper, a CBDC is defined as a <b>digital liability of the Federal Reserve</b> that is widely available to the general public.</i></blockquote>I used bold font to highlight the important part in the passage above. Most of the digital money Americans use today consists of dollar credits in transaction accounts that reside in the broader bank sector (which includes non-banks providing digital payment services). This form of digital money is technically a liability of private sector agencies, not the government. Is this an important distinction to make? I'm not sure--I suppose it depends on what one thinks is important. <p></p><p>For one thing, the Board's adopted definition appears to rule out the "wholesale CBDC" proposal that some have advocated for (including myself). Wholesale CBDC (also referred to as "synthetic CBDC" or "sCBDC") is essentially a narrow-banking proposal (which has a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_plan" target="_blank">long history</a> in the banking policy debate). </p><p>In my writings, I contrasted "wholesale CBDC" with "retail CBDC," the latter of which I interpreted as a product that is both a liability of the Federal Reserve <i>and</i> a payment service managed by the Federal Reserve. I thought this latter property was a bad idea--the Fed should probably not get involved with the challenges of retail banking. I missed the possibility of separating the legal status of digital money from the agencies responsible for managing digital money accounts. As George Selgin explains well <a href="https://www.alt-m.org/2022/01/22/missed-it-by-that-much-where-the-feds-disgital-currency-proposal-goes-wrong/" target="_blank">here</a>, the Board's definition of CBDC means a <i>privately-intermediated</i> liability of the Federal Reserve (George calls this iCBDC to distinguish it from sCBDC). </p><p>Speaking for myself, I'd be happy with either an sCBDC or an iCBDC (assuming they are properly designed). My main concern was over the prospect of a government agency operating a large retail business. Both sCBDC and iCBDC are intermediated products--we can let the private sector manage the day-to-day operations of processing payments. George, however, believes that sCBDC should be preferred to iCBDC for reasons that he spells out <a href="https://www.alt-m.org/2022/01/22/missed-it-by-that-much-where-the-feds-disgital-currency-proposal-goes-wrong/" target="_blank">here</a> (I'm not sure I share his concerns).</p><p>My own view is that the distinction between sCBDC and iCBDC will be of interest mainly to lawyers and regulators (John Kiff points me to this <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/11/20/Legal-Aspects-of-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-Central-Bank-and-Monetary-Law-Considerations-49827">IMF report</a>). From an economic perspective, the two products appear to be very close--if not perfect--substitutes (again, assuming their design is optimized). The practical difference between a Federal Reserve liability and a private liability fully-insured by the government seems almost non-existent to me. But I'm willing to be persuaded otherwise. </p><p><br /></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-34949461609288708772021-11-30T07:19:00.001-08:002021-11-30T08:16:54.632-08:00On the Necessity and Desirability of CBDC<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-yZ1D4K9bdNo/YaY_lr1MJ2I/AAAAAAAAJLg/JbAZU5lyQvcw9S6gUfIhHxnFN5PLPu8IQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="171" data-original-width="294" height="186" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-yZ1D4K9bdNo/YaY_lr1MJ2I/AAAAAAAAJLg/JbAZU5lyQvcw9S6gUfIhHxnFN5PLPu8IQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Remarks prepared for P2PFISY
Panel Discussion, December 1, 2021</span><br /><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">At a
conceptual level, CBDC is a compelling idea. It envisions everyone having an
account with the central bank consisting of a direct claim against digital fiat
currency that can be used as a safe and efficient form of payment. Since all
debiting and crediting of accounts occurs on the central bank’s balance sheet,
all the costs and counterparty risks associated with intermediated payments is
eliminated. All individuals and businesses would have access to secure,
low-cost real-time payment services. Moreover, concerns over data privacy and
ownership can be dealt with directly and in a manner consistent with societal
preferences. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">I have
nothing against a retail CBDC per se. Indeed, there may even be some merit to
the idea as a basic public option. But is it really something that is
essential? What existing problems is a CBDC supposed to solve that cannot be
solved through a wholesale-CBDC with supporting legislation? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">A
wholesale-CBDC is an old idea. It is basically a proposal to permit free-entry
into the business of narrow-banking. Let Novi, Square, PayPal and other
reputable firms have Fed accounts. Let them issue “stablecoin” liabilities
fully-backed by interest-bearing reserves. Consider adopting the U.K.’s open
banking legislation. Let the private sector work its magic. What else needs to
be done? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">Do we really
think that consumers would flock to CBDC for reasons of safety? Bank deposits
are close to fully-insured for most people, and all deposits would effectively
be fully-insured in a narrow bank. Do we think that big banks overcharge for
basic payment services? I see many online banks offering free checking accounts
and I see service fees generally declining over time—something that would be
spurred on with a wholesale-CBDC. I do see interchange fees in the U.S.
remaining stubbornly high. But I diagnose this as a by-product of American’s
love-affair with the cash-back and rewards programs offered by credit card
issuers. I do not see how a CBDC is supposed to discourage consumers from using
cards that effectively pay them to spend money. (This seems to be less of a problem outside of North America.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">But more
importantly, do we want to rely on the government sector to deliver high-performance
customer service at the retail level and to keep up with technological advances
in the space? A well-functioning government is essential for a well-functioning
private sector (and vice-versa), but these two sectors should probably stick to their knitting. Let the
central bank handle monetary policy, bank supervision, lender of last resort
operations, and wholesale payments. Let the private sector handle servicing the vast, demanding and rapidly-evolving retail sector. It’s a model that has proven to work best, in my view.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">As for
financial inclusion, one should keep in mind that the most significant progress
along this dimension in recent years has been the outcome of private
initiatives, not state initiatives. Consider, for example, the hundreds of
millions people who now have access to digital payments thanks to M-Pesa, WeChat
and AliPay. Contrast this to the many developing countries that already have
CBDC issued by their state banks. If their state banks have not been able to
deliver on this score, what makes us think that retail-CBDC is essential? <o:p></o:p></span></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-67570006052531239532021-11-11T09:42:00.011-08:002021-11-11T11:13:55.484-08:00Run-Proof Stablecoins<span style="font-family: helvetica;">A stablecoin (SC) is a financial structure that attempts to peg the value of its liabilities (or a tranched subset of its liabilities) to an object outside its control, like the USD. To do this, the SC must effectively convince its liability holders that SC liabilities can be redeemed on demand (or on short notice) for USD at par (or some fixed exchange rate). </span><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Qoe2lx2LLw0/YY1NCgsC4hI/AAAAAAAAJJM/NwrbaHZamMU3FaPceJXQe-J3wEuy0yskQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="576" data-original-width="960" height="192" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Qoe2lx2LLw0/YY1NCgsC4hI/AAAAAAAAJJM/NwrbaHZamMU3FaPceJXQe-J3wEuy0yskQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="320" /></a></div></span><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">The purpose of this structure is to render SC liabilities more attractive as a payment instrument. Pegging to the USD is attractive to people living in the U.S. because the USD is the unit of account. Non-U.S. holders may be attracted to the product because the USD is the world's reserve currency. This structure serves to increase the demand for a SC pegged to the USD. </span><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">To a macroeconomist, an SC looks like a unilateral </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_rate_regime" style="font-family: helvetica;">fixed exchange rate regime</a><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> or a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Currency_board">currency board</a>. The structure also resembles a money market fund that pegs the price of its liabilities with the USD at par (presently, government money funds in the United States). It also looks like a bank without deposit insurance (bank deposit liabilities are pegged at par value against cash). </span></div></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">The history of unilateral fixed exchange rate regimes is mixed. Hong Kong has successfully pegged its currency to the USD for decades. But the experience for many countries seems closer to that of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998%E2%80%932002_Argentine_great_depression#Currency">Argentina</a>. Unless a USD-based SC is backed fully by USD reserves (it needs an account at the Fed for this) or by USD bills (maximum denomination is $100, so unlikely), it may be prone to a bank run. Any other security (including USTs, as the events of March 2020 demonstrated) is subject to liquidity risk -- i.e., a risk that the market for the security suddenly freezes, or demand for the security vanishes as investors seek safer havens. If a SC cannot dispose of its assets at "fair" or "normal" prices, it will fail to raise the money it needs to meet its par redemption promise. The SC will turn out to be not so stable. </span></div></div></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">The theory of bank runs suggests that SCs might be rendered run-proof if their liabilities are properly designed. The famous <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diamond%E2%80%93Dybvig_model">Diamond and Dybvig (JPE 1983)</a> model of bank runs is, in fact, a paper that demonstrates how banks can be rendered run-proof. In the first part of their paper, the explain how a credible promise to suspend redemptions when redemption activity is abnormally high can serve to discourage runs (redemptions based on belief of failure, rather than a need for liquidity) altogether. There is no need for deposit insurance (the second part of their paper is devoted to explaining why deposit insurance may nevertheless be needed, but their argument is not entirely satisfactory). </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">In reality, we do see attempts to render run-prone structures less prone to runs. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, prevented institutional money funds from pricing their liabilities at par with the USD (only government funds can now do this). In addition, the Act required that fund managers implement liquidity fees and redemption gates in the event of heavy redemption activity. These provisions have not been entirely successful. Even banks that suspended redemptions in the old days did not manage to prevent mass redemption events. The theory suggests that what is needed is a *credible* policy. Evidently, when push comes to shove, people cannot always be expected to follow through on their promises. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Back in my teaching days, I used a "crowded movie theatre" as a metaphor to explain the phenomenon. Imagine a movie theatre that seats 500 people. If someone was to yell "fire!" (for legitimate or illegitimate reasons), people can be expected to rush for the exits. Invariably, some people are likely to be trampled and even killed. If people would instead react to the alarm by rising calmly from their seats and proceeding sequentially to the exits, then only the very last few people in the queue are destined not to make it. Losing one or two people relative to (say) is terrible, but it's preferable to losing 50 people in a mad rush for the exits. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">An economist might detect a missing market here. Why not sell tickets with queue positions (in the event of fire)? The tickets with the last few queue positions are likely to sell at a discount (that would depend on the likelihood of the event). This way, if someone yells "fire!", customers will simply show their assigned queue position to the ushers and proceed calmly out of the exits. If the fire does exist, the few people know they are doomed and accept their fate with stoic resignation, knowing that they are dying so that many others may live. (And if it turns out there is no fire, they are saved from the fire and the prospect of death that would have been present had they joined the rush to the exits). </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Except we know that's not what is likely to happen. People cannot be expected to commit in this manner. And there's no obvious way to enforce such contractual stipulations. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">But this is where SCs may have an advantage over conventional institutional structures. In particular, their use of "smart contracts" means that commitment is not an issue. The terms of such contracts are executed under the specified contingencies whether you like it or not. You may not like it <i>ex post</i>, but such commitment can be valuable <i>ex ante</i>. In the context of SCs, <i>the credible threat of suspending redemptions in the event of abnormal redemption activity may actually prevent any runs from occurring in the first place</i>. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">There are, of course, limits to what smart contracts can achieve. They wouldn't, for example, solve the movie theatre problem I just described. This is because people do not live "on-chain." (See also my blog post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2018/11/smart-contracts-and-asset-tokenization.html">Smart Contracts and Asset Tokenization</a>.) To some extent, the same issue exists for USD SCs because USDs and USTs exist "off-chain." Nevertheless, money accounts are different than people, so I think the principle described above can apply to financial products. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">****</span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;">Related work: <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/TE1970">Preventing Bank Runs</a> (w/ Nosal and Sultanum, TE 2017).</span></div><div><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> <span><a name='more'></a></span></span></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-37019416151168684332021-09-29T09:44:00.001-07:002021-09-29T09:44:12.605-07:00EEA-ESEM Panel: Macroeconomic Consequences of the Pandemic<p>I was recently asked whether I'd like to share my thoughts on monetary policy in a post-pandemic world. Sure, why not? Thanks to <a href="https://www.janeeckhout.com/">Jan Eckhout</a> for thinking of me. The panel was hosted by the European Economic Association last month and moderated by <a href="https://www.polis.cam.ac.uk/Staff_and_Students/professor-diane-coyle">Diane Coyle</a>. I was honored to speak alongside <a href="https://personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/">Ricardo Reis</a> and <a href="https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/people/beata-javorcik">Beata Javorcik</a>, both of whom provided riveting presentations. For what it's worth, I thought I'd provide a transcript of my remarks here. </p><p>Lunch Panel EEA-ESEM Copenhagen<br />August 25, 2021</p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">I want to focus my discussion on the U.S. economy
and from the perspective of a Fed official concerned with the challenges the
Fed may face in fulfilling its Congressional mandates in a post-pandemic world.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">First, to provide a bit of context, let me offer
a bit of history on policy and, in particular, on what I think were some
policy mistakes. Let me begin with the 2008-09 financial crisis, which is
something I think most people would agree should never have happened. Whether a sufficiently aggressive Fed lender-of-last-resort operation would have averted the crisis remains a open question. Even if it had been successful, such an operation would have had costs. It may, for example, have elicited
an even greater political backlash than we saw at the time--and who knows how this
may have manifested itself as undesirable changes to the FRA. As well, such an
intervention may have just pushed mounting structural problems down the road.
In particular, while it’s now clear that some private sector lending practices
needed to change, it’s not clear where the incentive to do so would have come
from absent a crisis. In any case, the crisis happened. How was it managed?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">The ensuing recession was deep and the recovery
dynamic very slow. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio did not reach
its pre-pandemic level until 2019, a full decade later. Nevertheless, on the
whole, I think the Fed followed an appropriate interest rate policy. There were
one or two times the FOMC exhibited a little too much enthusiasm for
“normalizing” policy, but I think the slow recovery dynamic had more to do with
insufficient fiscal stimulus—especially at the state and local level—rather
than a consequence of inappropriate monetary policy. The evidence for this can
also be seen by the fact that inflation remained below the Fed’s 2% target for
most of the time the policy rate was close to its ELB. The Fed has interpreted
this low inflation episode as partly a monetary policy mistake, something its
new AIT regime is designed to address. But my own view is that persistently low
inflation—and the low money market yields that go along with it—have more to do
with the supply and demand for U.S. Treasury securities. This is something the
Fed does not have very much direct control over.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">I know many people are skeptical of fiscal
theories of the price-level, but in virtually every economic model I know, a
fiscal anchor is necessary to pin down the long-run rate of inflation. Monetary
policy—specifically, interest rate policy—can, of course, influence the
price-level, so monetary policy can influence inflation dynamics. But it can do
so only in the “short run.” Interest rate policy alone cannot, in my view,
determine the long-run rate of inflation, at least, not without appropriate
fiscal support. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">Now, I know many of you may be asking how I can
think fiscal policy has very much to do with inflation given how rapidly the
debt has risen since the financial crisis and again with the C-19 crisis, all
with little apparent pressure on long-run inflation expectations and on
long-term bond yields. We should, however, keep in mind that an observed change
in the quantity of an object may entail both supply and demand considerations.
And one can easily point to several forces that have contributed to increases
in the global demand for UST securities in recent decades. For example, the
growing use of USTs as collateral in repo and credit derivatives markets
beginning in the 1970s and accelerating through the 1980s. The growing demand
for USTs as a safe store of value from EMEs. The evaporation of private-label
safe assets during the financial crisis that left a gaping hole for USTs to
fill. Next, we had a large increase in the regulatory demand for USTs coming
out of Dodd-Frank and Basel III. The Fed’s SRF and FIMA facility should further
enhance the demand for USTs. On top of all this, we’ve witnessed an emergent
class of money funds called “stablecoins” that are further contributing to the
demand for USTs. These forces have been disinflationary, leading bond investors
to revise down their expectation of the future path of policy interest rates.
It is interesting to ponder a counterfactual here. In particular, think of what
may have transpired absent an accommodating U.S. fiscal policy. We may very
well have experienced the mother of all deflations. If this is correct, then an
elevated debt-to-GDP ratio, given a relatively stable inflation and interest
rate structure, reflects an elevated real demand for outside assets. The
problem is not that the debt-to-GDP ratio is going up. The problem is what
disruptions might occur if it goes <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">down</i>
owing to a sudden and unexpected inflation. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">The recent rise in inflation is concentrated in
durable goods, and I think is mostly attributable to ongoing supply-chain
issues associated with the pandemic. This effect is likely to reverse itself,
the way lumber prices recently have. Some of what I think is temporarily high
inflation may not reverse itself, leading to a permanently higher price-level. In
this case, households will worry whether their wages will keep pace with the
higher the cost of living. There is even the possibility—though I think less
likely—that the rate of inflation itself will remain elevated and that
inflation expectations will rise well above the Fed’s 2% target. This may
happen, for example, if the traditional bipartisan support for fiscal anchoring
in the new generation of Congressional representatives is perceived to wane, or
if the global demand for safe assets slows. If either or both of these things happen
and are persistent, then the Fed may find itself faced with what Sargent and
Wallace phrase an “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.” That paper, which was
published exactly 40 years ago, warned how tightening monetary policy without
fiscal support might actually make inflation go higher rather than lower. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 106%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;">The implications for U.S. monetary policy are
quite interesting should an event like this unfold. A determined Fed may try to
fight inflation by raising its policy rate. The result is likely to be a temporary
disinflation and recession. Should fiscal policy remain unaltered, the
logic provided by Sargent and Wallace implies that inflation will return even
higher than before as the deficit must increase to finance a larger interest
expense on the debt. The best the Fed can do in this case is to lower its
policy rate, announce a temporarily higher inflation target, and hope that the
fiscal authority gets its house in order. The notion that a Volcker-like policy
would lower the long-run rate of inflation depends on fiscal capitulation. This
capitulation to some extent did happen under Volcker, although keep in mind he
had considerable Congressional support from both sides of the aisle. I do not
think this type of political support is something one can count on, especially
given today’s political climate. So, you may want to buckle up, as we may be in
for some interesting times ahead.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Related Readings:<p></p><p>Is it Time for Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic? Link to <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2021/03/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant.html">blog post</a>. Link to <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2021/05/26/is-it-time-for-some-unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic">paper</a>.</p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-35194518777738890522021-04-26T18:09:00.001-07:002021-04-26T18:09:22.321-07:00Labor Force Participation Gaps Between the U.S. and Canada<p>Am hearing some talk about whether the U.S. labor market can fully recover to its pre-Covid19 levels. Is it possible that a sizeable number of workers with marginal attachment to the workforce decide to remain out of the labor force? For example, this crisis, unlike the one that preceded it, has been associated with large increases in personal wealth. Workers on the cusp of retiring may now choose to do so earlier? (This is just one of the many stories I hear.)</p><p>For what it's worth, I thought I'd update my labor market participate blog post from 2013 which compared participation rates across Canada and the U.S., for males and females, and across different age categories. You can find my old post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2013/12/labor-force-participation-gaps-us-vs.html">here</a> along with some links to related posts. Below I report the updated data.</p><p>Remember, an individual is counted "in the labor force" if they are either employed (working) or unemployed (actively searching for work) in the previous 4 weeks from the time the labor force survey enquires about labor market status. </p><p>First up, prime-age women. </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-ZmEdvrLiNYk/YIdih_nqmsI/AAAAAAAAIA4/7RoWnuTtyNITpic3R_cKuBp3buMblPZeACLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-ZmEdvrLiNYk/YIdih_nqmsI/AAAAAAAAIA4/7RoWnuTtyNITpic3R_cKuBp3buMblPZeACLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p>The increase in female labor participation is well-known. Less well-known is how U.S. female participation rates have diverged from other countries (I think Canada is more similar to Europe, last time I checked). Let's take a look at prime-age men.</p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-ZcK1yxRxWIU/YIdjCezdYgI/AAAAAAAAIBA/7mINoZ0J3Lo01cY4R22p4Smt-gpg9uoOQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-ZcK1yxRxWIU/YIdjCezdYgI/AAAAAAAAIBA/7mINoZ0J3Lo01cY4R22p4Smt-gpg9uoOQCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p>For the U.S., a secular decline throughout the sample, with evidence of a short-lived rebound from 2016-2019. The Canada-U.S. gap emerged during the Great Recession and is now wider than its ever been. This does suggest there's considerable room for an employment rebound for this demographic. But what accounts for the cross-country gap? </p><p>I provide the other diagrams without commentary. </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-audjvpdrD6o/YIdjsfLnTOI/AAAAAAAAIBI/ZJzHsIN9w94X9fnotdr975Em1Gmyf4k7gCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="381" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-audjvpdrD6o/YIdjsfLnTOI/AAAAAAAAIBI/ZJzHsIN9w94X9fnotdr975Em1Gmyf4k7gCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/--n8H-llEeng/YIdjvaJNEiI/AAAAAAAAIBM/fFXe4B65jDU7TjPK3gXZs5Xm9n_yFDjIwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/--n8H-llEeng/YIdjvaJNEiI/AAAAAAAAIBM/fFXe4B65jDU7TjPK3gXZs5Xm9n_yFDjIwCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Ot1EniLBO0Q/YIdjz3xpp-I/AAAAAAAAIBQ/Ynii8E9jT2A42LvgixZaXze5n5w4sTNegCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="379" data-original-width="534" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Ot1EniLBO0Q/YIdjz3xpp-I/AAAAAAAAIBQ/Ynii8E9jT2A42LvgixZaXze5n5w4sTNegCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-LrzbEapn8qM/YIdj5AMpjYI/AAAAAAAAIBU/LlRvlJXTyj4AigddnWtlJKuJcuJFQSuVwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-LrzbEapn8qM/YIdj5AMpjYI/AAAAAAAAIBU/LlRvlJXTyj4AigddnWtlJKuJcuJFQSuVwCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-gKctbgHDy1o/YIdj8cxfDEI/AAAAAAAAIBY/h-P8c9n_50Q6yLLp77RGU2EAQK5WLP37QCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="379" data-original-width="535" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-gKctbgHDy1o/YIdj8cxfDEI/AAAAAAAAIBY/h-P8c9n_50Q6yLLp77RGU2EAQK5WLP37QCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Ys_W3Zdgni0/YIdj_e-X8GI/AAAAAAAAIBg/fUCyZsTJV4Q2fugEmNcS6PPRLJgFi88tgCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="380" data-original-width="536" height="284" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Ys_W3Zdgni0/YIdj_e-X8GI/AAAAAAAAIBg/fUCyZsTJV4Q2fugEmNcS6PPRLJgFi88tgCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h284/image.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-4292271148797831842021-04-23T11:16:00.002-07:002021-05-05T09:13:20.987-07:00On the Role and Future of Cryptocurrencies<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-fHacf64nha0/YIMHWMeU2PI/AAAAAAAAEis/IF3D7QG2xC4_0GMolfIYhct2pWkOIEZawCLcBGAsYHQ/s600/Slide1_JPG.webp" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="450" data-original-width="600" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-fHacf64nha0/YIMHWMeU2PI/AAAAAAAAEis/IF3D7QG2xC4_0GMolfIYhct2pWkOIEZawCLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Slide1_JPG.webp" width="320" /></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">My former colleague <a href="https://www.howardwall.org/">Howard Wall</a> asked me to join <a href="https://economics.gmu.edu/people/lwhite11">Lawrence White</a> yesterday evening to discuss the role and future of cryptocurrencies at an <a href="https://www.hammondinstitute.org/cryptocurrencies-apr-2021">event</a> hosted by the Hammond Institute for Free Enterprise. It was a great honor to share the stage with Larry. </span><p></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I've been thinking about cryptocurrencies for a long time; many of my writings and talks on the subject can be found <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2017/12/my-perspective-on-bitcoin-project.html">here</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">. My thoughts on the subject are evolving as I learn more about the phenomenon. For what it's worth, I thought I'd share my opening remarks with interested readers below. As usual, any feedback is welcome.</span><span style="font-family: helvetica;"> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /><span style="line-height: 107%;"><b><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">The Role and Future of Cryptocurrencies</span></b></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">A money and
payments system is about managing databases containing the money accounts of
individuals and organizations. Any database management system must necessarily
define read and write protocols. Read privileges specify who can view what on
the database. Write privileges specify who gets to write what to the database. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">So, for
example, we can read what’s in our bank account. So can the bank and its
regulators. But other people cannot see how much money is held in any account
apart from their own. While we cannot write directly to our account, we can
send our bank instructions to so on our behalf. The bank can also write directly
to our account. It may, for example, credit our account with interest, or debit
it for service fees. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Note that bank
accounts are digital. Moreover, the messages we send to our bank over the
Internet are secured with the aid of cryptography. In this sense, one could say
that bank deposits are a form of cryptocurrency. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Bank
deposits, however, are not typically viewed as cryptocurrencies. Well then, what
are the distinguishing characteristics of a cryptocurrency? It’s not so
clear-cut, but two things come to my mind. First, the database for a
cryptocurrency is typically associated with an open-read privilege. This
implies that the database can, in principle, at least, be subject to audits
from any person, or any agency, at any time, all the time. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This property offers a degree of financial
transparency that is unheard of in conventional money services businesses. Second,
the task of managing the database is typically decentralized in some manner to
“validator nodes;” or, what one might label more mundanely as “accountants” in
the non-crypto world. What is interesting here is how these validators are
potentially recruited and compensated. For Bitcoin, anyone can potentially
become a validator and compensation arrives in the form of a stochastic reward.</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">When it
comes to keeping track of money balances, an open-write privilege is problematic.
This is known as the double-spend problem. In conventional payment systems, the
double-spend problem is solved by delegating database management to a trusted
third party. A cryptocurrency like Bitcoin or Ethereum must instead rely on a
consensus mechanism that somehow ensures that a dispersed write-privilege does
not result in garbage being written to the database. To date, the most popular
mechanisms are based on PoW (Proof of Work) and PoS (Proof of Stake). But there
are others as well, and one should expect innovation along this dimension
since, as far as I know, no existing consensus mechanism has yet proven to be entirely
satisfactory. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Of course,
the same can be said of conventional database management systems. To young
eyes, the current system seems a hopelessly tangled mess of databases that have
trouble communicating with each other. Moreover, they appear not to be very
secure at times. But despite the problems we all encounter with the modern
banking system, one should, in fairness, acknowledge the tremendous
achievements that have taken place over the last fifty years. For example, we
are now able to travel to foreign countries with just a credit card. This is
not the way things worked until relatively recently. Anyone who has had the
experience of needing traveler’s checks can fill you in on what it was like to
travel in the old days.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Well, if
there’s been so much progress in money and payments, what accounts for the emergence
and proliferation of cryptocurrencies? <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">As is so
often the case, I think the fundamental cause of this development is rapid
technological change moving against a relatively slow-moving incumbency that
includes banks, money services businesses, and especially their regulators. In
saying this, I do not mean to assign blame; the inertial properties of existing
institutional arrangements likely has some merit. Institutional inertia can stabilizing,
for example. But to benefit the communities they serve, institutions also have to evolve to meet the
challenges of new technologies. And I think this is happening today in the
sphere of money and payments.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">What new
technologies are we talking about? Innovations in communications, like the
Internet, have been transformational. As well, there have been advances in data
storage and cryptography that have played a critical role. All these
innovations are, however, within the grasp of incumbent banks and money service
businesses. And indeed, incumbents have made use of these technologies. Internet
banking and PayPal are real things, after all. I think the important innovation as
far as cryptocurrencies are concerned isthe development of database
management protocols that permits a degree of decentralization for managing large
databases. I say “large” databases because we already have decentralized
database management systems for small communities, like gift exchange or the
exchange of favors among friends (see: <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/05/why-blockchain-should-be-familiar-to-you.html">Why the Blockchain Should be Familiar to You</a>). Advances in data storage and communications
have, in effect, permitted this ancient form of communal record-keeping to
scale. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">The
decentralized or communal aspect of managing a database is, of course, very
much at odds with the notion of delegating the responsibility to a privileged
set of institutions. Some people believe that these developments will lead to a
revolution—an overthrow of existing institutions—a triumph in democracy over a
privileged class. What is much more likely is an evolution of existing
institutions to accommodate the threat posed by the potential usurpers in a
manner that serves the broader community. In short, what we are likely to
witness is the usual pattern of economic development in relatively well-functioning
societies. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">What do
cryptocurrencies offer individuals and society? What are the concerns of
regulators and policymakers?<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">To answer
these questions, we need to recognize that there are different classes of
cryptocurrencies, each of which cater to a specific constituency. Broadly, they
can be categorized as belonging to one of two groups distinguished by their
respective exchange rate regimes and governance structures. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">In one
group, we have the decentralized autonomous organizations, like Bitcoin. From
the perspective of domestic policymakers, Bitcoin can be viewed as foreign
currency operating under a floating exchange rate regime. Except that there’s
no negotiating with Bitcoin (there's no negotiating with some countries either). The intermediaries that deal or broker BTC
transactions can, however, be regulated. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">In the other
group, we have the so-called stablecoins, like USD Coin (sponsored by Circle
and Coinbase) and Diem (sponsored by Facebook). To domestic policymakers,
stablecoins can be viewed as checkable mutual funds operating under a unilateral
fixed exchange rate regime utilizing various forms of collateral. The major
innovation here has less to do with technological innovation and more to do
with the willingness and ability to process USD payments outside the commercial
banking sector. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Viewed in
this light, cryptocurrencies do not look so unfamiliar. As a foreign
currency operating under a floating exchange rate, they’ll likely never displace the domestic unit of account. They may,
however, serve as store-of-value or portfolio hedge. And they may facilitate
certain kinds of payments, typically on-chain and large-value. As a stablecoin
offering a par exchange rate, they suffer from all the usual problems of
uninsured fractional reserve banking—unless they promise to back their
currencies fully with USD cash. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">The question
here is whether these products are offering something fundamentally more
cost-effective when it comes to making payments, or whether they owe their
existence primarily to regulatory arbitrage. I do not know the answer to this
question, but I suspect that much of what they have to offer comes from the
latter. Diem, for example, can bypass banking regulations by not becoming a
bank. It can leverage Facebook’s huge social network as a payment system
connecting 2B+ users around the world. It can potentially offer
money-transmitting services for “free” or, rather, in exchange for personal
data. My guess is that banks (or even PayPal) are not permitted operate in this manner. Regulatory advantage: Diem. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">Regulators
need to keep a close eye on these structures since it is politically impossible
to commit to the doctrine of caveat emptor when it comes to money and banking.
The temptation, as always, will be to replace “cash” for higher-yielding “cash
equivalents” on the balance sheet. The structure slowly evolves into an
uninsured fractional reserve bank, but in the shadow bank sector. If something
goes wrong, depositors will seek compensation, first from the firm and then from the government. After all, how could a
government knowingly permit such an unstable structure to exist in the first
place? <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">To sum up, I
think the future of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin is to serve as an alternative
asset class for investors. I doubt that it will ever become a dominant medium
of exchange in any large economy. Fractional reserve banks using BTC as
reserves are not likely to be tolerated. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: medium;">The future
of stablecoins seems more interesting to me. In the first instance, they seem
capable of filling the gaps that remain apparent in modern day payment systems
(think correspondent banking here). But the main effect here is likely to spur
conventional banks and their regulators to fill these gaps at a faster pace. There
is a possibility that a project like Diem might one day abandon its peg to the
USD and offer itself as a stand-alone currency. Policymakers would in that case
be concerned about a country maintaining monetary policy sovereignty. One manifestation
of this concern could be a pre-emptive action on the part of the government,
for example, by offering its own universally-accessible CBDC. </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></span></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-9846023807596480942021-03-31T13:53:00.001-07:002021-03-31T15:38:27.439-07:00A Natural Rate of Interest<p>This post was motivated by a conversation with Eric Lonergan. It began with a simple question: what should be the interest rate paid on reserves? I answered that according to theories I'm familiar with, reserves should earn the "natural" rate of interest, which I defined as the sum of population and productivity growth. So, assuming 2% "real" growth and 2% inflation, reserves (and government debt more generally) should be yielding around 4%. </p><p>I think it's fair to say most people did not find my answer very satisfying. So I thought I'd take a moment to explain how I arrived at it. I want to do so in the context of a model economy. Let me describe the model first. We can discuss its limitations and possible extensions later on. </p><p>Consider an economy where people live for two periods; they are "young" and then become "old." Let N(t) denote the population of young at date t. Assume that the population grows at (gross) rate n; that is, N(t) = nN(t-1). In this "overlapping generations" model, the population at date t is given by N(t)+N(t-1). </p><p>Individuals in this economy generate y units of perishable output (goods and services) when they are young. I'm going to treat y as fixed over time. This implies that the RGDP at date t is given by N(t)y and that the RGDP grows at rate n over time (there is no productivity growth). In what follows, I label n the "natural" rate of interest. </p><p>Suppose that people only value consumption when they are old. This poses an interesting economic problem. The young can produce goods that the old value, but the old have no way of paying for these goods. Private credit markets don't work here. </p><p>The cooperative solution is very simple: the young should "gift" their goods y to the old. If everyone followed this cooperative protocol, then the young of generation t would consume (in their old age) c(t+1) = N(t+1)y/N(t) = ny. </p><p>That is, by following this protocol, it's as if the young "deposit" their income y in a savings account that generates a (gross) real yield equal to n, the "natural" rate of interest. </p><p>Since private competitive markets cannot be expected to implement this socially-desirable outcome, what other mechanisms might be employed? In small communities, reciprocal gift exchange seems to work quite well. In the present context, the young look after their parents, expecting their children to return the favor, and so on. </p><p>Larger communities need to rely on other mechanisms. In the present context, a PAYGO social security system that taxes the young y and pays the old ny would do the trick. </p><p>The same outcome could be achieved through monetary exchange. Suppose the government lets all individuals open a central bank money account. The government creates (out of thin air) M dollars and credit the accounts of the "initial old" with M/N(0) dollars. Assume that M is kept constant over time. The old are expected to spend these dollars on a competitive spot market, where goods exchange for dollars at price p(t). </p><p>The equilibrium price-level is easy to derive in this example. At any date t, we have N(t-1) old people collectively holding M dollars. These M dollars will be spent (the old have no reason not to) on the goods available for sale, N(t)y. The market-clearing condition here is M = p(t)N(t)y at every date t. Because both M and y are constant, and because population N(t) is growing at rate n, it follows that the equilibrium price-level p(t) must be falling at rate n. </p><p>So, if we interpret M as "reserves" in this model economy, then reserves yielding the natural rate of interest would be consistent with economic efficiency. If reserves yield zero nominal interest rate, then efficiency requires some deflation. But the same outcome is possible if reserves were to yield a nominal interest rate n in a zero-inflation rate regime. </p><p>This result continues to hold for more general preferences. Suppose that people care about consumption when young and old. Then the young will only want to consume a fraction of their income. That fraction will depend on (among other things) the real rate of return they expect on their retirement savings. As it turns out, the so-called "Golden Rule" allocation requires that money/bonds yield the natural rate of interest. </p><p>Is this a good place to start thinking about Eric's question? It may be a good place to start, but we don't want to stop here. The analytical framework above is "bare bones." Among other things, my analysis implicitly assumes that there is no difference between reserves and government treasury securities. Does this matter? If it does, the reasons need to be spelled out. What modifications to the simple model above would imply that to meet a given social objective, it is desirable to have reserves yield less than treasury securities? In reality there is duration risk. But why does the Treasury issue bonds with different maturities in the first place? Moreover, why are these bonds purposefully rendered illiquid (for example, by discouraging the Fed from monetizing the entire bond issue or, at least, from setting up standing purchase facilities?). The answers to these questions are not immediately obvious to me. But they may be to you! </p><p><br /></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-47659225599730078122021-03-04T10:18:00.010-08:002021-03-04T10:33:38.260-08:00Is it time for some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic?<span>The title of this post alludes to a paper written by Tom Sargent and Neil Wallace 40 years ago "<a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/quarterly-review/some-unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic">Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic</a>." The startling conclusion of this paper is that a central bank (limited to interest rate policy and/or open market operations) does not have unilateral control over the long-run rate of inflation. The result is made all the more powerful by the fact that it relies mostly on arithmetic and only minimally on theory.</span><div><span> </span></div><div><span>So, what's the basic idea? First, begin with the fact that monetary and fiscal policy are inextricably linked via a consolidated government budget constraint. This implies that monetary policy will have fiscal consequences. In particular, interest-rate policy affects the interest expense associated with rolling over any given amount of government debt. The question is how the fiscal authority intends to finance interest expense. There are two basic ways it can to do this: (1) use primary surplus (increase taxes and/or cut spending); (2) issue debt. The first option is associated with what economists call a <i>Ricardian</i> fiscal policy; the second option is associated with a <i>Non-Ricardian</i> fiscal policy. </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>A central bank has no control over (1) or (2); these are determined by the tax and spend decisions made by the fiscal authority. Suppose the fiscal authority chooses (2). If so, then what is accomplished by increasing the policy rate? <i>Ceteris paribus</i>, it increases the rate at which nominal debt is issued. This is arithmetic. If nominal debt is money (and it is), then this must lead to higher inflation, not lower inflation. </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>The corollary here is that a central bank has no unilateral control over the long-run rate of inflation. A central bank may be permitted to choose a long-run inflation target, but only with the blessing of the fiscal authority. Canadians know this: the Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada meet every five years to review their joint inflation-control agreement. In other jurisdictions, the central bank simply assumes that fiscal policy will be conducted in a "responsible" manner (i.e., a manner that will not un-anchor long-run inflation expectations). </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>If the primary deficit is managed in a manner to anchor long-run inflation, then the central bank is left free to use interest rate policy for the purpose of stabilizing shocks to aggregate demand. To stabilize the inflation rate around target requires, in this context, that the central bank raises its policy rate aggressively against above-target inflation. (Hopefully, even the <i>threat</i> of such a response keeps inflation close to target. This is the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_rule#The_Taylor_principle">Taylor principle</a>.) </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>The question monetary policymakers might want to mull over these days is whether this standard policy prescription is appropriate in an environment where the traditional fiscal support for inflation-targeting seems to be waning? I want to be clear here: I am <i>not</i> saying this is happening today or that it will happen in the future. I'm saying that it <i>might</i> happen and that if it does, monetary policy makers should have a contingency plan in place. What should this contingency plan look like? </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>So, to take a concrete example, suppose that the tax and spend decisions coming from Congress imply an elevated primary deficit for the foreseeable future. Perhaps there's been a "regime change" in thinking that transcends political parties so, no matter who controls Congress, the expectation is for elevated primary deficits for as long as we can see. (I am not suggesting this is good or bad, I'm just saying suppose.)</span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>Next, suppose the economy is humming along at or near what anyone would call "full employment." And then suppose inflation rises to 3, 4, 5% or higher and stays there with no sign of ever wanting to return to the Fed's official 2% long-run inflation target. What should the FOMC do in this hypothetical scenario? (Again, consider this as the type of thought-experiment that is necessary to form a contingency plan -- I do not mean to suggest that this scenario is likely, only that it is possible--and not in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KX5jNnDMfxA">Dumb and Dumber way</a>). </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>The monetary policy advice coming from a model like Sargent and Wallace (1981) might suggest something like this: <i>For as long as Congress remains in a regime of high primary deficits</i>, </span></div><div><span><br /></span></div><div><span>[1] Keep policy rate low, or even lower it, if possible; and </span></div><div><span>[2] Announce a temporarily higher inflation target (consistent with the new fiscal regime).</span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>Recommendation [1] comes from Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Increasing the interest rate in this fiscal regime will only lead to higher inflation. Lowering the interest rate has the opposite effect. If recommendation [2] is not adopted, the monetary authority would have to explain (after every meeting) why it is missing its 2% inflation target. They might, of course, just say it's "temporary," but this would wear thin after a few years. </span></div><div><span><br /></span></div><div><span>This advice is based on the assumption that everyone knows there's been a change in fiscal regime and that it will be persistent. What if no one is really sure of regime change or, if regime change, how long it might last? </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>The prudent thing to do in this more realistic case is to hedge your bets. In terms of [1], one might recommend raising the policy rate, but not by as much as would normally be done given the observed inflationary pressure. In terms of [2], one could probably get away with maintaining the long-run inflation target at 2% and legitimately explaining away deviations from target as "transitory." </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>Probably the last thing monetary policy should do <i>under these circumstances</i> is to raise the policy rate aggressively against inflationary pressure (as recommended by the Taylor principle). The Taylor rule works fine under a Ricardian fiscal policy. But it may backfire un a Non-Ricardian fiscal policy--this was the whole point of Sargent and Wallace (1981). </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>Tightening monetary policy might</span><span> have the effect of bringing inflation down </span><i>temporarily </i><span>(this is consistent with the Sargent and Wallace model). But in reality (and </span><span>in some models, like </span><a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2019/01/14/understanding-lowflation">here</a><span> and </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BuVQKjSDfRHprmQN5ZsqCTq0q_GmNWvE/view">here</a><span>)</span><span>, this would come at the cost of economic recession. </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>I can see no rationale for creating a recession to bring inflation down temporarily. But there may be a political-economy rationale for the <i>threat</i> of such a policy. That is, a Congress that does not trust future Congresses may want to create an independent (but accountable) central bank to pursue a low-inflation mandate and to do whatever it can with interest rate policy to achieve that mandate, even at the cost of recession. Future Congresses are in this manner obliged to behave in a Ricardian manner (so only temporary deficits permitted), which has the effect of anchoring long-run inflation. </span></div><div><span><br /></span></div><div><span>Well, maybe. But I can't help but think of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Strangelove">Dr. Strangelove</a> here. </span></div><div><span> </span></div><div><span>PS. I recently gave a talk on this that you can view <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8emovgTQ06w&feature=emb_logo">here</a> beginning at the 3 hour 12 minute mark.</span></div><div><br /></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-34991404685595935482021-02-21T11:59:00.026-08:002021-02-23T23:49:34.911-08:00A Journey in Macroeconomic Thinking<p>I've been thinking a bit lately about theories of the business cycle (a lot of time for reflection in these days of COVID-19). At least, the way some of these theories have evolved over my lifetime and from the perspective of my own training in the field. From my (admittedly narrow) perspective as a researcher and advisor at a central bank, the journey beginning c. 1960 seems like it's taken the following steps: (1) Phillips Curve and some Natural Rate Hypothesis; (2) Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory; (3) New Keynesian theory. It seems like we might be ready to take the next step. I'll offer some thoughts on this at the end, for whatever they're worth. </p><p>There's no easy way to summarize the state of macroeconomic thinking, of course. But it seems clear that, at any given time, some voices and ways of thinking are more dominant than others. By the time the 1960s rolled around, there seemed to be a consensus that monetary and fiscal policy should be used to stabilize the business cycle. The main issue, in this regard, revolved over which set of instruments was better suited for the job. (See, for example, this <a href="https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/meltzer/monetary_fiscal_friedman_1969.pdf">classic debate between Milton Friedman and Walter Heller</a>). </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-xnifT-Di9zI/YDJyx93GOCI/AAAAAAAAEdY/pea0EqFMKqoEQjih5sGEmV3W5gupDlLYQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1219" data-original-width="800" height="240" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-xnifT-Di9zI/YDJyx93GOCI/AAAAAAAAEdY/pea0EqFMKqoEQjih5sGEmV3W5gupDlLYQCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="158" /></a></div>Central to macroeconomic thinking at the time was a concept called the Phillips Curve (PC). There is a subtle, but important, distinction to make here between the PC as a statistical correlation and the PC as a <i>theory</i> of that statistical relationship. In 1958, Phillips noticed an interesting pattern in the data: nominal wage growth seemed negatively correlated with the unemployment rate in the U.K. over the period 1913-48 (see diagram to the right). How to interpret this correlation? One theory is that when the unemployment rate is high, workers are easy to find and their bargaining position is weak, leading to small nominal wage gains. Conversely, when unemployment is low, available workers are scarce and their bargaining position is strong, leading to large nominal wage gains. <br /><p></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-YVQuumn-KAs/YDJ-IJYaZdI/AAAAAAAAEdk/58-n7LiAQxMW8K9zM1QRaSEfCGH5QOQWACLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="233" data-original-width="216" height="240" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-YVQuumn-KAs/YDJ-IJYaZdI/AAAAAAAAEdk/58-n7LiAQxMW8K9zM1QRaSEfCGH5QOQWACLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="222" /></a></div>Then, in 1960, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow wrote their classic piece "<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815021?seq=1">Problem of Achieving and Maintaining a Stable Price-Level: Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy</a>." Then, as is the case still now, the authors lamented the lack of consensus on a theory of price inflation. Various cost-push and demand-pull hypotheses were reviewed, problems of identification noted, and calls for micro-data to help settle the issue were made. They also mentioned Phillips' article and noted how the same diagram for the U.S. looked like a shot-gun blast (little correlation, except for some sub-samples). Then they translated the Phillips curve using price inflation instead of wage inflation. No data was sacrificed in this exercise; their "theory" was summarized with the diagram to the left. <br /><p></p><p><br /></p><p>I put "theory" in quotes in the passage above because the theory (explanation) was never clear to me. In particular, while I could see how an increase in the rate of unemployment might depress the level wage, I could not grasp how it could influence the rate of growth of wages for any prolonged period of time. This logical inconsistency was solved by the Phelps-Friedman natural rate hypothesis; see <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19267/w19267.pdf">Farmer (2013)</a> for a summary and critique. </p><p>The TL;DR version of this hypothesis is that the PC is negatively sloped only in the short-run, but vertical in the long-run. So, while monetary policy (increasing the rate of inflation) could lower the unemployment rate below its natural rate, it could only do so temporarily. Eventually, the unemployment rate would move back to its natural rate at the higher rate of inflation. This hypothesis seemed to provide a compelling interpretation of the stagflation (high inflation and high unemployment) experienced in the 1970s. It also seemed to explain the success of Volcker's disinflation policy in the 1980s. Nevertheless, uneasiness in the state of the theory remained and a new (well, nothing is ever completely new) way of theorizing was on the horizon.</p><p>By the time I got to grad school in the late 1980s, "real business cycle theory" was in vogue; see Charles Plosser's summary <a href="http://faculty.wwu.edu/kriegj/Econ407/Reading%20List/Plosser-Understanding%20Real%20Business%20Cycles.pdf">here</a> and Bob King's lecture notes <a href="http://people.bu.edu/rking/EC702/BULEC11&12.pdf">here</a>. </p><p>There was a lot going on with this program. A central thesis of RBC theory is that the phenomena of economic growth and business cycles are inextricably linked. This is, of course, is an old idea in economics going back at least to Dennis Robertson (see <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-12567-8_2">this review</a> by Charles Goodhart) and explored extensively by a number of Austrian economists, like Joseph Schumpeter. </p><p>The idea that "the business cycle" is to some extent a byproduct of the process of economic development is an attractive hypothesis. Economic growth is driven by technological innovation and diffusion, and perhaps regulatory policies. There is no <i>a priori</i> reason to expect these "real" processes to evolve in a "smooth" manner. In fact, these changes appear to arrive randomly and with little or <i>no mean-reverting properties</i>. It would truly be a marvel if the business cycle did not exist. </p><p>The notion of "no mean-reverting properties" is important. It basically means that technology/policy shocks are largely permanent (or at least, highly persistent). If macroeconomic variables like the GDP inherit this property, then a "cycle"--the tendency for a variable to return to some long-run trend--does not even exist (and if you think you see it, it's only a figment of your imagination). For this reason, early proponents of RBC theory preferred the label "fluctuations" over "cycle." This view was supported by the fact that econometricians had a hard time rejecting the hypothesis that the real GDP followed a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_walk">random walk</a> (with drift). For example, here is Canadian GDP plotted against two realizations of a random walk with drift:<br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-pvNPJNCBjwY/YDFUUQY0eMI/AAAAAAAAEcE/dUuy23Cb-TY-tvvNWjzR2V0ZacaC02e-QCLcBGAsYHQ/s613/randomwalk.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="425" data-original-width="613" height="278" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-pvNPJNCBjwY/YDFUUQY0eMI/AAAAAAAAEcE/dUuy23Cb-TY-tvvNWjzR2V0ZacaC02e-QCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h278/randomwalk.png" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p>This perspective fermented at a time when the cost of computing power was falling dramatically. This permitted economists to study models that were too complicated to analyze with conventional "pencil and paper" methods. Inspiration was provided by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1992030?seq=1">Lucas (1980)</a>, who wrote:</p><p></p><blockquote>Our task, as I see it…is to write a FORTRAN program
that will accept specific economic policy rules as ‘input’ and will generate as
‘output’ statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we
care about, which are predicted to result from these policies.”</blockquote><p></p><p>And so that's what people did. But what sort of statistics were model economies supposed to reproduce? Once again, it was <a href="https://cemi.com.au/sites/all/publications/Lucas%20(1976).pdf">Lucas (1976)</a> who provided the needed guidance. The empirical business cycle regularities emphasized by Lucas were "co-movements" between different aggregate time-series. Employment, for example, is "pro-cyclical" (tends to move in the same direction as GDP) around "trend." These types of regularities can be captured by statistics like correlations. But these correlations (and standard deviations) only make sense for stationary time-series, and the data is mostly non-stationary. So, what to do? </p><p>Transforming the data through first-differencing (i.e., looking at growth rates instead of levels) is one way to render (much of) the data stationary. Another approach was made popular by <a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/quarterly-review/theory-ahead-of-business-cycle-measurement">Prescott (1986)</a>, who advocated a method that most people employ: draw a smooth line through the data, label it "trend," and then examine the behavior of "deviations from trend." Something like this, </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ppdHWLjk8ts/YDFqARP5VGI/AAAAAAAAEcQ/NwaYCft9_zwAdBcKL3G2PhGjUabLXHr5gCLcBGAsYHQ/s439/Detrended.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="385" data-original-width="439" height="351" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ppdHWLjk8ts/YDFqARP5VGI/AAAAAAAAEcQ/NwaYCft9_zwAdBcKL3G2PhGjUabLXHr5gCLcBGAsYHQ/w400-h351/Detrended.png" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p>It's important to note that Prescott viewed the trend line in the figure above as "statistical trend," not an "economic trend." To him, there was no deterministic trend, since the data was being generated by a random walk (so, the actual trend is stochastic). Nevertheless, drawing a smooth trend line was a useful way to render the data stationary. The idea was to apply the same de-trending procedure to actual data and simulated data, and then compare statistical properties across model and data.</p><p>The point of mentioning this is that no one involved in this program was conditioned to interpret the economy as "overheating" or in "depression." Growing economies exhibited <i>fluctuations</i>--sometimes big and persistent fluctuations. The question was how much of these observed fluctuations could be attributed purely to the process of economic development (technological change), without reference to monetary or financial factors? I think it's fair to say that the answer turned out to be "not much, at least, not at business cycle frequencies." The important action seemed to occur at lower frequencies. <a href="https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/darcillon-thibault/lucasmechanicseconomicgrowth.pdf">Lucas (1988)</a> once again provided the lead when he remarked "Once one starts to think about growth, it is hard to think about anything else." And so, the narrow RBC approach turned its attention to low-frequency dynamics; e.g., see my interview with Lee Ohanian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K07lvwvuRVA">here</a>. </p><p>Of course, many economists never bought into the idea that monetary and financial factors were unimportant for understanding business cycles. Allen and Gale, for example, schooled us on financial fragility; see <a href="http://www.sfu.ca/~dandolfa/Allen%20and%20Gale%202007.pdf">here</a>. But this branch of the literature never really made much headway in mainstream macro, at least, not before 2008. Financial crises were something that happened in history, or in other parts of the world. Instead, macroeconomists looked back on its roots in the 1960s and embedded a version of the PC into an RBC model to produce what is now known as the New Keynesian framework. Short-run money non-neutrality was achieved by assuming that nominal price-setting behavior was subject to frictions, rendering nominal prices "sticky." In this environment, shocks to the economy are not absorbed efficiently, at least, not in the absence of an appropriate monetary policy. And so, drawing inspiration from John Taylor and Michael Woodford, the framework added an interest rate policy rule now known as the Taylor rule. Today, the basic NK model consists of these three core elements:</p>[1] An IS curve: Relates aggregate demand to the real interest rate and shocks.<br />[2] An Phillips Curve: Relates the rate of inflation (around trend) to the output gap.<br />[3] A Taylor Rule: Describes how interest rate policy reacts to output and inflation gaps.<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-3GeH40zUK5A/YDGAC4ULsbI/AAAAAAAAEcc/j9jJZkikIZgE_TxI_Unk674M_W2MWlHpwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="428" data-original-width="747" height="183" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-3GeH40zUK5A/YDGAC4ULsbI/AAAAAAAAEcc/j9jJZkikIZgE_TxI_Unk674M_W2MWlHpwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="320" /></a></div>I have to be honest with you. I never took a liking to NK model. I'm more of an Old Keynesian, similar to <a href="https://www.rogerfarmer.com/">Roger Farmer</a> (we share the <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/e/pho22.html">same supervisor</a>, so perhaps this is no accident). In any case, the NK framework became (and continues to be) a core thought-organizing principle for central bank economists around the world. It has become a sort of <i>lingua franca</i> in academic macro circles. And if you don't know how to speak its language, you're going to have a hard time communicating with the orthodoxy. <p></p><p>Of the three basic elements of the NK model, I think the NK Phillips Curve (which embeds the natural rate hypothesis) has resulted in the most mischief; at least, from the perspective of advising the conduct of monetary policy. The concept is firmly embedded in the minds of many macroeconomists and policymakers. Consider, for example, Greg Mankiw's recent piece "<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/business/trade-inflation-unemployment-phillips.html">Yes, There is a Trade-Off Between Inflation and Unemployment</a>."</p><blockquote><span style="font-family: inherit;">Today, most economists believe there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the sense that actions taken by a central bank push these variables in opposite directions. As a corollary, they also believe there must be a minimum level of unemployment that the economy can sustain without inflation rising too high. But for various reasons, that level fluctuates and is difficult to determine.</span></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: inherit;"> The Fed’s job is to balance the competing risks of rising unemployment and rising inflation. Striking just the right balance is never easy. The first step, however, is to recognize that the Phillips curve is always out there lurking.</span></blockquote><p><i>The Phillips curve is always lurking</i>. The message for a central banker is "sure, inflation and unemployment may be low for now, but if we keep monetary policy where it is and permit the unemployment rate to fall further, we will risk higher inflation in the future." I'm not sure if economists who write in this manner are aware that they're making it sound like workers are somehow responsible for inflation. Central banker to workers: "I'm sorry, but we need to keep some of you unemployed...it's the inflation, you see." </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-cNB84UNeKbY/YDLPVuUYDDI/AAAAAAAAEeA/mHl-2UIhZGU-uSGkPxQWwVUQLIwieQ8cwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="240" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-cNB84UNeKbY/YDLPVuUYDDI/AAAAAAAAEeA/mHl-2UIhZGU-uSGkPxQWwVUQLIwieQ8cwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="320" /></a></div><p></p><p>There is evidence that this line of thinking influenced the FOMC in 2015 in its decision to "lift off" and return the policy rate to some historically normal level; see my post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/08/arguments-for-and-against-lift-off.html">here</a> explaining the pros and cons in the lift-off debate. By the start of 2014, there was considerable pressure on the Fed to begin "normalizing" its policy rate. By mid 2014, the expectation of "lift off" likely contributed to significant USD appreciation and the economic weakness that followed. If I recall correctly, Vice Chair Stan Fischer started off the year by announcing that four rate hikes for 2015 were in order (as it turned out, the Fed only raised rates once--in December). To some observers, this all seemed very strange. After all, the unemployment rate was still above its estimated "natural" rate (5%) and inflation continued to undershoot its 2% target. What was going on?</p><p>What was going on was the Phillips curve. Here is Chair Yellen at the March 17-18, 2015 FOMC meeting (transcript available <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20150318meeting.pdf">here</a>):</p><blockquote>If we adopt alternative B, one criterion for an initial tightening is that we need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. For the remainder of this year, my guess is that it will be hard to point to data demonstrating that inflation is actually moving up toward our objective. Measured on a 12-month basis, both core and headline inflation will very likely be running below 1½ percent all year. That means that if we decide to start tightening later this year, a development that I think is likely, we will have to justify our inflation forecasts using indirect evidence, historical experience, and economic theory.</blockquote><div><blockquote>The argument from history and economic theory seems straightforward. Experience here and abroad teaches us that, as resource utilization tightens, eventually inflation will begin to rise. To me, this seems like a simple matter of demand and supply. So the more labor and product markets tighten, the more confident I’ll become in the inflation outlook. Because of the lags in monetary policy, the current high degree of monetary accommodation, and the speed at which the unemployment rate is coming down, it would, to my mind, be imprudent to wait until inflation is much closer to 2 percent to begin to normalize policy. I consider this a strong argument for an initial tightening with inflation still at low levels, and it’s one that I plan to make. But I also recognize and am concerned that, at least in recent years, the empirical relationship between slack and inflation has been quite weak.</blockquote></div><div>Now, I don't want to make too much of this particular episode. Personally, I don't think it had a major impact on the recovery dynamic. But I do think it had an impact; in particular, the pace of improvement in labor market conditions temporarily slowed. It was an unforced error (as I think other members of the Committee sensed as well). </div><div> </div><div>I think the lift-off episode has contributed to a general re-thinking of the Phillips curve and the natural rate hypothesis. The notion of an economy operating at "excess capacity" has always seemed a bit strange to me, let alone the idea that excess capacity as a cause of inflation (as opposed to a force operating on the price-level). Perhaps it is time to re-visit Milton Friedman's "plucking model." Instead of drawing a smooth line through the center of a time-series, Friedman drew a line that defined a ceiling (a capacity constraint). Shocks to the economy manifest themselves as "downward plucks" (as if plucking on an elastic band). </div><div><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-URjQ-RwNowI/YDHdB5tiElI/AAAAAAAAEdM/hwQyjItb6ygza5XJ3RkmtthNO2lmiPITwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img data-original-height="278" data-original-width="730" height="244" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-URjQ-RwNowI/YDHdB5tiElI/AAAAAAAAEdM/hwQyjItb6ygza5XJ3RkmtthNO2lmiPITwCLcBGAsYHQ/w640-h244/image.png" width="640" /></a></div><p></p><p>The plucking model is consistent with the observed cyclical asymmetry in unemployment rate fluctuations. And labor market search models are a natural way to model that asymmetry. In case you're interested, I develop a super-simple (and dare I say, elegant) search model here to demonstrate (and test) the idea: <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/136240?seq=1"><i>Evidence and Theory on the Cyclical Asymmetry in Unemployment Rate Fluctuations</i>, CJE 1997</a>). See also my blog post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-most-obvious-source-of-cyclical.html">here</a> as well as some recent work by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fsites.google.com%2Fsite%2Fdomenicoferraropersonalpage%2Fmanuscript.pdf%3Fattredirects%3D0%26d%3D1&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHI7-Lo9gPtIjxCCfljc9hGhMmPJA">Ferraro (RED, 2018)</a> and <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26351">Dupraz, Nakamura and Steinsson (2019)</a>. I like where this is going! </p><p>One attractive feature of search models, in my view, is that they model <i>relationship formation</i>. Relationships provide a very different mechanism for coordinating economic activity relative to the canonical economic view of anonymous spot exchange in centralized markets. In a relationship, spot prices do not matter as much as the dynamic path of these prices (and other important aspects) over the course of a relationship (see my critique of the sticky price hypothesis <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2010/07/sticky-price-hypothesis-critique.html">here</a>). The observation that retailers, in the early days of C-19, voluntarily rationed goods instead of raising prices makes little sense in anonymous spot exchange, but makes perfect sense for a merchant concerned with maintaining a good relationship with his or her customers. And merchant-supplier relationships can handle shortages without price signals (we're out of toilet paper--please send more!). In financial markets too, the amount of time that is spent forming and maintaining credit relationships is hugely underappreciated in economic modeling. Search theory turns out to be useful for interpreting the way money and bond markets work too. These markets are not like the centralized markets we see modeled in textbooks--they operate as <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w25239">decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets</a>, where relationships are key. One reason why economies sometimes take so long to recover after a shock is because the shock has destroyed an existing set of relationships. And it takes time to rebuild relationship capital.</p><p>Notions of "overheating" in this context probably do not apply to labor market variables, although there is still the possibility of an overaccumulation of certain types of physical capital in a boom (what the Austrians label "malinvestment"). Any "overheating" is likely to manifest itself primarily in asset prices. And sudden crashes in asset prices (whether <a href="https://josephzeira.weebly.com/uploads/5/7/3/4/57342721/99_journal_of_monetary_economics.pdf">driven by fundamentals</a> or not), can have significant consequences on real economic activity if asset valuations are used to support lines of credit. </p><p>Finally, we need a good theory of inflation. The NKPC theory of inflation is not, in my view, a completely satisfactory theory in this regard. To begin, it simply assumes that the central bank can target a long-run rate of inflation (implicitly, with the support of a Ricardian fiscal policy, though this is rarely, if ever, mentioned). At best, it is a theory of how inflation can temporarily depart from its long-run target and how interest rate policy can be used to influence transition dynamics. But the really interesting questions, in my view, have to do with monetary and fiscal policy coordination and what this entails for the ability of an "independent" central bank even to determine the long-run rate of inflation (<a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/quarterly-review/some-unpleasant-monetarist-arithmetic">Sargent and Wallace, 1981</a>). </p><p>I know what I've described only scratches the surface of this amazingly deep and broad field. Most of you have no doubt lived through your own process of discovery and contemplation in the world of macroeconomic theorizing. Feel free to share your thoughts below. </p></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-88685062205459089702020-09-09T13:17:00.009-07:002020-09-09T13:33:24.344-07:00Cochrane on debt II<p><span style="font-size: medium;">Yesterday, I posted a <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2020/09/cochrane-on-why-debt-matters.html">reply</a> to John Cochrane's <a href="https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/09/debt-matters.html" target="_blank">Sept 4 post</a> on the national debt. John alerted me to his Sept 6 update, which I somehow missed. Given this update (together with some personal correspondence), let me offer my own update. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">John begins with an equation describing the flow of government revenue and expenditure. With a debt/GDP ratio of one, the sustainable (primary) deficit/GDP ratio is given by g - r, where g = growth rate of NGDP and r = nominal interest rate on government debt (I include Federal Reserve liabilities and currency in this measure). John assumed g - r = 1% (so about $200B). In a post I published last year, I assumed g - r = 3% (so about $600B); see here: <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/05/is-us-budget-deficit-sustainable.html" target="_blank">Is the U.S. Budget Deficit Sustainable?</a> </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Two things to take away from these calculations. First, this arithmetic suggests that the U.S. federal government can easily run persistent primary budget deficits in the range of 1-3% of GDP. Not only does the debt not need to be paid off, but it can grow forever. Second, primary budget deficits are presently far in excess of this range. What does this imply?</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Let's step back and think about John's equation. The arithmetic of the government "budget constraint" basically says this:</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Deficit/GDP = [1 - (1+r)/(1+g)] x Debt/GDP</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Note that a sustainable primary deficit is only possible if r < g. If r > g, then a primary surplus is needed to service the interest expense of the debt. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Students of monetary theory may recognize the expression above as a Laffer curve for inflation finance. That is, in the case of currency we have r = 0. Let g represent the growth rate of the supply of currency and assume a constant RGDP (so that g also measures the growth rate of NGDP). Finally, replace debt with currency, so that </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Seigniorage revenue = [1 - 1/(1+g)] x Money/GDP </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Again, this is just arithmetic. Economic theory comes in through the assumption that the demand for money is decreasing in the rate of inflation, g. If this is true, then an increase in g has two opposing effects: it increases seigniorage revenue by increasing the inflation tax <i>rate</i>, but it lowers seigniorage revenue because it decreases the inflation tax <i>base</i>. There is a maximum amount of seigniorage revenue the government can collect by printing money. That is, there are limits to inflation finance. (See also my post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/03/sustainable-deficits.html" target="_blank">here</a>.)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Now, I know John is fond of saying that Federal Reserve liabilities and U.S. Treasury securities are essentially the same thing (especially if the former exist mainly as interest-bearing reserve accounts). I happen to agree with this view. But then we can use exactly the same logic to characterize the limits to bond finance, recognizing that U.S. Treasury securities are essentially money. To this end, assume that the Debt/GDP ratio is an increasing function of (r - g). To make things a little simpler, let me continue to assume zero RGDP growth, so that g represents both inflation and NGDP growth. Finally, let me assume that r is a monetary policy choice (just as setting r = 0 for currency is a policy choice). </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Next, we need a theory of inflation. In the models I work with, the rate of inflation in a steady state is determined by the growth rate of the nominal debt, g, which I also treat as a policy parameter. So, the magnitude r - g is policy-determined, at least, within some limits. By lowering r and increasing g, the government is making its securities less attractive for people to hold. But this just tells us that the demand for debt is lower than it otherwise might be--it does not tell us how large this demand is in the first place, or how it is likely to evolve over time owing to factors unrelated to r or g (e.g., regulatory demand, foreign demand, etc.).</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">So, with this apparatus in place, my interpretation of what worries John is the question of what happens if [1] the federal government finds itself near the top of the bond-seigniorage Laffer curve; and [2] a shock occurs that requires a large fiscal stimulus. Barring alternative forms of securing resources (e.g., through direct command/conscription), the government will not have the fiscal capacity to lay claim against the resources it needs. Printing more money/bonds here is not going to help even with zero interest rates. The ensuing inflation would simply put us on the right-hand-side of the Laffer curve -- the government's ability to secure resources would only <i>diminish</i>. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">Assuming I have captured at least a part of John's concern accurately, let me go on to critique it. To begin, there's nothing wrong with the logic I spelled out (I don't think). But I want to make a couple of points nevertheless.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">First, the demand for U.S. government securities (D/Y) seems to be growing very rapidly and for a very long time now. We know, anecdotally, that the UST is used widely as collateral in credit derivatives markets and repo, that foreign countries view it as a safe asset, that investors value its safety, and that recent changes to Dodd-Frank and Basel III have contributed to the regulatory demand for USTs. The global demand for the U.S. dollar is, if anything, growing more rapidly than ever (re: the recent "dollar shortages" that resulted in the Fed opening its central bank swap lines). We don't know where this limit is, but judging by how low U.S. inflation is (together with low UST yields), it seems fair to day that there's still plenty of fiscal capacity. (And I want to stress that this has nothing to do with the ability of a country to pay back its debt -- I'm not sure why John keeps mentioning this while at the same time understanding that this debt is money). </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">I suspect that John is likely to agree with what I just said. Sure, there may be more room now, but how much more? With bipartisan concern for debt absent in Congress, with no sign of inflation in sight, with interest rates so low, how can we <i>not</i> hit this limit at some point?</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">My own view is that we are bound to hit this limit (though, economists like Simon Wren-Lewis have warned me not to discount the forces of austerity). The question is what happens once we hit that limit? I say we get USD depreciation and some inflation (not hyperinflation). John seems to be worried about hyperinflation after all, which he likens to a debt rollover crisis. I just don't see it. (Of course, if John is simply suggesting that the fiscal authority will continue to run persistently large deficits in the face of high inflation, then I agree with him. While I don't see this happening, who can say for sure?)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span>Finally, what happens if we're near the debt limit and there's a shock. Well, what type of shock exactly? The type of shock that hit us in 2008 is likely to increase the demand for debt, <i>expanding</i> fiscal capacity. So, here too, I'm not sure what form the debt crisis is supposed to take. It would be great to appeal to a model (but please, not one of Greece).</span> </span></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-45124682058498568312020-09-08T11:13:00.002-07:002020-09-08T11:13:19.041-07:00Cochrane on why debt matters<div class="separator"><p style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="National Debt - HISTORY" height="168" src="https://www.history.com/.image/t_share/MTU3ODc5MDg2NDM2MzI4Nzc3/the-national-debt-clock-is-a-very-very-large-digital-display.jpg" width="251" /></p></div><p><span style="font-size: medium;">The stock of national debt is now larger than our annual national income in the United States. Is this something to worry about? Does it matter how big the debt-to-GDP ratio gets? Is there any limit to how large it can grow and, if so, what is it this limit and what factors determine it? A lot of people have been asking these questions lately. John Cochrane is the latest to opine on these questions here: <a href="https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/09/debt-matters.html" target="_blank">Debt Matters</a>. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">I'm not even sure where to begin. I suppose we can start with the famous debt clock pictured on the right. Whenever I look at the debt clock, I'm reminded of James Tobin who, in 1949 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1336267" target="_blank">remarked</a>: </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(68, 68, 68, 0.8);"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(68, 68, 68, 0.8);">The peace of mind of a conscientious American must be disturbed every time he is reminded that his government is 250 billion dollars in debt. He must be shocked by the frequent announcement that every newborn baby is burdened, not with a silver spoon, but with a debt of $1700.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(68, 68, 68, 0.8);"> </span></span></span></blockquote><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white; color: rgba(68, 68, 68, 0.8); font-family: "Open Sans", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;"></span></span><p></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">The national debt is now 100 times larger than it was in 1949. Society has somehow managed to hold itself together since then. At the very least, this suggests we need not pay attention to the debt clock. It does not, however, not mean we shouldn't pay attention to managing the debt. Ironically, worrying about the debt is, in a way, what permits us not to worry about it. The time to start worrying is when we and our elected representatives stop worrying about it. According to John, <span style="font-family: inherit;">"</span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">The notion that debt matters, that spending must be financed sooner or later by taxes on someone, and that those taxes will be economically destructive, has vanished from Washington discourse on both sides of the aisle." That is, it may be time to start worrying. </span></span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">I think there's an element of truth to this. For example, while it's true that the Reagan deficits were large, it's also true that there was strong bipartisan support for "doing something about the growing debt." And it wasn't just words. As Justin Fox <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-15/the-mostly-forgotten-tax-increases-of-1982-1993?sref=anCLR9Pk" target="_blank">reminds us</a>, Congress increased taxes seven times between 1982-93. Well, what about Japan? As I explain <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-failure-to-inflate-japan.html" target="_blank">here</a>, Japan is a poster child for "worrying about the debt." To make a long story short, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Japan has stabilized (pre-Covid, at least), inflation is below target, and the fiscal authority keeps raising the sales tax. Rightly or wrongly, the Japanese "care" about the national debt--the effect of which is to keep fiscal policy "anchored." </span></span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">But what exactly is there to fear if fiscal policy becomes "unanchored?" For a country like the United States, it seems clear that outright default will never happen. U.S. Treasury securities (USTs) are too important for global financial markets. A default may very well trigger a global financial meltdown. The only practical option is to continue rolling over the debt, principal and interest (the latter of which is very low these days). Is there a danger of "bond vigilantes" sending the yields on USTs skyward? Not if the Fed stands ready to keep yields low (related post <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2020/08/some-thoughts-on-yield-curve-control.html" target="_blank">here</a> on yield curve control). And, in any case, even if the Fed raises (or is expected to raise) its policy rate, the U.S. Treasury can just continue to issue the bills necessary to make the scheduled payments. Treasury securities and Federal Reserve reserves are just different forms of interest-bearing money. To put things another way, the national debt need never be paid back--like money, it can be held in private wealth portfolios forever. The only question is on what terms it will be willingly held.</span></span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">This last point gets to the question of what can be expected to happen if the debt gets too large (say, because the fiscal authority plans to run large primary budget deficits off into the indefinite future). Much will depend on the evolution of the global demand for USTs. If that demand stops growing while fiscal deficits run unabated, surely we can expect the U.S. dollar to weakened and the domestic price-level to rise. The former is likely to contribute to an export boom, which should serve to close the trade deficit (mitigating the adverse consequences of <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/pupchapts/9936-1.htm" target="_blank">global imbalances</a>). The latter is likely to promote the growth of nominal GDP. </span></span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">Needless to say, an export boom and higher NGDP growth don't sound like disaster scenarios, especially in the current economic environment. John seems to worry that whatever happens, it's likely to happen suddenly and without warning. We know Naples is going down (in the manner of Pompeii c. 79AD), we just don't know when. But how does the lava flow correspond to the economic consequences of a debt crisis? (Keep in mind, we're not talking about a country that issues foreign-denominated debt.)</span></span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">Should we be worried about hyperinflation? Evidently not, as John does not mention it (see also this <a href="http://www.coppolacomment.com/2019/03/inflation-is-always-and-everywhere.html" target="_blank">nice piece</a> by Francis Coppola). But he does mention something about fiscal capacity (the ability of the fiscal authority to exert command over resources). </span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-size: large;">As I explain </span><a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/05/is-us-budget-deficit-sustainable.html" style="font-size: large;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-size: large;">, there are limits to how much seigniorage can be extracted in this manner. To put things another way, there are economic limits to how large the debt-to-GDP ratio can get. But reaching this limit simply means that the required tax (whether direct or indirect via inflation) is high--it does not mean disaster. </span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">John concludes with the following warning: "The closer we are to that limit, the closer we are to a real crisis when we need that fiscal capacity and its no longer there." This is one of those sentences that starts your head off nodding in agreement. But then you think about it for a minute and wonder what type of "real crisis" he has in mind? If it's a financial crisis, the implied positive money-demand shock (flight-to-safety) is likely to <i>increase</i> fiscal capacity, not diminish it. A war perhaps? In these types of emergencies, the nation bands together and governments use other means to gather the resources necessary (e.g., conscription). </span></span></p><p><span style="color: #222222; font-size: medium;"><span style="background-color: white;">So, to conclude, I'm not saying that John is wrong. It's just not very clear in my mind how he imagines a U.S. debt crisis to unfold exactly. What is missing here is a model. This is odd because one of John's great strengths is model building. And so my conclusion is that it would be very interesting to follow the logic of his argument through the lens of one of his models. Let's see the model, John! </span></span></p>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-29730313003779132222020-09-04T08:59:00.004-07:002020-09-05T07:38:23.610-07:00The Fed's new monetary policy framework<span style="font-size: medium;">The Fed's much-anticipated new monetary policy framework is now public. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell outlined the policy framework last week in Jackson Hole; you can view his speech <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7xw7SPIDqM&feature=emb_logo" target="_blank">here</a>. Overall, I thought Powell's delivery was very good. While there's room for improvement, I think the new framework is a step in the right direction (George Selgin provides a good critique <a href="https://www.alt-m.org/2020/09/02/the-feds-new-strategy-from-missed-target-to-missed-opportunity/" target="_blank">here</a>). There were three things in Powell's speech that stuck out for me. I discuss these below. </span><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span><div><b><span style="font-size: medium;">Shortfalls vs. Deviations</span></b></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">At the 22:30 mark, Powell reports what may very well be the most substantive change to the monetary policy statement. Here, he states that the FOMC will now interpret important macroeconomic time-series like GDP and unemployment as exhibiting "shortfalls" instead of "deviations" from some ideal or "maximum" level (a frustratingly vague concept). </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">The practical effect of this shift is to remove (or make less prominent) in the minds of FOMC members the idea that the economy is, or will soon be, "overheating" (i.e., embarked on an unsustainable path that can only end in misery for those most vulnerable to economic recession). <br /><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">The idea of "deviation from (some) trend" seems like a plausible description of the postwar U.S. up to the mid-1980s. Severe contractions were usually followed by equally robust recoveries. However, this representation seems to break down since the "great moderation" that began in the mid-1980s. Since then, economic recessions have not been followed by above-average growth. Instead, each recession seems better described as a "growth shortfall." We're not entirely sure what accounts from this cyclical asymmetry, but it seems consistent with Milton Friedman's "plucking model." I think we can expect a stream of research resurrecting this old idea (see <a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~enakamura/papers/plucking.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>, for example).<br /><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><img alt="" height="230" 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" width="598" /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><span>In any case, the upshot here is that, to the extent that "overheating" is no longer considered a serious threat, the FOMC will be less likely to implement "preemptive" policy rate hikes. This constitutes a tacit acknowledgement that the period leading up to "lift off" and what followed might have been handled better. As I wrote at the time </span><span>(see my discussion </span><a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/08/arguments-for-and-against-lift-off.html" target="_blank">here</a><span>), standard Phillips Curve logic did not seem to support tightening (unemployment was above the estimated natural rate, inflation was below target, and inflation expectations were declining). But the Committee somehow talked itself into the need to "normalize," to act preemptively and not get caught "behind the curve." In fairness, monetary policy is always about balancing risks (in this case, the perceived risk of overheating). In the near future, less weight will be assigned to the risk of overheating. </span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>The Maximum Level of Employment</b></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">At the 22:30 mark, Powell states "Of course, when employment is below its maximum level, <i>as is so clearly the case now</i>, we will actively seek to minimize that shortfall..."</span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">I have a hard time not interpreting "maximum" here as "socially desirable." I think most people would agree that the 2008 financial crisis caused employment to decline below its maximum level. The workers rendered idle in that episode constituted a social waste, and the Fed was right to loosen monetary policy to <i>stimulate</i> economic activity in the face of recessionary headwinds. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><span>But the recession induced by the C-19 is very different from standard recessions. This was laid out very clearly by St. Louis Fed President Jim Bullard on March 23, 2020: <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2020/march/bullard-expected-us-macroeconomic-performance-pandemic-adjustment-period" target="_blank">Expected U.S. Macroeconomic Performance during the Pandemic Adjustment Period</a>. </span><span>According to Bullard, the temporary removal of some workers from their jobs is not, in this case, a waste of resources. The decline in employment in this case should be viewed as an <i>investment in public health</i>. That is, the maximum level of employment declined and its recovery is driven mostly by the contagion dynamic (as well as improvements in social distancing protocols, masking, testing, treatments, etc.). The role of monetary policy here is to calm financial markets (which the Fed successfully accomplished in March) and to aid the fiscal authority with its income maintenance programs. In short, the primary monetary/fiscal policy objective here is to deliver </span><i>insurance</i><span>, not </span><i>stimulus. </i></span></div><div><i><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></i></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">Monetary stimulus is appropriate, however, to the extent that demand factors (e.g., individually rational, but a collectively irrational restraint on spending) are inhibiting the recovery dynamic. The evidence for this is <i>usually</i> assumed to be found in falling inflation and inflation expectations, and declining bond yields. And usually, this makes sense, because we <i>usually</i> assume that recessions are caused by collapses in aggregate demand (as in 2008-09). But what if the increase in the demand for money (safe assets in general) is driven by a <i>collectively rational </i>fear? We'd expect to see the exact same inflation and interest rate dynamic, but the role for stimulative monetary policy would be more difficult to justify (though the desirability for insurance remains). </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">So, maybe it is not so clearly the case now that employment is below or, at least, far below its "maximum" level. Note that a significant part of the decline in aggregate employment is coming from the leisure and hospitality sector: </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><img alt="" height="398" src="" width="511" /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">Arguably, we do not want, at this stage of the pandemic, to promote the indoor dining experiences people enjoyed earlier this year. This activity will return slowly as economic fundamentals improve. The "full employment" level of employment in this sector is clearly below what it was in Jan 2020. But, to be fair, it is entirely possible, and perhaps even likely, that the level of employment even here is lower than the "full employment" level. It's very hard to tell by how much though. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>Average Inflation Targeting</b></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">At the 24:00 mark, Powell explains how AIT will help anchor inflation expectations. Missing the inflation for a prolonged period of time will cause expectations to drift away from target and line up with the historical experience. This view of expectation formation is firmly rooted in the "adaptive expectations" tradition. That is, expectations are assumed to be formed by looking <i>backward</i> instead of <i>forward</i>. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">People sometimes claim that adaptive expectations are inconsistent with "rational" expectations. But this is not necessarily the case. In fact, it makes sense to use the historical record of inflation realizations to make inferences about the long-run inflation target if people are not sure of the monetary authority's true inflation target; see, for example, here: <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/827005" target="_blank">Monetary Policy Regimes and Beliefs</a>. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">It's still not entirely clear to me whether FOMC members view AIT as a policy to pursue passively (i.e., let inflation creep up to and beyond target on its own) or actively (i.e., take explicit actions to promote an overshoot of inflation). If it's the former, then I'm on board with the idea. But if it's the latter, I am not. In particular, with the liquidity-trap-like conditions we're presently in, the Fed does not have the tools (or political will) to boost inflation persistently. It is likely to fail, just as the <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-failure-to-inflate-japan.html" target="_blank">Bank of Japan failed</a>. (I explain <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2019/01/14/understanding-lowflation" target="_blank">here</a> why it's more difficult for a central bank to raise the inflation target than to lower it.) So, as I've advocated many times in the past, why not just declare 2% as a soft-ceiling and let fiscal policy do the rest? </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">My view rests on the belief that missing the inflation target from below by 50bp over the past eight years is not a significant macroeconomic problem (especially given how crudely inflation is measured). The FOMC did view it as a problem, but mainly, it seems, because of the embarrassment associated with missing its target. "We are a central bank. We have an inflation target. Central banks are supposed to hit their inflation targets. We need to hit our inflation target to remain credible." This is why earlier FOMC statements emphasized the <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2018/12/does-fed-have-symmetric-inflation-target.html" target="_blank">Fed's "symmetric" inflation target</a>. That did not work and so now we have AIT which, I'm afraid, might not work either. Happily (for those who want to see higher inflation), Congress seems comfortable with the idea of producing large budget deficits into the foreseeable future. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">So, if we get higher inflation, it will largely be a fiscal phenomenon. The purpose of AIT is to accommodate any rise in inflation for the purpose of increasing inflation expectations and avoiding the specter of deflation (people often point to Japan as a case to avoid, by Japan seems to be doing fine as far as I can tell). There is the question of how the Fed would react should inflation rise sharply and persistently above 2%. Even if the event is unlikely, it would be good to state a contingency plan. In the past, the Fed could be expected to raise its policy rate sharply. But this event, should it transpire, will almost surely take place during an employment shortfall (since this is now the acknowledged new normal). The only prediction I'll make here is that the FOMC will have a lot of explaining to do in this event. </span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div></div>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-31804011278438146872020-08-29T16:29:00.002-07:002020-08-29T16:29:47.717-07:00Some thoughts on yield curve control<p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">There's been a lot of talk about "yield curve control" (YCC) as of late. I found the recent exchange between Joe Weisenthal and David Beckworth (with many others chiming in) very interesting:</span></p><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I normally enjoy Joe's hot takes, but this one... yikes. It is a good example, in my view, of why relying too heavily on the "money view" (i.e.liquidity preference view) of interest rates can cause one to miss the forest for the trees. Let me explain...1/n <a href="https://t.co/EjUltLb4dF">https://t.co/EjUltLb4dF</a></span></p><span style="font-family: inherit;">— David Beckworth (@DavidBeckworth) <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidBeckworth/status/1292281210446778368?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 9, 2020</a></span></blockquote> <span style="font-family: inherit;"><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
</span><p></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">A number of us gathered on Zoom to discuss the subject. What follows is my own take on YCC and some of the issues involved. If you're interested in joining in on a future Zoom discussion, let me know. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">One thing I learned from the people I talked to is that my notion of YCC seemed to differ from the way they were thinking about it. Most people seem to have in mind the idea of YCC as a form of <i>interest-rate peg</i>, only with the fixed peg applying to interest rates at all maturities, for example, </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">in the manner of Fed policy over the period 1942-47 and 1948-51.</span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">In contrast, I view YCC as a state-contingent policy that pegs (or sets a narrow corridor for) rates at all maturities. The slope of the curve may be held fixed, with policy determining the level shifts in the yield curve (so, basically an extension of the Taylor rule applied to interest rates at all maturities). Or policy could also change the shape of the curve, making it steeper or flatter (so, basically replicating "<a href="https://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/news/economy/federal_reserve_operation_twist/index.htm" target="_blank">Operation Twist</a>" type interventions). Let me distinguish this notion of YCC by labeling it RBYCC (rule-based YCC).</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">What is the rationale for RBYCC? The RB part has the standard rationale. But what's the point of YCC then? The way I look at things is as follows. For some odd reason, the Treasury finances the deficit by issuing U.S. Treasury Securities (USTs) with different maturities. These securities are nominally risk-free. But if they all constitute risk-free claims to cash (reserves), then why do/should these objects sell at different prices? And even if there is some "preferred habit" force at work, why doesn't the treasury exploit the apparent arbitrage opportunity, selling securities that trade at a premium (typically bills) and repurchasing securities that trade at a discount (typically bonds). Indeed, why even issue securities that the market <i>discounts</i> (a polite way of saying <i>hates</i>) in the first place? (I offer one rationale here: <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2020-008" target="_blank">Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk</a>).</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">If by "liquidity" we mean the ability to convert a security in reserves (or bills), then it is clear that the liquidity of USTs is a policy choice. It would be a simple matter for the Fed and/or Treasury to set up a standing facility prepared to buy/sell USTs of any maturity on par with reserves, for example. This policy would have the effect of eliminating discounts across all securities. If you don't like this policy, then you'll have to explain why it's a good idea for government securities to trade at discounts relative to each other. To me, this is like saying a $10 bill should be discounted relative to two $5 bills. (Note: I am not saying such an argument does not exist--indeed, my paper above makes one such argument.)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">The effect of RBYCC would be to render all USTs equivalent to reserves (which itself leads to the question of why deficits can't be financed entirely with interest-bearing reserves). The same would be true of YCC with a fixed pattern of discounts, as in the U.S. from 1942-47. This much was recognized by Friedman and Schwartz in their <i>Monetary History </i>when they wrote "The support program converted all securities into the equivalent of money" (pg. 563). In theory, this type of policy should work as well or better than simply targeting the short rate. It eliminates the liquidity premia on government debt (i.e., it satiates liquidity demand) and it permits the usual sort of Taylor rule to stabilize the economy.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">As mentioned above, however, most people probably think of YCC as a peg-like policy. One argument against interest rate pegs is that they induce instability. The U.S. experience over 1942-47 and 1948-51 is widely interpreted as having promoted excess inflationary pressure. Let me briefly review those episodes here. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">At the time, the Fed set the short rate at 3/8% and capped a long rate at 2.5%. Measured inflation remained low, thanks to wartime wage and price controls. Interestingly, the 2.5% cap seemed non-binding. It is likely that long yields remained low because investors expected the Fed to keep the short rate low for the indefinite future. We know that at the time, investors were selling bills to the Fed and acquiring higher-yielding bonds to exploit the apparent arbitrage opportunity (see </span><a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20030618memo01.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">Chaurushiya and Kuttner, 2004</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">). Inflation only took off once wage and price controls were lifted in 1946. While this burst of inflation was likely only temporary, a concern over inflation led the Fed to raise the short rate to 1% in late 1947 when inflation had already declined from 20% to 10%. Inflation then stabilized for about a year at 8%, before declining sharply to 2.75% in 1948. At this time, the economy went into a recession, lasting until the last quarter of 1949. The inflation rate fell below zero in May 1949 and stayed below zero until July 1950 (so, well over a year of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">deflation</i><span style="font-family: inherit;">). </span></span></p><p><img alt="" height="281" 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" width="499" /></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Let me summarize this episode. Under this YCC policy,
inflation </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">fell</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> from a peak of 20% in March of 1947 to about 10% in November of
1947 with the bill rate still pegged at 3/8%. Then, with the rate hike pegged
at 1%, inflation continued to fall rapidly, hitting a low of </span><i style="font-family: inherit;">negative</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> 3% in August of 1949 (near the end
of the recession). It took until June 1950 for inflation to rise to 0%. </span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Inflation
then began to rise rapidly after June 1950 – the month the United States
entered the Korean War. The Treasury wanted to keep interest rates low to
facilitate war finance. The Fed favored high interest rates to combat
inflationary pressures created by the war. Inflation peaked in early 1951 at
9.5%. </span><a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20030618memo01.pdf" target="_blank">Chaurushiya and Kuttner, 2004</a> write:</span></p><p><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;"></span></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">“It
became abundantly clear during this period that the interest rate caps were
hampering the Fed’s ability to achieve its monetary policy objectives and, in
particular, its efforts to contain rapidly rising inflationary pressures.”</span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: medium;">This experiment in YCC ended with the Treasury Accord in March 1951. And the narrative that YCC is is inconsistent with inflation control was born.</span></span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: medium;">My own interpretation of these events and of the efficacy of YCC is as follows. First, it seems a bit of stretch to "blame" inflation over this episode as the consequence of YCC. For most of the 1942-51 period, the U.S. was at or recovering from war. Wars are known to place great fiscal strain on governments and financing a war effort with higher-than-normal inflation is likely desirable from the perspective of optimal public finance policy. That is, the U.S. would have likely experienced higher-than-normal inflation under any reasonable interest rate policy. </span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">I interpret the interest rate hike in 1947 as an example of how RBYCC can work to control inflation. In this example, the short rate was increased to 1% and the long-rate remained capped at 2.5%, in effect flattening the yield curve. The disinflationary impact of this rate hike seems evident in the data above. So, it seems clear that RBYCC can be used to control inflation, even if it seems to have been employed rather clumsily in 1947. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;">As usual, looking forward to your comments/criticisms, which can be left below. </span></p> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-25452265025277646002020-06-23T18:47:00.001-07:002020-06-23T18:47:34.417-07:00Why the Fed Should Create a Standing Repo Facility<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="about:invalid#zClosurez" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="In Uncertain Times, Cash is King - Adi Dehejia - Medium" border="0" height="132" src="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width="200" /></a>I was invited recently to take part on a panel discussion<br />
on <i>Modernizing Liquidity Provision</i> as part of a conference hosted jointly by CATO and the Mercatus Center entitled <a href="https://www.cato.org/events/fed-next-time-ideas-crisis-ready-central-bank">A Fed for Next Time: Ideas for a Crisis-Ready Central Bank</a>. My post today is basically a transcript of the presentation I gave in my session. I'd like to thank George Selgin and David Beckworth for inviting me to speak on why the Fed should create a standing repo facility, an idea that Jane Ihrig and I promoted early last year in a pair of St. Louis Fed blog posts <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/march/why-fed-create-standing-repo-facility">here</a> and <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/april/fed-standing-repo-facility-follow-up">here</a>.<br />
<br />
In those posts, Jane I argued that the Fed should create a standing repo facility that would be prepared to lend against U.S. Treasury securities and possibly other high quality liquid assets (HQLAs). We distinguished the facility we had in mind from the discount window in two key respects. First, unlike the window, it would restrict collateral to consist only of HQLA; and second, it would grant access to non-depository institutions, in particular, to dealers and possibly even to all the counterparties that are presently permitted to access the Fed's <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/overnight-reverse-repurchase-agreements.htm">ON RRP facility</a>.<br />
<br />
At the time, we motivated the facility as a way for the Fed to conduct monetary policy in a manner consistent with the FOMC's preferred operating framework of ample reserves together with its 2014 Policy Normalization Principles and Plans which stated, among other things, the desire to hold "no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively."<br />
<br />
Jane and I speculated that a significant source of the demand for reserves over other HQLAs came from the Global Systemically Important Bank's (G-SIB's) perceived need for resolution liquidity. We reasoned that these G-SIBs might be more inclined to hold higher-yielding HQLAs over reserves if it was known beforehand that the former could be readily converted into reserves on demand at a standing facility at pre-specified terms. At the same time, the facility would provide a ceiling on repo rates and eliminate the need to estimate the so-called "minimally ample" level of reserves. That is, the facility would automatically flush the system with the reserves it needed as reserve supply and demand conditions varied because of adjustments in the <a href="https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2018/cfl395-pdf.pdf">Treasury General Account</a> or other economic factors. Finally, we doubted whether the facility would lead to any significant amount of disintermediation as some people feared. In our view, it would serve mainly to cap the terms of trade in a number of over-the-counter (OTC) repo transactions involving Treasury debt.<br />
<br />
The title of this session is "Modernizing Liquidity Provision." We're here today, of course, because of the massive Fed-Treasury interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jane and I didn't tout the standing repo facility as a crisis tool because we figured that in a crisis, investors were unlikely to have much difficulty in finding buyers of U.S. Treasury securities. Since the 2008-09 financial crisis, we've grown accustomed to the idea of USTs serving as a flight-to-safety vehicle. And, indeed, this seems to have been the case as the present crisis initially unfolded. Bond yields began to drop sharply in Februrary and then again following the Fed's rate cut on March 5, with the 10-year hitting a low of 54bp on March 9.<br />
<br />
But then something happened that I don't think anyone was expecting (certainly, I was not). In particular, after March 9, there's clear evidence of selling pressure stemming from what looked like a repo run on treasury securities. That is, for a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/05/01/how-did-covid-19-disrupt-the-market-for-u-s-treasury-debt/">variety of reasons</a> there was an enhanced demand for cash which, in this instance, led to sales of U.S. Treasuries, depressing their value as collateral--effectively evaporating a significant portion of the supply of safe assets--which led to margin calls, which led to further selling pressure, and so on.<br />
<br />
When the Fed cut its policy rate to 10bp on March 16, bond yields continued to rise, with the 10-year hitting almost 120bp on March 18. Bond yields came down only after the Fed intervened first with its discretionary repo operations and then with $1.5T of outright purchases of securities. This episode reminds us again that cash is king in a crisis and that U.S. Treasury securities are not always considered cash-equivalent in a crisis.<br />
<br />
A natural question to ask here is whether disruptions like this constitute a policy problem. After all, it's not like bond traders are unfamiliar with the notion of interest rate volatility. When I glance at the data, the absolute size of this volatility seems more or less stable since the mid 1980s. However, because interest rate levels are so much lower today, a 50bp move is quantitatively more significant in relative terms. This wouldn't be much of a problem, in my view, if treasury securities served merely as pure saving instruments. But for better or worse, the UST has evolved over time to become an important form of wholesale money. In particular, it is used widely as collateral in the repo market (the so-called <i>shadow bank sector</i>). Its value as collateral stems in large part from its perceived safety and liquidity. And most of the time, the U.S. Treasury market is liquid. Except for when it isn't, of course. And so the question is, when it isn't liquid, does it matter and, if so, should something be done about it?<br />
<br />
My views on this questions are informed by both by theory and from what I know of the history of the U.S. Treasury market (e.g., <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr777.pdf?la=en">Garbade 2016</a>). Theory tells us that in a fiat money system, there's no fundamental difference between account entries at the Federal Reserve and (say) at Treasury Direct. They are both electronic ledgers containing interest-bearing accounts. There are legal differences, of course. Only depository institutions have access to Fed accounts, whereas treasury securities can be held much more widely. Treasury securities are more complicated objects because they differ from each other in terms of coupon, time left to maturity, and possibly other characteristics. For this reason, treasury securities, as with most bonds, trade in decentralized over-the-counter markets instead of centralized exchanges.<br />
<br />
While OTC markets may have their advantages (they evidently displaced the centralized exchange of bonds in the 1920s), their decentralized structure can be problematic. When investors become fearful, bond dealers and other traders may become unwilling or unable to execute trades, so that meaningful price information is lost. Safe assets may trade at significant discounts or premia, not for any fundamental reason, but simply because liquidity (market participation/communications) has vanished. Such events have implications that extend beyond the treasury market because, as is well-known, the yield on Treasury debt serves as a benchmark for many other financial assets. Unnecessary and avoidable problems in the treasury market can spillover into other financial markets, bringing grief to the broader economy.<br />
<br />
From this perspective then, I am led to ask the question: in what world does it make sense to permit risk-free claims to fiat money like treasury securities to suddenly become illiquid? (This question is distinct from the one that asks whether risk-free claims to fiat money should be made illiquid--as in, the issuance of non-marketable debt; see <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2020-008">here</a>, for example) There is really no good reason, as far as I know.<br />
<br />
I therefore continue to believe that a standing repo facility makes a lot of sense for the U.S. economy. And I again want to stress that this is not an hypothetical proposal. Many of the world's leading central banks operate such facilities. The Fed has had its ON RRP facility in place since 2013. Indeed, the Fed even implemented a repo facility (called the <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fima-repo-facility.htm">FIMA repo facility</a>) in March of this year where foreign central banks can borrow funds at 25bp above IOER by presenting U.S. Treasury securities as collateral. The same type of facility set up for domestic purposes (ideally with Treasury support) could simultaneously help the FOMC achieve interest rate control, shrink the size of its balance sheet, and prevent unnecessary violent disruptions in the treasury market by setting a corridor around treasury yields at different maturities. The size of the corridor could ultimately be adjusted to help achieve yield curve control if desired. But this is a separate issue, so let me end here. Please feel free to comment below. </div>
David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-22471486860042810052020-02-06T11:57:00.000-08:002020-02-06T16:31:03.792-08:00Kalecki on the Political Aspects of Full Employment<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-KiUuk6MvOI8/XjuFQT6zFII/AAAAAAAAEBg/EJFHhLdLWVoil4glXN7gbe-rbShGkGg0wCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/Michal_Kalecki.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="410" data-original-width="298" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-KiUuk6MvOI8/XjuFQT6zFII/AAAAAAAAEBg/EJFHhLdLWVoil4glXN7gbe-rbShGkGg0wCLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Michal_Kalecki.jpg" width="232" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Michal Kalecki 1899 - 1970</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<a href="https://twitter.com/SamHLevey">Sam Levey</a> reminded me of Kalecki's 1943 article on the <a href="http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/~mshalev/ppe/Kalecki_FullEmployment.pdf">political aspects of full employment</a>. This a very interesting and thought-provoking paper. I enjoyed it enough to offer my critique of it.<br />
<br />
The paper starts by taking as given what Kalecki calls the <i>doctrine of full employment</i>. The basic idea is that the private sector, left to its own devices, is prone to Keynesian aggregate demand failures (see <a href="https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1485&context=economicsresrpt">here</a> for game-theoretic interpretation). The remedy for these spontaneously-occurring "coordination failures," is a government spending program that acts, or stands ready to act, as private demand begins to falter.<br />
<br />
Kalecki starts his paper off by asserting that by 1943, the doctrine was widely accepted by most economists. It seems clear that Kalecki views the doctrine to be self-evidently true.<br />
<br />
But if this is the case, then this poses a problem. If the doctrine is so obviously true, why then are there still economists who oppose it? And if the idea is so self-evident, why are so many "captains of industry" reluctant to accept it? As Kalecki admits (pg. 324), this attitude is not easy to explain. After all, depressions are bad for business and businesses collectively should welcome any intervention that restores the economy to full employment.<br />
<br />
The problem, as he sees it, is a political one. While the "economic experts" that disavow the doctrine may believe in their own theories, however poor they may be, he notes that "obstinate ignorance is usually a manifestation of underlying political motives." He doesn't say exactly what these political motives are, but he notes that these "economic experts" are, or have been, closely connected with banking and industry. But if this is the case, then the question turns to what motivates industry leaders to block interventions that <i>they know</i> will be good for industry?<br />
<br />
He lists the following three reasons.<br />
<br />
[1] Absent full employment policy the "state of confidence" will produce business cycles. Under <i>laisser-faire</i> then, industry leaders can <i>credibly</i> use this fact to exert a powerful indirect control over government policy.<br />
<br />
[2] Supporting obviously beneficial public sector investments leads to a slippery slope. The government may wish to encroach in other areas in competition with private enterprise.<br />
<br />
[3] In a perpetually full employment economy, the threat of unemployment vanishes as a discipline device for employers (see also <a href="https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8DN4G12">here</a>). As well, the social position of the boss would be undermined and the self assurance and class consciousness of the working class would grow, leading to political instability.<br />
<br />
What to make of this? Well, I'm not sure. The first reason asserts that "business leaders" are willing to plumb the depths of economic depression every once in a while in exchange for political power. He doesn't actually say what this political power buys them. But whatever it buys them, I wonder whether it might not be purchased more cheaply through more conventional means?<br />
<br />
The second reason doesn't seem plausible to me. Why wouldn't the private sector be willing to support infrastructure projects that benefit their interests directly? Was there any serious industry opposition, say, to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Aid_Highway_Act_of_1956">Federal Highway Act of 1956</a>? And if there was, was it because of a fear that the project might succeed too well, an outcome that would encourage the government to become more adventurous in other arenas?<br />
<br />
The third reason also seems weak to me. It is true, Kalecki writes, that profits would be higher under full employment, "but 'discipline in the factories' and 'political stability' are more appreciated by the business leaders than profits." First, the idea of unemployment as a discipline device only needs a constant low level of unemployment to work (Shapiro and Stiglitz, AER 1984 "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device;" see their reply <a href="https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8DN4G12">here</a> to a critique.) A decade-long Great Depression seems like an awfully high price to pay for "worker discipline." And as for promoting political stability, I think it is understood that events like the Great Depression, or even the Great Recession for that matter, promote political instability (which even Kalecki mentions in the article).<br />
<br />
To sum up, Kalecki asks a great question. Collectively, we are all better off materially in the absence of economic depressions. We know--in principle, at least--how to prevent major economic depressions (I'm not talking about regular "small time" business cycles here.) But if so, why are interventions like the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Act_of_2009">Obama stimulus program</a> met with such bitter opposition in some quarters? For that matter, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_Asset_Relief_Program">TARP</a> intervention--a "bailout" program aimed at stabilizing the financial sector--was also met with vocal opposition, especially from Main Street. Is this really all just a concern over "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard">moral hazard</a>?"<br />
<br />
Maybe there's just a suspicion that these interventions, however good they may sound on paper, work out in practice simply as ways to redistribute income to undeserving, but squeaky wheels. I overheard a political commentator on NPR the other day remark that in economic and political negotiations, "if you're not at the table, then you're likely on the menu." I suppose it's easy to say what we need in this case is better representation at the table. How to do this? I'm all ears.<br />
<br />
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David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-67157218459139813502019-09-04T21:04:00.000-07:002019-09-04T21:10:45.362-07:00A conversation with Eric Tymoigne on MMT vs SMT<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">There are a lot of moving parts to the MMT program. I want to focus on one of these parts today: the relation between monetary and fiscal policy.
One thing I find appealing about MMT scholars is their attention to monetary history and
institutional details. I've learned a lot from them in this regard.
But as is often the case with details, one has to worry about whether they help
shed light on a specific question of interest, or whether they sometimes let us not see
the forest for the trees. And in terms of the broader picture, since I grew up
in that branch of macroeconomics that tries to take money, banking, and debt
seriously (i.e., not standard NK theory), I sometimes have a hard time understanding what all the fuss is
about. Much of standard monetary theory (SMT) seems perfectly consistent with
some of the ideas I seen discussed in MMT proponents; see, for example, <u><span style="color: blue;"><a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-failure-to-inflate-japan.html" target="_blank">The Failure to Inflate Japan</a></span></u>. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">This post is devoted to better
understanding a contribution by Eric Tymoigne. Eric is one of the people I go
to whenever I want to learn more about MMT (if you're interested in MMT, you
should follow him on Twitter @tymoignee). In this post, I discuss his
article "Modern Monetary Theory, and Interrelations Between the Treasury
and Central Bank: The Case of the United States." (JEI 2014). Passages quoted from his paper are highlighted in <span style="color: blue;">blue</span>. The working
paper version of the paper can be found <u><span style="color: blue;"><a href="http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_788.pdf" target="_blank">here</a></span></u>. Eric has kindly agreed to respond to my comments and let me post our conversation. We had to some editing, hopefully this did not disrupt the flow too much. In any case, I hope you find it interesting. And, as always, feel free to join in on the conversation in the comments section below. -- DA</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Eric, let's start with the opening paragraph:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">One of the main contributions of modern money theory (MMT) has been
to explain why monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy
space. Not only can they issue their own currency to spend and to service their
public debt denominated in their own unit of account, but also any self-imposed
constraint on budgetary operations can be easily bypassed. </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">I'm
curious to know what the contribution is here relative to standard monetary
theory (SMT). In SMT, the government can also issue its own currency to spend
and to service the public debt denominated in its own unit of account. So this
degree of "flexibility" is already accounted for. As for
"self-imposed constraints on budgetary operations," SMT takes several
approaches to this issue, depending on the purpose of the analysis. One
approach is to take these constraints as given and then to study their
implications. But it is also common to consolidate the central bank, treasury
and government into a single authority, which implies no self-imposed
constraints on budgetary operations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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Perhaps what is meant is that MMT shows how existing self-imposed constraints
on budgetary operations can be (or are) bypassed in reality. This leads
us to question, however, concerning what those self-imposed constraints are doing there in
the first place. Are they there by design and, if so, why? Or are they there by
accident (and, if so, how in the world did this happen)?</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>Yes
consolidation is not unique to MMT as we have said repeatedly. Not only is it
used quite commonly in the economic literature, but also it is a common
rhetorical tool in economic talks, discourse, etc.</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Right, so everyone understands this (at least, they should)--it's perfectly consistent with standard monetary theory. So far, so good.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>Most
economists, politicians and the public don’t understand this or its
implications. They will interpret the above as saying that it is obvious that
the government can create money but it is not a normal way to proceed and it is
inflationary. MMT just pushes consolidation to its logical conclusions and
shows that institutional details do back those conclusions. In a consolidated
framework, the federal government can only implement spending by creating
money, this is not abnormal and it is not inflationary by itself. There is no
other way to find the necessary dollars to spend. </i></span><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Here is what consolidation means in terms of balance sheets:</span></i></div>
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<i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">For the federal government, taxes destroy currency
(L1 falls) and claims on non-fed sectors falls (A1 falls) (an alternative
offsetting operation is net worth of government rises). When US spends, it
credits accounts (L1 rises). Similarly, bond issuance does not lead to a gain
of any asset for the government; all it does is replace a non-interest earning government
liability (monetary base) with an interest-earning government liability (Treasury
securities). </span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: I am not going to argue against your accounting. As for bond-issuance, in
SMT, an open-market operation is modeled as a swap of zero-interest reserves
for interest-bearing treasuries. The interest on treasuries is explained by
their relative illiquidity (another self-imposed constraint). The economic
consequences of such a swap depends on a host of factors, which I'm sure you're
familiar with. </span><span style="color: red; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET:<i> Sure</i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">, in
addition</span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">, self-imposed financial constraints (e.g. debt ceiling, no direct
financing by the Fed, no monetary power for treasury) have been put in place at
various times with the argument that they impose discipline in public finances.
MMT argues, these financial constraints are not necessary and are bypassed
routinely through Treasury-Central Bank coordination.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Sure, the standard view is that these
self-imposed constraints are designed to impose discipline in public finance.
The proposition that these financial constraints are or are not necessary, however, must be
based on a set of assumptions that may or may not be satisfied in reality. (The
fact that these constraints may be bypassed through Treasury-Central Bank
coordination does not seem relevant to me -- the conflict emphasized by SMT is
between an "independent" central bank and the legislative authority
(e.g., the Fed and Congress, not the Fed and Treasury). I'm not sure why a new
theory is needed here. We know, for example, that if the legislative branch of
government fully trusts itself (and future elected representatives) to behave
in a fiscally responsible manner, the notion of an "independent"
central bank (and other self-imposed constraints) makes little sense. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET:<b> </b><i>Remember
that MMT emphasizes the irrelevance of financial/nominal constraints for
monetarily sovereign governments (bond vigilantes, risk of insolvency of social
security, etc.). One can do that by using the consolidated government (taxes
don’t finance, bonds don’t finance, government spends by crediting accounts,
etc.) or by using the unconsolidated government (the central bank helps the Treasury,
the Treasury helps the central bank). The second method conforms to actual
federal government operations but it is much less easy to use rhetorically and it
waters down the core point: government finances are never a </i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">financial </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">issue as
long as monetary sovereignty applies.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Given that point, as you note, financial constraints are not only
irrelevant, but also disruptive and used for political games. MMT wants to make
government financial operations as smooth and flexible as possible. Once
society has decided how, and to what degree, government should be involved in
solving socioeconomic problems, finding the money should not be an issue </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">when
monetary sovereignty prevails</span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. That means demystifying
and eliminating financial barriers to government operations so the political
debate can focus on solving real issues (environment issues, socio-economic
issues, etc.). Fearmongering about the public debt and fiscal deficits makes for
poor political debates and policy prescriptions. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">There is a view, </span></i><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_pasHodJ-8"><i><span style="color: blue; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">expressed by Paul Samuelson</span></i></a><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">, that if
we tell policymakers and the public that there are no financial limits to
government spending, policymakers will spend like mad; therefore, economists
need to lie to policymakers and the public (and themselves). This is nonsense.
We ought to discuss policy choices not on the basis of Noble Lies but rather on
the basis of sound and informed premises. Economists needs to make sure that
policymakers focus on resource constraints.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">In addition, political constraints on government should be geared
toward improving the transparency and participatory aspects of government (e.g.
limit role of big money in elections, limit wastes, etc.). We already have a
government that passes a budget (it needs to do so for transparency and
accountability purposes), we already have an auditing process, and we already
have some (limited) democratic process, so aim at improving these aspects. MMT
proponents are not naive, we know that some politicians are self-interested, we
know that policy implementation may lead to mistakes, we know people may try to
game the system (“free riders”); however we trust that a transparent and
democratic government can (and does) get through these issues. MMT does not see
financial constraints as helping in any ways, rather they inhibit the
democratic process.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Of course, MMT proponents also have a policy agenda (Job guarantee,
financial regulation based on Minsky, etc.) because we do not see market
mechanisms as self-promoting full employment, price stability and financial
stability. As such, as you said, MMT proponents favor alternative means to
achieve these goals through direct government intervention. We don’t see the
central bank as an effective means to promote price stability. The central bank
should focus on financial stability through interest-rate stabilization and
financial regulation (an area where the Fed has not performed well).</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Finally, yes independence
of the central bank is seen as a big deal but MMT disagrees for two reasons.
First, MMT emphasizes the lack of effectiveness of monetary policy in managing
the business cycle and, second, and probably more importantly, MMT notes that
central-bank independence in terms of interest-rate setting and goal settings
does not mean independence from the financial needs of the Treasury</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: I think it's fair to say most people want to see government
operations run smoothly, and would welcome a sober debate over the issues at
hand without the fear-mongering that some like to promote. The broad objective seems the same--the debate is more over implementation--how monetary and fiscal policy is to be coordinated--given human frailties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Having said this, I think you go too far by asserting that
"government finances are never an issue as long as monetary sovereignty
applies." Of course, technical default on nominal debt is not an issue (we
all understand this). But SMT also recognizes the importance of <i>economic</i> default
on nominal debt. True, a government can always print money to satisfy its
nominal debt obligation, but if money printing dilutes the purchasing power of
money, this is a <i>de facto</i> default. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">On a related issue, SMT asks "what are the limits to
seigniorage?" The fact that a government can print money does not give it
the power to command resources without constraint. People can (and do) find
substitutes for government money (they may also substitute out of taxed activities
into non-taxed activities). SMT treats the limits to seigniorage as a <i>financial</i> constraint.
Maybe MMT has a different label for this constraint? Perhaps it is related to
what I hear MMT proponents call an "inflation constraint." <i>Maybe
one way to reconcile MMT with SMT on this score is by recognizing that SMT
usually assumes (sometimes incorrectly) that the inflation constraint is always
binding.</i> If this is the case, a monetarily-sovereign government <i>does</i> have
a financial constraint, even according to MMT. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>Yes, ability to create a
currency does not mean ability to command resources because there may not be a
demand for the currency. That is where tax liabilities and other dues owed to
the government become important (cf. the chartalist theory of money, a
component of MMT). That’s also why taxes, monetary creation and bond issuance
are not conceptualized by MMT as alternative financing means but rather as
complementary. The government imposes a tax liability, spends by issuing the
currency necessary to pay the tax liability, then taxes and issues bonds. </i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Spending may be inflationary
indeed and so there is an inflation constraint; but it is not a financial constraint,
it is a resource constraint.</span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">About the “printing” of money
by government, inflation and economic default. Regarding the first two, there
is no evidence of an automatic relation between money and inflation. In a
consolidated view, government always spends by monetary creation but controls
the impact on inflation via taxes and the impact on interest rates via bond
issuance. In an unconsolidated view, the central bank routinely finances and
refinances the Treasury by helping some of the auction bidders and by
participating in the auction. <o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Finally, regarding economic
default, governments routinely “default” in that sense with no problems. I
don’t see that as a relevant concept unless someone can show that economic
default raises interest rates or generates rising inflation (it does not); here
again, there is no automatic link between inflation and interest rates. That
link depends on how the central bank reacts; if it does not then market
participants don’t either. <span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Let me return to the manner in which the Fed/Treasury/Congress
are consolidated (or not) in SMT and why this matters, in your view. In some
SMT treatments, Congress decides spending and taxes, which implies a primary
deficit. It's up to the Treasury to finance that deficit, with the Fed playing
a supporting role (by determining interest rate and issuing reserves for
treasury debt). What's wrong with this approach?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <b> </b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: That goes in the
right direction with an understanding that the government really has no control
over its fiscal position.</span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">All this, which relates to the implementation of
monetary sovereignty, helps understand why the financial crowding out is not
operative, why monetary financing is not by definition inflationary, why i >
g is normal. It helps explain why the hysterical rhetoric surrounding the
public debt and deficits in nonsense. I recently wrote a piece for </span></i><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/05775132.2019.1639412"><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Challenge Magazine</span></i></a><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> on that topic. Surpluses are celebrated, governments implement
austerity during a recession to “live within our means”, Social Security needs
to be fixed to avoid bankrupting it, governments need to save more, etc. All of this is incorrect.<span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: I'm not sure why you claim SMT leads to the idea of i > g.
The case i < g is perfectly consistent with SMT (see Blanchard's 2019 AEA
Presidential address, and also my posts </span><a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/03/sustainable-deficits.html"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and </span><a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/05/is-us-budget-deficit-sustainable.html"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">). The
correct criticism (I think) is that mainstream economists have assumed i > g
as being the empirically relevant case (it is not). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>That is what I meant. MMT links that to monetary sovereignty.</i><span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: I think that's correct. I should like to add that mainstream economists (apart from a small set of
monetary theorists) have not appreciated the role of high-grade sovereign debt
as an exchange medium in wholesale financial markets and as a global store of value, which in my view likely explains a lot of the "missing inflation." But as for
"surpluses being celebrated," you are now talking about individual
viewpoints and not SMT <i>per se</i>. There were plenty of calls out there
for countercyclical fiscal policy based on standard macroeconomic principles.
But I do agree virtually all mainstream economists are (perhaps overly)
concerned about "long-run fiscal sustainability." The view is that at
the end of the day, stuff has to be paid for -- and that having the ability to
print money, while granting an extra degree of flexibility, does not get around
this basic fact. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: I'd like to ask you about this statement you make:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">In (the unconsolidated) case, the Treasury collects taxes and
issues securities before it can spend. However, federal taxes and bond
offerings also serve another highly important function that is overlooked in
standard monetary economics. Specifically, federal taxes and bond offerings
result in a drainage of funds from the banking system, and MMT carefully
analyzes the implication of this fact. From that analysis, MMT argues that
federal taxes and bond offerings are best conceptualized as devices that
maintain price and interest-rate stability, respectively (of course, the tax
structure also has some important role to play in terms of influencing
incentives and income distribution; something not disputed by MMT). </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Well, yes, taxes serve both as a revenue device
(permitting the government to gain control over resources that would otherwise
be in control of the private sector) and as a way to control inflation. I'm not
sure about the idea of the Treasury offering bonds for the purpose of achieving
interest-rate stability (though this may happen to some extent when the
treasury determines which maturity to offer). I don't think this is the way
things work in the U.S. today.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET:<b> </b><i>Taxes and issuance of
treasuries drain reserves and so raise the overnight rate. Hence, on a daily
basis, a fiscal surplus raises the overnight rate and a fiscal deficit lowers
it. There has been significant Treasury-Fed coordination to smooth the impact
of taxes (and treasury spending) on the money market.</i></span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: Fine, but so what? We all understand
"coordination" between Fed and Treasury exists at the operational
level.</span><span style="background: white; color: red; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>I think you are too kind to other
economists and policymakers. On taxes as price-stabilizing factors, there is
indeed some similarities here. On the role of treasuries for interest-rate
stability, it does work like this today. It may not be obvious because of the
current emphasis on treasuries as Treasury's </i></span><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">budgetary</span><span style="background: white; color: red; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span></i><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">tools, but Treasury has issued securities for
other purposes than its </span></i><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">budgetary </span></i><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">needs. In the US, this occurred most recently during the 2008
crisis (SFP bills). In Australia, in the early 2000s, the Treasury issued
securities while running surpluses in order to promote financial stability.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: But even if this is not the way things actually work
(in my view, it's the Fed that stabilizes interest rates, possibly through OMOs
involving U.S. Treasuries), I'm not sure what point is being made. I think we
can all agree that monetary and fiscal policy can be thought of as being
consolidated in some manner. What would be good to know is how a specific MMT
consolidation matters (relative to other specifications) for a specific set of
questions being addressed. There is nothing in the abstract or introduction of
this paper that suggests an answer to this question. </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>The point being made is that in a consolidated
government, tax and bond issuance lose the<span style="color: red;"> </span></i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">financial</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">purpose
they have for the Treasury but keep their price and interest-stability purposes.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: In standard monetary theory, tax and bond issuance keeps
its funding purposes for the government and at the same time can be used to
influence the price-level (inflation) and interest rates. Is this wrong? I
don't think so. At some level, taxes (a vacuum cleaner sucking up money from
the private sector) must have some implications for the ability of government
to exert command over real resources in the economy. What we label this ability
(whether "funding" or ''finance" or whatever, seems
inconsequential). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>Ok here comes the crucial difference between financial
and real sides of the economy. In financial terms, taxes do not increase the
capacity of the government to spend, i.e. the government does not earn any
money from taxing; taxes destroy the currency. In financial terms, there is no
reason to fear a fiscal deficit; deficits are the norm, are sustainable and
help other sectors grow their financial net wealth. As such, it is not because a
government wants to spend more that it must tax more or lower spending
somewhere else. That is the PAYGO mentality. This mentality makes policymakers
think of spending and taxing in terms of how they impact the fiscal balance
instead of their impact on employment, inflation, incentives, etc. While
deficits may have negative consequences, </i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">they are not automatic. If
one takes a look at the evidence, deficits have no automatic negative impacts
on interest rates, tax rates, public-debt sustainability, or inflation.</span></i><span style="color: red; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">In real terms, the necessity to increase tax rates to prevent
inflation, and so move more resources to the government, depends on the state
of the economy and the permanency of the increase in government spending </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">relative to
the size of the economy</span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">. In an underemployed economy, the government
can spend more without raising tax rates. In a fully employed economy, shifting
resources to the government without generating inflation does require raising
tax rate and/or putting in place other measures such as rationing, price
controls, and delayed private-income payment. Here Keynes’s “How to Pay for the
War” provides the roadmap. Standard economics is full-employment economics so
opportunity costs are always present. MMT follows Kalecki, Keynes and the work
of their followers </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">(have a look at Lavoie’s “Foundations of Post
Keynesian Economic Analysis”)</span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and note that capitalist
economies are usually underemployment and economic growth is demand driven. Put
in a picture, the economy is usually at point a.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Put succinctly, the real constraint is conditionally relevant, the
financial constraint is irrelevant if monetary sovereignty prevails. That is
the proper way to frame the policy debates and to advise policymakers; don’t
worry about the money, worry about how spending impacts the economy.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET<i>: Moving to another topic,</i></span><span style="background: white; color: red; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">consolidation of the government brings to the forefront
forces that are operating in the current system but that are buried under
institutional complications. Namely that a fiscal deficit lowers interest rates
and treasuries issuance brings them back up, that spending must come before
taxing and treasuries issuance, that monetary financing of the government is
not intrinsically unsound and does not mean that tax and treasuries issuance
don't have to be implemented.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: The statement that "deficit lower
interest rates" needs considerable qualification. Among other things, it
depends on the monetary policy reaction function. As for the claim that
spending *must* come before taxes, this is not a universally valid statement
(even if it may be true in some circumstances. But even more importantly, who
cares? Mainstream theory does not suggest that monetary financing is
intrinsically unsound (seigniorage is fine, if it respects inflation ceiling).
As for money, taxes and bonds not being alternative "funding"
sources, I worry that this semantics. You can call X a "funding"
source or not -- it's just a label. The real question is: what are the
macroeconomic implications of X? </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>Let me emphasize where I agree. Yes, evidence
shows the central role of monetary policy for the direction of interest rates,
fiscal policy is at best a very small driver. And yes, one ought to focus on
the real implications </i></span><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">of government spending</span></i><i><span style="background: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and we ought to forget about the financial implications. A fiscal
deficit is not unsustainable nor abnormal; deficits are the stylized fact of
government finances and are financially sustainable if monetary sovereignty is
present. So don’t try to frame the policy debate and set policy in terms of
household finances, bankruptcy, fixing the deficit, etc.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">To conclude I see three reasons why the "taxes/bonds don't
finance the government" rhetoric is helpful:</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">1- It is strictly true for the federal government (i.e.
consolidation).<br />
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">2- it brings to the forefront some lesser-known aspects of taxes
and treasuries issuance: impacts on money market, role of central bank in
fiscal policy, role of treasury in monetary policy.<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">3- It changes the narrative in terms of policy and political
economy: government does not rely on the rich to finance itself, taxes should
be set to remove the "bads" not to finance the government (e.g. one
should not set tax rates on pollution with the goal of balancing the budget but
with the goal of curbing pollution to whatever is considered appropriate, that
may lead to much higher tax rates than what is needed to balance the budget),
PAYGO is insane, one should focus on the real outcomes of government policies
not the budgetary outcomes.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">1. I think this is semantics.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">2. Not sure how it helps in this regard.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">3. I think all of these positions are defensible without the
statement <i>"taxes/bonds don't finance the government"</i>, so
if this is the ultimate goal (and I think it should be), perhaps we should set
aside semantic debates and focus on the real issues at hand. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET:</span></b><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <i>1 is not semantic. I know you have in mind taxes as a
means to leave resources to the government. MMT makes a clear difference
between financial (ability to find the money) and resources constraint (ability
to get the goods and services) as explained above. The </i></span><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">financial
constraint is highly relevant for non-monetarily sovereign governments so it
should be noted and clearly separated from the real constraint. </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">Too many
policy discussions and decisions by policymakers operating under monetary
sovereignty are based on an inexistent inability to find </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">money </span></i><i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">and the imagined dear financial
consequences of budgeting fiscal deficits. 2 helps to understand how monetary
sovereignty is implemented in practice. On 3, yes focus on the real issues.</span></i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">DA: We agree on 3! Thank you for an interesting discussion,
Eric. There's so much more to talk about, but let's leave that for another day. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">ET: <i>You are welcome and thank you too!</i><span style="color: red;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com16tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-30434977555973035552019-07-27T10:41:00.002-07:002019-07-27T13:07:06.982-07:00Blanchard and Farmer on the Phillips Curve<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
In case you missed it, there's an interesting (and slightly wonkish) debate going on between Olivier Blanchard and Roger Farmer concerning the theoretical relevance of the Phillips curve. Roger fired the opening salvo by presenting a macroeconomic model he claims fits the data well and yet makes no use of the Phillips curve. Farmer, in Laplace-like fashion, declared "he had no use for that hypothesis." Blanchard predictably, and understandably, came to the defense of the orthodoxy:<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #8899a6; font-family: "helvetica neue" , sans-serif; font-size: 12px; text-align: center; white-space: nowrap;"></span><br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #8899a6; font-family: "helvetica neue" , sans-serif; font-size: 12px; text-align: center; white-space: nowrap;">On Farmer. One cannot just ignore an equation (the Phillips curve), and replace it by another. 😩 Does anybody doubt that if the Fed decreased u rate down to 1%, it would not lead to more inflation? P curve relation is complex and shifting, but it is there. Sorry Roger... <a href="https://t.co/ewy09sTg7i">https://t.co/ewy09sTg7i</a></span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #8899a6; font-family: "helvetica neue" , sans-serif; font-size: 12px; text-align: center; white-space: nowrap;">— Olivier Blanchard (@ojblanchard1) <a href="https://twitter.com/ojblanchard1/status/1154659853446590464?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">July 26, 2019</a></span></blockquote>
If you've followed my writings over the years, you'll not be surprised to learn that I am sympathetic to Roger's position in this debate. Below, I explain why. I begin by summarizing the gist of the conventional view. I then present a simple model that has no "natural" rate of unemployment. It's not exactly Roger's model, but it captures what I think is the essential part of his argument.<br />
<br />
Let me now review. According to conventional (e.g., New-Keynesian, but also other) theory, there exists a "natural rate of unemployment" that potentially moves around owing to "structural" factors. The long-run rate of inflation is assumed to be fixed by policy in some unspecified manner. In an economy free of any disturbances, actual (and expected) inflation correspond to the long-run inflation target and the unemployment rate corresponds to the natural rate of unemployment. There is also a "natural" (or "neutral") real rate of interest that corresponds to the natural rate of unemployment. Absent any economic disturbances, monetary policy is assumed to set "the" nominal interest rate to its natural rate (the natural real rate of interest plus the inflation rate).<br />
<br />
The actual rate of unemployment fluctuates around this natural rate owing to "shocks" that influence the aggregate demand for goods and services. I like to think of these shocks as "news" shocks that cause expectations over the future profitability of investment to fluctuate over time (see, for example, <a href="http://people.bu.edu/amckay/pdfs/krusell.pdf">here</a>). It does not matter for my purpose here whether expectations react rationally or irrationally to this information flow. The important thing is when people collectively become more bullish over the future return to investment, the demand for investment rises (at the expense of other forms of storing value, like government paper). For this reason, I attach the conventional label "aggregate demand shocks."<br />
<br />
In the conventional model, fluctuations in aggregate demand for fixed nominal interest rate generate a negative relationship between inflation and unemployment. Intuitively, if firms have a bullish outlook, they raise their product prices more aggressively against the higher expected demand, and they also recruit more aggressively as well, which sends the unemployment rate lower. Adjustments in the interest rate (via monetary policy) designed to stabilize the inflation rate would imply movements in the unemployment rate without any corresponding change in inflation. All of this is consistent with the model I present below.<br />
<br />
What about the question posed by Blanchard above: "Does anybody doubt that if the Fed decreased (unemployment) to 1%, it would not lead to more inflation?"<br />
<br />
It's not entirely clear what experiment he has in mind. An educated guess suggests he's thinking about the Fed temporarily reducing its policy rate, causing a temporary boom in aggregate demand, leading to a temporary increase in inflation and a temporary decline in unemployment, with everything returning to normal once the Fed returns its policy rate to its "neutral" level. My answer to his question is that probably few people doubt this is what is likely to happen. Accepting this, however, does not validate the notion that "low unemployment causes high inflation." (Note: I am not accusing Blanchard of suggesting this causal relation, but many if not most people interpret the Phillips curve in exactly this way).<br />
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What I would like to ask Blanchard is the following. What do you think would happen to inflation and unemployment if the central bank lowered its policy rate <i>permanently</i>? I think the answer to this question would illuminate the "natural rate" hypotheses assumed by theorists, as well as what they are implicitly assuming about the conduct of fiscal policy (i.e., how it reacts to the change in monetary policy).<br />
<br />
Let me now describe a simple OLG model (a model taught to me by Blanchard via his <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/lectures-macroeconomics">textbook</a> with Stan Fischer). I will keep the wonkishness to a minimum here. If you want the full-blown version, just email me and I'll send it to you.<br />
<br />
Individuals live for two periods in a sequence of overlapping generations. There are young entrepreneurs and young workers. Young entrepreneurs expend recruiting effort to find suitable young workers. The probability of finding a match is increasing in recruiting effort. A match, if it is formed, produces output in the following period. In this sense, recruitment effort is like an investment: a current expense leads to an expected future payoff. For the entrepreneur, the expected payoff depends in obvious ways on the expected productivity of the match (news) and the worker's bargaining power.<br />
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Young entrepreneurs face a trade-off: they can devote their resources to recruitment investment, or toward purchasing an alternative store of value in the form of interest-bearing government money (or debt). For a given inflation rate and a given nominal interest rate (both determined by policy), the optimal recruiting intensity trades off the expected return to recruiting relative to the real (inflation adjusted) return on government debt. In a steady-state, the inflation rate in my model is determined by the rate of growth of nominal debt, which is injected into the economy as lump-sum social security payments. The interest expense on the debt is financed with a lump-sum tax on old entrepreneurs.<br />
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The aggregate recruiting effort (which I associate with job vacancies) determines the unemployment rate. The model generates a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve. The equilibrium unemployment rate is: (1) decreasing in the inflation rate; (2) increasing in the nominal interest rate; (3) increasing in the bargaining power of workers; and (4) decreasing in the level of "optimism."<br />
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There is no "natural" rate of unemployment in this model in the sense of the unemployment rate necessarily reverting ("self-correcting") to a given "natural" rate over a long enough period of time. Monetary and fiscal policy in this model can result in many different "natural" rates of unemployment (and interest). So, in this model, it is indeed possible for policy to drive the unemployment rate to permanently low levels without any inflationary consequences (since inflation is determined by the rate of growth of nominal debt in the long-run).<br />
<br />
I should add that the model can speak to the effect of worker bargaining power on inflation as well. A permanent increase in worker bargaining power has no effect on inflation--it simply increases the real wage (and unemployment). In terms of an impulse-response function following a surprise increase in bargaining power, the mechanism works as follows. The increase in bargaining power reduces the expected return to recruiting workers, hence reduces recruiting investment. There is a portfolio substitution out of private investment activities into government securities. The implied increase in the demand for real money balances has the effect of driving the price-level down (for a given stock of nominal debt and assuming no change in the policy rate). So, increased worker bargaining power is disinflationary in the short run, but has no effect on inflation in the long run.<br />
<br />
Let me conclude. One purpose of this post was to demonstrate that models without a "natural rate" hypothesis are not that unconventional--I cobbled the model above based on what I learned from standard textbooks, after all. Roger has shown another way to do this that does not stray too far (in my view, at least) from conventional theory either. These models may or may not turn out to be useful ways for understanding basic elements of the macroeconomy and for informing policy--I do not yet know for sure. But I do believe they are worth exploring further and I commend Roger for leading the way!<br />
<br /></div>
David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-70664075131496971372019-07-15T08:16:00.000-07:002019-07-15T08:23:41.886-07:00Does the Phillips Curve Live in Europe?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-yQ0IsT6SXTY/XSyQjzV3l_I/AAAAAAAAD0c/-hDP21oao60apj13FmApIh7u5Qbw1ps6QCLcBGAs/s1600/PC.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="393" data-original-width="384" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-yQ0IsT6SXTY/XSyQjzV3l_I/AAAAAAAAD0c/-hDP21oao60apj13FmApIh7u5Qbw1ps6QCLcBGAs/s320/PC.png" width="312" /></a>There's been much talk about the Phillips curve lately, especially in the wake of Jay Powell's recent testimony before Congress. Many people are proclaiming the death of the Phillips curve. I think that many people making these proclamations are probably wrong--or, more likely--they are correct, but for the wrong reasons.<br />
<br />
What exactly is being proclaimed dead here? Are people referring to the absence of any statistical correlation between inflation and unemployment? Or are they referring to the <i>theory</i> that the unemployment rate (beyond some "natural" rate) <i>causes</i> inflation? These are two conceptually different notions of the Phillips curve. The fact that the Phillips curve is "flat" does not in itself negate the Phillips curve theory of inflation. This is because monetary policy and other factors (like expected inflation) could shift the position of the curve over time.<br />
<br />
My own preferred theory of inflation does not rely on the unemployment rate <i>per se</i>. I think that the long-run inflation rate is determined by monetary and fiscal policy and that fluctuations in "aggregate demand" can generate countercyclical movements in inflation and unemployment (or procyclical movements in inflation and employment in a "full-employment" economy). But this is not a post on the theory of inflation. It's just about the statistical properties of the Phillips curve in the European Monetary Union. (In my previous post I talked about the Phillips curve in the United States, see <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-phillips-curve-in-recession-and.html">here</a>.)<br />
<br />
Restricting attention to the EMU is of some interest here because individual member countries do not have direct control over monetary policy (although some countries may have greater influence than others). If (say) the Austrian economy goes into recession, it's not like the ECB will cut its policy rate just for the sake of Austria. So, to the extent that unemployment rates across EMU members states are not perfectly correlated, one might be in a better position to identify a conventional Phillips curve relationship. Below, I report the Phillips curve for all 19 member states and for the EMU as a whole. In this data, the negative relationship seems apparent in all but a few cases. I'll leave it up to the reader to draw his or her own conclusions.<br />
<br />
PS. Antoine Levy points me to his paper showing an even stronger relationship at the regional level; see here: <a href="http://economics.mit.edu/files/16976">http://economics.mit.edu/files/16976</a><br />
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David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-34992026543546555372019-06-21T06:30:00.005-07:002019-06-21T09:04:40.903-07:00The Phillips Curve in Recession and Recovery<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
The Phillips curve can mean one of two conceptually distinct things (which are sometimes confused). First, the Phillips curve may simply refer to a <i>statistical</i> property of the data--for example, <i>what</i> is the correlation between inflation and unemployment (either unconditionally, or controlling for a set of factors)? Second, the Phillips curve may refer to a <i>theoretical</i> mechanism--<i>why</i> does inflation and unemployment exhibit the statistical properties it does?<br />
<br />
The presumption among many is that statistical Phillips curves tend to be negatively sloped, suggesting a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. A standard theoretical interpretation of this negative relationship is that a high level of unemployment means that aggregate demand is low, so that firms feel less inclined to increase the price of their goods and services. Conversely, when unemployment is low, aggregate demand is high, allowing firms to raise their prices at a faster rate.<br />
<br />
The problem is that statistical Phillips curves are not always negatively sloped. In fact, sometimes they appear to be positively sloped. Over long periods of time, the data looks like a shotgun blast (i.e., zero correlation). In a <a href="https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb16-1.pdf">recent empirical study</a>, however, Blanchard (2016) claims that the Phillips curve is alive (though perhaps not so well) in the U.S. data. Among other things, he reports that:<br />
<ol style="text-align: left;">
<li>Low unemployment still pushes inflation up; high unemployment pushes it down. </li>
<li>The slope of the Phillips curve, i.e., the effect of the unemployment rate on inflation given expected inflation, has
substantially declined. But the decline dates back to the 1980s rather than to the crisis. There is no evidence of a
further decline during the crisis.</li>
</ol>
Some economists reason that the theoretical Phillips curve only <i>appears</i> flat these days because monetary policy is successfully keeping inflation close to target. If a central bank can hit its target inflation rate perfectly, then it's no surprise that measured fluctuations in unemployment will have no statistical relationship with inflation. There's probably something to this argument.<br />
<br />
Whatever the explanation, it will have to account for what I think is an interesting asymmetry in the statistical Phillips curve. In particular, the U.S. Phillips curve appears to be negatively sloped when unemployment is rising (as in a recession) and is either flat or even positively sloped when unemployment is falling (as in a recovery).<br />
<br />
In what follows, I measure inflation as the monthly year-over-year change in the PCE, averaged at the quarterly frequency. The unemployment rate is the quarterly civilian unemployment rate. I look at U.S. data 1980:1 - 2019:1. Here's what the data looks like.<br />
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tJBuSLwi0UU/XP1T5_G5lBI/AAAAAAAADyY/fJFkyfDxqDovdHXy0V1rsw_AvrHRAxNPQCLcBGAs/s1600/Fig1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="374" data-original-width="521" height="286" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tJBuSLwi0UU/XP1T5_G5lBI/AAAAAAAADyY/fJFkyfDxqDovdHXy0V1rsw_AvrHRAxNPQCLcBGAs/s400/Fig1.png" width="400" /></a></div>
I define "recession" as quarters in which the unemployment rate is trending up and "recovery" as quarters in which the unemployment rate is trending down. I divide the sample above into four recession-recovery subsamples. In effect, I plot the Phillips curve conditional on whether the unemployment rate is rising or falling. A full analysis should also control for monetary policy and inflation expectations, but I leave that for another day. Here is what I find.<br />
<br />
<b>Episode 1. Recession 1981:1 - 1982:4 and Recovery 1983:1 - 1990:2</b><br />
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-dYTCuaIsWNw/XP1V9-UuP9I/AAAAAAAADyk/RwOgkQlGjJIFWyFyCy3tN4r2g-yM0brTQCLcBGAs/s1600/Fig2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="374" data-original-width="522" height="286" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-dYTCuaIsWNw/XP1V9-UuP9I/AAAAAAAADyk/RwOgkQlGjJIFWyFyCy3tN4r2g-yM0brTQCLcBGAs/s400/Fig2.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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<b>Episode 2. Recession 1990:3 - 1992:3 and Recovery 1992:4 - 2000:4</b><br />
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<b><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-vyFGtTLMezA/XP1YTVSafbI/AAAAAAAADyw/xkgXznR2GtMgQEL-5R-8B4PmmZC5MSEAgCLcBGAs/s1600/Fig3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="374" data-original-width="521" height="286" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-vyFGtTLMezA/XP1YTVSafbI/AAAAAAAADyw/xkgXznR2GtMgQEL-5R-8B4PmmZC5MSEAgCLcBGAs/s400/Fig3.png" width="400" /></a></b></div>
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<b><br /></b></div>
<b> <b>Episode 3. Recession 2001:1 - 2003:3 and Recovery 2003:4 - 2006:4</b></b><br />
<b></b>
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<b><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-QnzbcXQNaTk/XP1YToz8TRI/AAAAAAAADy4/N1Tx2T8FyToDQxsXBWXMELLkgLE1DBA1gCLcBGAs/s1600/Fig4.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="374" data-original-width="521" height="286" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-QnzbcXQNaTk/XP1YToz8TRI/AAAAAAAADy4/N1Tx2T8FyToDQxsXBWXMELLkgLE1DBA1gCLcBGAs/s400/Fig4.png" width="400" /></a></b></div>
<b>
</b>
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<b>
<b>Episode 4. Recession 2007:1 - 2009:4 and Recovery 2010:1 - 2019:1</b><b><br /></b></b><b></b><br />
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<b><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0sXRUATmb0s/XP1YT3x3t0I/AAAAAAAADzA/5cFwCsNam6o04-mXdjNZW3dinmjzRZKTgCLcBGAs/s1600/Fig5.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="374" data-original-width="523" height="285" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0sXRUATmb0s/XP1YT3x3t0I/AAAAAAAADzA/5cFwCsNam6o04-mXdjNZW3dinmjzRZKTgCLcBGAs/s400/Fig5.png" width="400" /></a></b></div>
<b>
</b>
So it seems that the Phillips curve <i>is</i> alive and well -- but only in recessionary periods. Recessions in the United States tend to be sharp and short-lived. The unemployment rate displays a well-known cyclical asymmetry (something that labor-market search theory accounts for in a natural way; e.g., see <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/136240?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">here</a>). Whatever it is that drives the unemployment rate sharply higher seems to release a disinflationary force that is not immediately mitigated by monetary and fiscal policy.<br />
<br />
At the same time, it seems that the Phillips curve is dead -- at least, once the dust has settled and the economy enters into its typical recovery and expansion phase. (Or does the Phillips curve only appear flat because monetary policy tends to tighten policy over the recovery phase?)<br />
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<b>Policy Implications?</b><br />
<br />
What does this imply about the conduct of monetary policy? Well, we have to be careful, of course. But to my eye, the evidence above suggests that the Fed need not worry about letting the unemployment rate decline as far as it wants during a period of economic expansion. The specter of a sharp spike in future inflation because unemployment is too low seems nowhere evident in the data (see also <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/third-quarter-2017/does-low-unemployment-signal-a-meaningful-rise-in-inflation#endnotes">Bullard 2017</a>). In addition, we do not know where the so-called "natural" rate of unemployment resides at any given point in time, assuming that such an object even exists.<br />
<br />
In the present environment, I think one might even be inclined to let inflation fluctuate below the target rate--in other words, treat the target rate as a soft ceiling when the economy is expanding. Trying to induce inflation higher during an expansion phase seems strange (imprudent?) to me for a couple of reasons.<br />
<br />
First, what is the point of purposely taking an action that could be construed as making the cost-of-living grow more rapidly over time? How is such an action to be justified, apart from fulfilling an apparent desire on the part of a small number of technocrats to maintain "credibility" of the "symmetric" inflation target? There may be ways to justify persistent inflation overshooting following a period of persistent undershooting (e.g., if the goal is price-level targeting). But the arguments I've heard made in this regard are probably too subtle to communicate effectively and persuasively. If so, then why not just let inflation fluctuate between 0-2%. It's not like we can measure it with precision in any case (a point former Vice Chair Stan Fischer was fond of repeating).<br />
<br />
Second, modern day central banks were built for the purpose of keeping a lid on inflation--they were not built to promote it. The present projected trajectory of deficit-spending will almost surely, sooner or later (<a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-failure-to-inflate-japan.html">Japan notwithstanding</a>), generate inflationary pressure. (If it doesn't, then please just keep cutting taxes and increasing spending.) So again, it seems that the Fed (and the U.S. economy) might be better served by viewing 2% inflation as a soft ceiling--something to defend only in the event that inflation begins to wander significantly and persistently away from 2% (or whatever number one has in mind) in normal times. Let the fiscal authority have the fiscal space it wants/needs as long as inflation remains low.<br />
<br />
Recessions, when they hit, tend to appear suddenly and unpredictably. Forecasting the precise date of a recession is a mug's game. Estimating recession probabilities seems more art than science. Perhaps the best that monetary policy can do is to be prepared to act quickly and decisively when the unemployment rate starts rising rapidly. If recent history is a guide, a sharp recession is likely to release a strong disinflationary impulse (<a href="https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/2015-09-08/a-model-of-u-s-monetary-policy-before-and-after-the-great-recession.pdf">related theory paper</a>). In the old days, we might have labeled this a "money demand shock." Today, it is more likely to be described as a "flight to safety shock"--i.e., the safety of U.S. dollars and Treasury securities. I don't think it's particularly helpful to say that high unemployment is causing low inflation--the direction of causality may working in the opposite direction (a high demand for money/debt is causing low inflation). But either way, the appropriate policy response likely entails an accommodating expansion in the supply of money/debt.<br />
<br />
<br /></div>
David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8702840202604739302.post-88177928294414501242019-05-25T18:22:00.000-07:002019-06-02T12:57:14.567-07:00Is the U.S. budget deficit sustainable?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
The U.S. federal budget deficit for 2018 came in just shy of $800 billion, or about 4% of the gross domestic product (the primary deficit, which excludes the interest expense of the debt, was about 3% of GDP).<br />
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As the figure above shows, the present level of deficit spending (as a ratio of GDP) is not too far off from where has been in the 1970s and 1980s. It's also not too far off from where it was in the early 2000s (although, the peaks back then were associated with recessions).<br />
<br />
Of course, the question people are asking is whether deficits of this magnitude can be sustained into the foreseeable future without economic consequences (like higher inflation). In this post, I suggest that the answer to this question is yes, but just barely. If I am correct, then any new government expenditure program will have to come at the expense of some other program, or be funded through higher taxes. Let me explain my reasoning.<br />
<br />
<b>The Arithmetic of Government Spending and Finance</b><br />
<br />
I begin with some basic arithmetic (I describe <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2019/03/sustainable-deficits.html">here</a> where theory comes in). Let <span style="color: red;">G</span> denote government expenditures and let <span style="color: red;">T</span> denote government tax revenue. Then the <i>primary deficit</i> is defined as <span style="color: red;">S = G - T</span> ( if <span style="color: red;">S < 0</span>, then we have a <i>primary surplus </i>). The absolute magnitudes involved have little meaning--it turns out to be more useful to measure a growing deficit relative to the size of a growing economy. Let <span style="color: red;">Y</span> denote the gross domestic product (the total income generated in the economy). The deficit-to-GDP ratio is then given by <span style="color: red;">(S/Y)</span>. In what follows, I will assume that this ratio is expected to remain constant over the indefinite future (this is what a "sustainable" budget deficit means.)<br />
<br />
Let <span style="color: red;">D</span> denote the outstanding stock of government "debt." For countries that issue debt representing claims to their own currency and permit their currency to float in foreign exchange markets, attaching the label "debt" to these objects--like U.S. Treasury securities--is somewhat misleading. The better analog in this case is equity. Companies that finance acquisitions or expenditure through equity do not have to worry about bankruptcy. They may have to worry about diluting the value of existing shareholders if they over-issue equity, or use it to finance negative NPV projects. The same is true of the U.S. federal government (but not state or local governments). The risk of over-issuing treasury debt is not default--it is share dilution (i.e., inflation).<br />
<br />
Let <span style="color: red;">R</span> denote the <i>gross</i> yield on debt (so that <span style="color: red;">R - 1</span> is the <i>net</i> interest rate). If we interpret <span style="color: red;">D</span> as currency, then <span style="color: red;">R = 1</span> (currency has a zero net yield). If we interpret <span style="color: red;">D</span> as U.S. Treasury debt, then <span style="color: red;">R = 1.025</span> (UST debt has an average net yield of around 2.5%). Note that in some jurisdictions today, government debt has a <i>negative</i> yield (so, <span style="color: red;">R < 1</span> ) -- that is, government "debt" is in this case an income-generating asset!<br />
<br />
Alright, back to the arithmetic. Let <span style="color: red;">D'</span> denote the stock of debt inherited from the previous period that is due interest today. The interest expense of this debt is given by <span style="color: red;">(R - 1)D'</span> (the interest expense of currency is zero). The primary deficit plus interest expense must be financed with new debt <span style="color: red;">D - D'</span>, where <span style="color: red;">D </span>represents the stock of debt today and <span style="color: red;">D'</span> represents the stock of debt yesterday. Our simple arithmetic tells us that the following must be true:<br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">[1] S + (R - 1)D' = D - D'</span><br />
<br />
Let me rewrite [1] as:<br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">[2] S = D - RD'</span><br />
<br />
Now, let's divide through by <span style="color: red;">Y</span> in [2] to get:<br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">[3] (S/Y) = (D/Y) - </span><span style="color: red;">R(D'/Y)</span><br />
<br />
We're almost there. Notice that <span style="color: red;">(D'/Y) = (D'/Y')(Y'/Y)</span>. [I want to say that this is just high school math...except that my son came to me the other night with a homework question I could not answer. If you're not good at math, I understand your pain. But if you need some help, don't be afraid to ask someone. Like my son, for example.]<br />
<br />
Define <span style="color: red;">n = (Y/Y')</span>, the (gross) rate at which the nominal GDP grows over time. In my calculations below, I'm going to assume <span style="color: red;">n = 1.05</span>, that is 5% growth. Implicitly, I'm assuming 2-3% real growth and 2-3% inflation, but I don't think what I have to say below depends on what is driving NGDP growth. In any case, let's combine <span style="color: red;">(D'/Y) = (D'/Y')(Y'/Y)</span> and<span style="color: red;"> </span><span style="color: red;">n = (Y/Y') </span>with [3] to form:<br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">[4] (S/Y) = </span><span style="color: red;">(D/Y)</span><span style="color: red;"> - (</span><span style="color: red;">R/n)(D'/Y')</span><br />
<br />
One last step: assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio remains constant over time; i.e., <span style="color: red;">(D'/Y') = </span><span style="color: red;">(D/Y). </span>Again, I impose this condition to characterize what is "sustainable." Combining this stationarity condition with [4] yields:<br />
<span style="color: red;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: red;">[*] (S/Y) = [1 - R</span><span style="color: red;">/n ]</span><span style="color: red;">(D/Y)</span><br />
<br />
Condition [*] says that the deficit-to-GDP ratio is proportional to the the debt-to-GDP ratio, with the factor of proportionality given by <span style="color: red;">[1 - R</span><span style="color: red;">/n ]. </span>This latter object is positive if <span style="color: red;">R < n</span> and negative if <span style="color: red;">R > n</span>.<br />
<br />
<b>The Mainstream View</b><br />
<br />
There is no such thing as "the" mainstream view, of course. But I think it's fair to say that in thinking about the sustainability of government budget deficits, many economists implicitly assume that <span style="color: red;">R > n</span>. In this case, condition [*] says that if the outstanding stock of government debt is positive (<span style="color: red;">D > 0</span>), then sustainable deficits are impossible. Indeed, what is needed is a sustainable primary budget <i>surplus</i> to service the interest expense of the debt.<br />
<br />
The condition <span style="color: red;">R > n</span> is a perfectly reasonable assumption for any entity that does not control or influence the money supply: state and local governments, emerging economies that issue dollar-denominated debt, EMU countries that issue debt in euros, federal governments that abide by the gold standard or delegate control of the money supply to an independent central bank with a preference for tight monetary policy.<br />
<br />
The only exception to this that a mainstream economist might make is for the case of "debt" in the form of currency. The seigniorage revenue generated by currency (zero-interest debt), however, is typically considered to be small potatoes. Consider the United States, for example. Let's interpret <span style="color: red;">D</span> as currency. Currency in circulation is presently around $1.7 trillion, almost 10% of GDP. So let's set <span style="color: red;">(D/Y) = 0.10</span>, <span style="color: red;">R = 1</span>, and <span style="color: red;">n = 1.05</span> in equation [*]. If I've done my math correctly, I get <span style="color: red;">(S/Y) = 0.0025</span>, or (1/4)% of GDP. That's about <b>$100 billion</b>. This may not sound like "small potatoes" to you and me, but it is for a government whose expenditures in 2018 totaled about <b>$4 trillion</b>.<br />
<br />
<b>The New and Modern Monetarist View</b><br />
<br />
I think of "monetarists" as those who view money and banking as critical factors in determining macroeconomic activity. I'm thinking, for example, of people like Friedman, Tobin, Wallace, <a href="https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2010/07/01/new-monetarist-economics-methods/">Williamson and Wright</a> (old and new monetarists) on the mainstream side and, for example, Godley, Minksy, Wray, Fullwiler on the <a href="https://alittleecon.wordpress.com/academic-mmt/">MMT</a> (and other heterodox) side. A common ground shared by new/modern monetarists is the view of treasury debt as a form of money; i.e., the difference between (say) U.S. Treasury debt and Federal Reserve money is more of degree than in kind. Consider, for example, the following two objects:<br />
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Can you spot the difference? The first one was issued by the U.S. Treasury and the second one by the Federal Reserve (the promised redemption for silver has long since been suspended). The Fed is said to "monetize the debt" when it replaces the top bill with the bottom bill. Is it any wonder why the BoJ cannot create inflation by swapping zero-interest BoJ reserves for zero-interest JGBs? (In case you're interested, see my piece <a href="http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-failure-to-inflate-japan.html">here</a>.)<br />
<br />
In any case, rightly or wrongly, U.S. government policy presently renders the treasury bill illiquid (in the sense that it cannot easily be used to make payments). Of course, while the treasury bill no longer exists in physical form, every U.S. person can acquire the electronic version of (interest-bearing) T-bills at <a href="http://www.treasurydirect.gov/">www.treasurydirect.gov</a>. Just don't expect to be able to pay your rent or groceries with your treasury accounts any time soon. (Though, as I have argued elsewhere, it would be a simple matter to integrate treasury direct accounts with a real-time gross settlement payment system.)<br />
<br />
But even if treasury securities cannot be used to make everyday payments, they are still liquid in the sense of being readily convertible into money on secondary markets (and maybe one day, on a Fed standing repo facility, as Jane Ihrig and I suggest <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/march/why-fed-create-standing-repo-facility">here</a> and <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/april/fed-standing-repo-facility-follow-up">here</a>). USTs are used widely as collateral in credit derivative and repo markets -- they constitute a form of wholesale money. Because they are safe and liquid securities, they can trade at a premium. A high price means a low yield and, in particular, <span style="color: red;">R < n</span> is a distinct possibility for these types of securities.<br />
<br />
In fact, <span style="color: red;">R < n</span> seems to be the typical case for the United States.<br />
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-z_jQ-H6Rapk/XOmMT6pplyI/AAAAAAAADxU/PFwWcFiwenMuwgDSN1pkIlrupxpsfQu4ACLcBGAs/s1600/fig3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="433" data-original-width="693" height="248" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-z_jQ-H6Rapk/XOmMT6pplyI/AAAAAAAADxU/PFwWcFiwenMuwgDSN1pkIlrupxpsfQu4ACLcBGAs/s400/fig3.png" width="400" /></a></div>
The only exception in this sample is in the early 1980s -- the consequence of Volcker's attempt to reign in inflation.<br />
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But if this is the case, then the mainstream view has long neglected a source of seigniorage revenue beyond that generated by currency. Low-yielding debt can also serve as a revenue device, as made clear by condition [*] above. How much is this added seigniorage revenue worth to the U.S. government?<br />
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Let's do the arithmetic. For the United States, the (gross) debt-to-GDP ratio is now about 105%, so let's set <span style="color: red;">(D/Y) = 1.0</span>. Let's be optimistic here and assume that the average yield on USTs going forward will average around 2%, so <span style="color: red;">R = 1.02</span>. As before, assume NGDP growth of 5%, or <span style="color: red;">n = 1.05</span>. Condition [*] then yields <span style="color: red;">(S/Y) = 0.03</span>, or 3% of GDP. That's about <b>$600 billion</b>.<br />
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$600 billion is considerably more than $100 billion, but it's still small relative to an expenditure of $4 trillion. And, indeed, since the budget deficit is presently running at around $800 billion, there seems little scope to increase it without inducing inflationary pressure. (Note: by "increase it" I mean <i>increase it relative to GDP</i>. In the examples above, the debt and deficit all grow with GDP at 5% per year).<br />
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<b>Conclusion</b><br />
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What does this mean for fiscal policy going forward? The main conclusion is that the present rate of deficit spending and high level of debt-to-GDP is not something to be alarmed about (especially with inflation running below 2%). The national debt can, will, and probably should continue to grow indefinitely along with the economy. What matters more is how expenditures are directed and how taxes are collected. Of course, this should be done with an eye to keeping long-term inflation in check.<br />
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What deserves our immediate attention, in my view, is a re-examination of the mechanisms through which government spending (when, where and how much) is determined. This is not the place to get into details, but suffice it to say that one should hope that our elected representatives have a capacity to reason effectively, have a broad understanding of history, are willing to listen, and do not view humility and compromise as four-letter words or signs of personal weakness. If we don't have this, then we have much deeper problems to deal with than the national debt or deficits.<br />
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Once the spending priorities have been established, the question of finance needs to be addressed. If the level of spending is less than 2% of GDP, then explicit taxes can be set to zero--seigniorage revenue should suffice. However, if we're talking 20% of GDP then tax revenue is necessary (at least, if the desired inflation target is to remain at 2%). If the tax system is inefficient and cannot be changed, this may mean cutting back on desired programs. Ideally, of course, the tax system could be redesigned to minimize inefficiencies and distortions. But tax considerations are likely always to remain in some form and, because this is the case, they should be taken into consideration when evaluating the net social payoff to any new expenditure program.<br />
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David Andolfattohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12138572028306561024noreply@blogger.com13